Justia Iowa Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that Division I of Senate File 471 (the Act), which creates new prerequisites for physicians performing an abortion, violates both the due process and equal protection clauses of the Iowa Constitution because its restrictions on women are not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest of the State.The district court held that the Act, which includes a mandatory seventy-two-hour waiting period between informational and procedure appointments, did not violate the Iowa Constitution. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the “seventy-two hour[]” waiting requirement of the Act violates the right to equal protection and due process under the Iowa Constitution. View "Planned Parenthood of the Heartland v. Reynolds ex rel. State" on Justia Law

At issue was whether the three-year statute of limitations in Iowa Code 822.3 applies where a postconviction relief (PCR) petitioner files an untimely second petition for PCR alleging that counsel for his timely filed first petition for PCR was ineffective.The district court concluded that the second petition’s allegations of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel were not grounds to avoid the three-year statutory bar. The court of appeals affirmed, citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Dible v. State, 557 N.W.2d 881, 883, 886 (Iowa 1996).The Supreme Court qualified Dible and held that where a PCR petition alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel has been timely filed per section 822.3 and there is a successive PCR petition alleging that postconvcition counsel was ineffective in presenting the ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim, the timing of the filing of the second PCR petition relates back to the timing of the filing of the original PCR petition for purposes of Iowa Code section 822.3 if the successive PCR petition is filed promptly after the conclusion of the first PCR petition. The Court therefore vacated the court of appeals and reversed the decision of the district court and remanded the case. View "Allison v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court adopted a tighter legal framework for warrantless inventory searches and seizures of automobiles under Iowa Const. art. I, 8 than provided under the recent precedents of the United States Supreme Court.In his challenge to the search and seizure provision of article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution Defendant noted that a number of state courts have rejected the approach of the United States Supreme Court - which generally provides that warrantless inventory searches of automobiles are permissible if they are conducted pursuant to law enforcement policies that govern the decision to impound the vehicle and the nature and scope of any subsequent search - in favor of a more restrictive approach that sharply limits warrantless searches and seizures of automobiles.The Supreme Court ultimately held (1) the police should advise the owner or operator of the vehicle of the options to impoundment, and when impoundment is necessary, personal items may be retrieved from the vehicle, and if the vehicle is impounded, containers found within the vehicle will not be opened but stored for safekeeping as a unit unless the owner or operator directs otherwise; and (2) the impoundment and search in this case was outside the bounds of any constitutionally permissible local impoundment and inventory policy. View "State v. Ingram" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court declined to hold that the felony-murder rule violates due process under the Iowa or United States Constitution when it is applied to juvenile offenders pursuant to a theory of aiding and abetting.Defendant was a juvenile and unarmed when he participated in a marijuana robbery. A coparticipant, who had brought a gun to the crime, killed the robbery victim. Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with immediate parole eligibility. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding (1) applying the felony-murder rule to juvenile offenders based on a theory of aiding and abetting is constitutional; (2) Defendant’s sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, either categorically or as applied to Defendant; (3) the trial court provided the jury with proper instructions regarding the types of assault required to establish the forcible felony robbery element of felony murder; and (4) the record was inadequate for the Court to address some of Defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and the remainder of Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims were without merit. View "State v. Harrison" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court declined to hold that the felony-murder rule violates due process under the Iowa or United States Constitution when it is applied to juvenile offenders pursuant to a theory of aiding and abetting.Defendant was a juvenile and unarmed when he participated in a marijuana robbery. A coparticipant, who had brought a gun to the crime, killed the robbery victim. Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with immediate parole eligibility. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding (1) applying the felony-murder rule to juvenile offenders based on a theory of aiding and abetting is constitutional; (2) Defendant’s sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, either categorically or as applied to Defendant; (3) the trial court provided the jury with proper instructions regarding the types of assault required to establish the forcible felony robbery element of felony murder; and (4) the record was inadequate for the Court to address some of Defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and the remainder of Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims were without merit. View "State v. Harrison" on Justia Law

