Justia Iowa Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana as an accommodation offense. Defendant was previously convicted of simple possession of marijuana. Defendant requested a sentencing hearing to determine whether he should be sentenced for a serious misdemeanor or an aggravated misdemeanor. The district court concluded the plain language of Iowa Code 124.410 and 124.401(5) provided Defendant be sentenced for a serious misdemeanor. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and sentence imposed by the district court, holding that the court did not misinterpret or misapply sections 124.401(5) and 124.410 when it sentenced Defendant for a serious misdemeanor under the circumstances presented here. View "State v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Police officers initiated an investigatory encounter with William DeWitt in Walmart based initially on information provided to them by a confidential informant. The officers decided to confront DeWitt and take him outside to his car to talk to him about their suspicion he was selling drugs. One or both of the officers took DeWitt by the arm. DeWitt broke free from their grasp, and the officers responded by taking him to the ground and handcuffing him. DeWitt was subsequently convicted of possession with intent to deliver, violation of the drug stamp act, and interference with official acts. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying DeWitt's motion to suppress, as the officers' conduct in physically restraining DeWitt was not a violation of his right to be protected from unreasonable seizures under the state and federal constitutions; and (2) under the facts and circumstances of this case, the evidence was sufficient to support DeWitt's conviction. View "State v. DeWitt" on Justia Law

Rachel Overbay, the driver of a vehicle, was involved in an accident and transferred to the hospital. A law enforcement officer requested a blood sample from Overbay. Overbay, however, was incorrectly informed that her refusal of the requested chemical test would automatically lead to revocation of her driving privileges. In fact, Overbay's refusal of the blood test would not have been deemed final but would have led to her being offered a different chemical test. Overbay agreed to provide the blood sample, and the results showed a blood alcohol content of more than twice the legal limit. The State subsequently charged Overbay with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The district court granted Overbay's motion to suppress, finding that Overbay's consent to the blood test was not voluntary because it was based on misleading information. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and reversed the district court, holding that consistent with precedent, inaccurate information does not render a driver's consent involuntary when the record indicates that the inaccuracy did not affect the driver's decision. Remanded. View "State v. Overbay" on Justia Law

Defendant Jerin Mootz was convicted for assault on a police officer resulting in bodily injury. During voir dire, Mootz sought to use a peremptory challenge to remove a Hispanic juror. The district court found Mootz was using his strikes in a racially discriminatory manner, denied the strike, and seated the juror. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, finding that the district court erred in refusing to allow the strike of the potential juror, but that Mootz had not shown that the error prejudiced him. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and reversed the judgment of the district court, holding (1) the trial court erred when it prohibited Mootz from using his peremptory challenge to remove the juror; (2) Mootz, or any other similarly situated defendant, was not required to show actual prejudice in order to reverse his conviction; and (3) automatic reversal is required whenever a defendant is denied the use of a peremptory challenge based on an erroneous interpretation of Batson v. Kentucky and its progeny and the objectionable juror is improperly seated. View "State v. Mootz" on Justia Law

Robert Lowe was charged with several criminal counts related to Lowe's alleged manufacture of methamphetamine. Lowe moved to certain suppress statements he made to the police. The district court granted the motion, determining that because the statements had been made in response to a promise of leniency they were rendered involuntary. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the consent that led to the search of the premises was proper and the motion to suppress the physical evidence obtained as a result of the search was properly denied; and (2) when police reinitiated questioning of Lowe after he requested an attorney, they violated his constitutional rights under Miranda, and because there was not sufficient exigency to justify such questioning, the public safety exception to Miranda did not apply under the facts of this case. Therefore, Lowe's statements were properly suppressed. View "State v. Lowe" on Justia Law

After his vehicle collided with and killed a bicyclist, Defendant was convicted of homicide by vehicle, operating while intoxicated, and leaving the scene of an accident. The court of appeals affirmed his convictions but remanded for a sentencing correction. The Supreme Court granted further review to determine whether the State must prove in a prosecution under Iowa Code 707.6A(1) that Defendant's intoxication was a proximate cause of the victim's death and, if so, whether Defendant's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue below. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the State must prove Defendant's intoxicated driving caused the victim's death to sustain a conviction for homicide by vehicle; and (2) the record was not adequate to determine whether Defendant's trial counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the causation issue, and therefore, the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was preserved for postconviction proceedings. View "State v. Adams" on Justia Law

Dennis Richards was convicted of second-degree murder and second-degree arson for strangling his ex-wife to death and setting her house on fire. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial after concluding that Richards should have been allowed to call a physical therapist in his defense even though the witness had been disclosed a day late. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed Richards' convictions, holding that even if the district court erred in excluding the therapist, any error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of Richards' guilt. View "State v. Richards" on Justia Law

Lee Breuer was the apparent driver in a one-car accident. Breuer and the passenger were transported to the hospital, where a deputy sheriff asked Breuer to provide a breath test. Breuer refused. An officer then obtained a warrant authorizing withdrawal of a blood specimen from Breuer. Before the officer arrived at the hospital with the warrant, the deputy sheriff advised Bruer that his blood would be withdrawn by force if necessary, and Breuer acquiesced to a blood draw. The passenger in Breuer's vehicle subsequently died as a result of injuries sustained in the accident. The State charged Breuer with homicide by vehicle. Breuer filed a motion to suppress the results of the blood draw, which the district court denied. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that neither the state or federal constitution required the search warrant to be physically present before the search could begin. View "State v. Breuer" on Justia Law

The State charged Anthony Rodriguez with second-degree sexual abuse, willful injury, and domestic abuse assault. Ultimately, the district court dismissed the case due to a speedy trial rights violation. The court of appeals reversed. At issue on appeal was whether the State was entitled to an independent psychiatric evaluation of Rodriguez, a request the district court had denied. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals and reversed the district court, holding (1) when a defendant puts at issue his mental capacity to knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily waive his Miranda rights, the State is entitled to obtain an independent psychiatric evaluation of the defendant; (2) in order to protect the defendant's constitutional right against self-incrimination in these cases, the safeguards found in State v. Craney regarding the expert's testimony following the evaluation are applicable; and (3) the expert should not disclose to the State the same matters about which Craney prohibits an expert from testifying. Remanded. View "State v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

The State charged Daniel Rainsong with theft in the first degree, dependent adult abuse and habitual offender. The State alleged Rainsong stole $15,000 each from his mother, a dependent adult who passed away, and her husband, Loren Radford. The State later noticed the deposition of Radford, but Rainsong refused to attend the deposition. The State proceeded to take the deposition of Radford without participation by Rainsong. When the State attempted to introduce the deposition at trial, the district court denied the request. The Supreme Court granted interlocutory review and affirmed, holding that the district court correctly decided not to allow the State to introduce at trial the statement contained in Radford's noticed deposition because (1) Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.13 did not authorize the taking of the deposition; and (2) therefore, the noticed deposition was nothing more than a sworn affidavit, and its admission would violate Rainsong's right to confrontation as guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause. View "State v. Rainsong " on Justia Law