Justia Iowa Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court granting Plaintiff's petition for mandamus and ordering the City of Ottumwa to disclose names of all persons who had and had not been issued automated traffic enforcement (ATE) citations by the City after their vehicles were detected as speeding by an ATE camera, holding that the district court erred in ordering the production of records whose disclosure was prohibited by the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2721-2725, and a corresponding Iowa state law, Iowa Code 321.11.In denying the request for names, the City argued that the DPPA and section 321.11 prohibited disclosure of the requested information. The district court disagreed, concluding that the names of speed regulation violators was information on driving violations and therefore was not confidential information under the DPPA or section 321.11. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that where the personal identifying information sought by Petitioner came from a vehicle registration and driver's license database, its public disclosure was presumptively prohibited under the DPPA and section 321.11. View "Milligan v. Ottumwa Police Department" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of driving while intoxicated, holding that Defendant was not seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment or Iowa Const. art. I, 8 when the officer approached Defendant on foot the evening of her arrest.An officer watched a vehicle driving suspiciously for several minutes in a residential neighborhood at night. When the vehicle entered a one-lane alley and did not emerge from the alley, the officer approached the stopped vehicle without activating flashers. The officer walked up to Defendant, the driver, to engage in a conversation, which resulted in the officer learning that Defendant was under the influence of alcohol. Defendant was convicted of driving while intoxicated. Defendant appealed, arguing that she was seized in violation of her rights under the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 8. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Defendant was not subjected to a seizure in the constitutional sense. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that no seizure occurred under either the state or federal constitution. View "State v. Fogg" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the decision of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's conviction and remanding the case for a new trial, holding that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to a jury instruction on the outdated version of the "stand your ground" justification and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding character evidence of the victim.A jury found Defendant guilty of murder. During trial, Defendant asserted the justification of self-defense and defense of others. On appeal, the court of appeals held (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain character evidence of the victim, (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction, but (3) the outdated justification instruction was prejudicial. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' decision in part and affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding (1) trial counsel was not ineffective for not objecting to the instruction because engaging in an illegal activity disqualified Defendant from asserting stand-your-ground justification; and (2) the character evidence at issue was properly excluded because Defendant was unaware of the victim's specific conduct. View "State v. Baltazar" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction for sexual abuse in the second degree and lascivious acts with a child, holding that there was no error in the trial court's evidentiary rulings.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain evidence proffered by Defendant; (2) the district court did not err in admitting certain hearsay testimony under the medical diagnosis or treatment exception to the general rule; and (3) even if defense counsel breached an essential duty in failing to object to certain hearsay testimony the admission of the testimony did not amount to constitutional prejudice. View "State v. Walker" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to suppress all evidence stemming from a stop of his vehicle, holding that the district court erred in finding that the deputy developed reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity before unreasonably prolonging the stop.After Defendant was stopped for violating Iowa Code 321.297(2) the deputy asked Defendant and his passenger questions. Finding the answers suspicious, the deputy sought permission for a consent search. Defendant consented. After a search of the car, the deputy located more than eighty pounds of marijuana in the trunk. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence, which the district court denied. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the delay of Defendant's stop was measurable, unreasonable, and in violation of Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. View "State v. Salcedo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment convicting Defendant of first-degree murder, holding that Defendant's Sixth Amendment rights of confrontation or compulsory process were not violated when the district court refused to permit Defendant during trial to call a witness who intended to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination on all questions.In his retrial for murder, Defendant sought to call a witness so that the jury could him him "take the Fifth" and thus infer the witness's guilt. The district court refused to permit Defendant to call the witness because, pursuant to State v. Bedwell, 417 N.W.2d 66 (Iowa 1987), the jury is not entitled to draw inferences favorable to the defense from a witness's decision to exercise his constitutional privilege. The court of appeals reversed, distinguishing Bedwell on grounds that the witness had testified in Defendant's prior trial and the district court failed to ascertain the scope of his privilege question by question. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' decision and affirmed the district court, holding (1) under the circumstances, Bedwell provides a categorical rule against compelling the witness to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege in front of the jury; and (2) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his remaining allegations of error. View "State v. Heard" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's sentence in connection with her Alford plea to four counts of child endangerment entered pursuant to a plea agreement, holding that the State breached the plea agreement with Defendant and that Defendant's original counsel was ineffective for failing to object.On appeal, Defendant argued that, pursuant to the plea agreement between the parties, the State was obligated to jointly recommend a deferred judgment. Instead, at the sentencing hearing, the State recommended, and the court imposed, a two-year suspended prison sentence without objection from defense counsel. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence. Thereafter, amendments to Iowa Code 814.6 and 814.7, enacted in Senate File 589, were signed into law and became effective. The State argued before the Supreme Court that Senate File 589 foreclosed relief in this appeal. The Supreme Court held (1) sections 814.6 and 814.7, as amended, do not apply to a direct appeal from a judgment and sentence entered before July 1, 2019; and (2) the State breached the plea agreement and Defendant's counsel was ineffective. The Supreme Court remanded the case for the State's specific performance of the plea agreement and resentencing by a different judge. View "State v. Macke" on Justia Law

In this civil action filed against the police investigator, the prosecutors, and the municipalities that investigated and prosecuted a criminal case in which Plaintiff was eventually acquitted the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court denying Defendants' motions to dismiss, holding that the district court erred in concluding that Baldwin v. City of Estherville, 951 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 2018), displaced the judicial process immunity.Specifically, the Court held (1) the district court erred in part in denying the prosecutor defendants' motion to dismiss because the judicial process immunity barred all claims in the petition against the prosecutors and the county except for a claim relating to an ethics complaint; and (2) the district court correctly denied the motion to dismiss with respect to the police defendants' argument regarding the judicial process immunity but erred in denying the police defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's defamation claim. View "Venckus v. City of Iowa City" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the district court granting summary judgment to Defendants on all claims in this employment case, holding (1) Plaintiff's direct civil action under Iowa Code 70A.28(5), the whistleblower statute, is not precluded by the availability of an administrative remedy; and (2) the district court correctly granted summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims of age discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional distress.Specifically, the Court held (1) section 70A.28(5) expressly creates an independent cause of action in the alternative to administrative remedies under Iowa Code chapter 17A, and therefore, the district court erred when it determined that judicial review following the administrative process was the exclusive means to seek redress for alleged retaliation against a whistleblower; (2) the district court did not err in determining that Plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer age discrimination was the real reason for Plaintiff's termination; and (3) the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim because none of Defendants' conduct was sufficiently egregious to satisfy the "outrageousness" prong. View "Hedlund v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence discovered by law enforcement after a stop of Defendant's automobile that resulted in her arrest for driving while barred, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress.Specifically, the Court held (1) Defendant was not subject to an impermissible pretextual seizure because the subjective motivations of an individual officer in making a traffic stop are irrelevant as long as the officer has objectively reasonable cause to believe the motorist violated a traffic law; (2) Defendant's stop was supported by reasonable suspicion; and (3) Defendant's claim that her trial court provided ineffective assistance for declining to challenge whether the vehicle's license plate was malfunctioning failed on the merits. View "State v. Haas" on Justia Law