Under the Iowa Constitution, a community caretaking seizure of a vehicle must be undertaken for genuine community caretaking purposes. In this case, a law enforcement officer was justified under the “community caretaking function” exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment and Iowa Const. art. I, 8 when he pulled behind a vehicle stopped by the side of a highway after 1 a.m. with its brake lights engaged and activated his emergency lights.Defendant was charged with operating while intoxicated, first offense. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the stop of his vehicle, arguing that the stop of his vehicle and person was unconstitutional. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the conduct of the deputy in this case was not unconstitutional because the officer acted out of a genuine community caretaking motivation. View "State v. Coffman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings, holding that because the district court did not make specific findings of fact relative to any plaintiff when concluding that Iowa Code 657.11(2), as applied to Plaintiffs, violated Iowa Const. art. I, 1, the issue could not be resolved on this record.Plaintiffs, the owners and/or residents of real estate located near the confined animal feeding operations (CAFOs), brought this action claiming that Defendants were negligent in their operation of the CAFOs and that the CAFOs constituted a nuisance, entitling Plaintiffs to damages. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the nuisance claims, asserting that section 657.11(2) barred the claims because Plaintiffs could not meet the requirements under the statute to recover the requested special damages against the CAFOs. The district court denied the motion, finding that section 657.11(2) was unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiffs because it denied Plaintiffs access to a remedy for their alleged injuries. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with directions that the district court engage in a fact-based analysis by applying the three-prong test set forth Gacke v. Pork Xtra, LLC, 684 N.W.2d 168 (Iowa 2004). View "Honomichl v. Valley View Swine, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant was entitled to a new trial after the State limited his access to his personal funds by freezing his assets prior to trial.Defendant was convicted of attempted murder and willful injury causing serious injury. Before trial, the trial court granted the State’s application for an order freezing all of Defendant’s assets. The order granting the freeze did not cite any authority or legal basis for the asset freeze. After Defendant’s convictions were affirmed on appeal he filed a postconviction relief (PCR) application arguing that the order freezing his assets was illegal and imposed for an improper purpose. Defendant also argued that the asset freeze adversely impacted his ability to defend himself by, among other things, inhibiting his ability to select his counsel of choice. The PCR court denied relief, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the asset freeze was unlawful; (2) defense counsel’s failure to properly challenge the freeze breached an essential duty; and (3) the consequences of the asset freeze violated Defendant’s constitutional right to be master of his defense, a structural error. View "Krogmann v. State" on Justia Law

Assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination excuses compliance with forfeiture threshold pleading requirements in Iowa Code 809A.13(4)(d), such as identifying the source of cash.Claimants’ property was seized after a drug interdiction traffic stop. The State sought forfeiture of the impounded vehicle and money discovered in a hidden compartment after issuance of a search warrant. Claimants sought return of the cash and vehicle but their pleadings omitted information required by section 809A.13(4)(d). The district court dismissed the driver’s claims for noncompliance with the statute’s pleading requirements. Following months of litigation, the State consented to return of the vehicle to the owner. The district court denied the owner’s claim for attorney fees. The Supreme Court remanded, holding (1) the district court erred by failing to rule on Claimants’ motions to suppress before adjudicating the forfeiture claims and erred by overruling Fifth Amendment objections to the pleading requirements; and (2) the vehicle owner was a prevailing party entitled to recover his reasonable attorney fees under the forfeiture statute. View "In re Property Seized from Jean Carlos Herrera and Fernando Rodriguez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision granting postconviction relief to Defendant on his claim that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel from an immigration attorney when he tried to get a driver’s license, holding that no right to counsel had attached when Defendant went to the driver’s license station.Defendant’s visit to the driver’s license station triggered a criminal investigation and ultimately a conviction for a previously committed fraudulent practice. The district court set aside Defendant’s guilty plea and sentence, holding that Defendant’s counsel, who was representing Defendant in a pending federal immigration case, breached his essential duty to provide necessary advice to Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that neither the right to counsel under Iowa Const. art. I, 10, nor the United States Constitution Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached at the time Defendant’s attorney advised Defendant regarding getting a driver’s license, as this was before any investigation or criminal proceedings had begun. View "Hernandez-Ruiz v. State" on Justia Law