Justia Iowa Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and first-degree robbery. Defendant was sixteen years old at the time he committed the offenses. The district court imposed a seventy-five-year aggregate sentence, of which Defendant was required to serve 52.5 years. Defendant's alleged actions took place before the Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. Alabama. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions but vacated his sentence, holding (1) Defendant's 52.5-year minimum prison term triggered the protections to be afforded under Miller - namely, an individualized sentencing hearing to determine the issue of parole eligibility; and (2) a district court must recognize and apply the core teachings of Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, and Miller in making sentencing decisions for long prison terms involving juveniles. Remanded.View "State v. Null" on Justia Law

As a condition of her employment, Employee signed an agreement to arbitrate claims with Employer. Employee later filed a complaint with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission (ICRC), alleging that Employer had discriminated against her because of her pregnancy. The ICRC subsequently filed a statement of charges with the Iowa Department of Inspections and Appeals (DIA). Employer filed a motion to dismiss the ICRC’s charges or, in the alternative, compel arbitration. The DIA denied Employer’s motion on the ground that ICRC was not a party to the arbitration agreement and, consequently, not bound by it. On judicial review, the district court remanded instructions for the ICRC to dismiss the matter pending arbitration by the parties, concluding that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempted state law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding the FAA did not require arbitration of this proceeding because it was brought by an entity that was not bound to arbitrate under generally applicable principles of contract law, where the ICRC was not a party to the agreement and its interest was not derivative of Employee’s. View "Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of kidnapping in the first degree, among other charges. Defendant was a juvenile at the time of the kidnapping. The district court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the kidnapping conviction. After the U.S. Supreme Court decided Graham v. Florida, Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence on the kidnapping conviction, contending that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The district court agreed that the sentence was unconstitutional and corrected Defendant’s conviction to life in prison with immediate parole eligibility. Defendant appealed, claiming, inter alia, that his sentence was unconstitutional under both the U.S. and the Iowa Constitutions. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant’s conviction and sentence as corrected. The Supreme Court conditionally affirmed, holding that Defendant’s sentence was constitutional under the U.S. Constitution. Because Defendant’s claims that his sentence was illegal under the Iowa Constitution were not fully developed, the Court did not reach those claims. Remanded. View "State v. Hoeck" on Justia Law

Dentist fired his long-time female dental assistant (Employee) at the request of his wife after she discovered Dentist and Employee had been texting. Wife claimed Employee "was a big threat" to the marriage. Employee subsequently brought this action against Dentist, alleging that he discriminated against her on the basis of sex. The district court granted summary judgment for Dentist, concluding that Employee was not fired because of her gender but because she was a threat to Dentist's marriage. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Dentist did not engage in unlawful gender discrimination in violation of the Iowa Civil Rights Act when he fired Employee at the request of his wife.View "Nelson v. Knight" on Justia Law

The Iowa Department of Transportation (IDOT) hired a general contractor, which was a “targeted small business” (TSB), for two public construction contracts. The general contractor subcontracted with three subcontractors, which the general contractor failed to pay in full. The subcontractors sued IDOT and the general contractor. The district court granted IDOT’s motion to dismiss and entered default judgments against the general contractor, ruling that, in absence of a bond, the subcontractors’ remedy against the state was limited to the funds IDOT retained on its contract with the general contractor. The subcontractors appealed, arguing that Iowa Code 573.2, the statute that governs subcontractors’ remedies for unpaid work on public improvements when the state waives the performance bond for a general contractor that is a TSB, allowed broader recovery rights and required IDOT to step into the TSB’s shoes to pay the balances owed them. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 573.2 operates as a waiver of sovereign immunity that allows subcontractors to recover from IDOT the unpaid balances TSBs owe for work on public improvements. Remanded. View "Star Equip., Ltd. v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to attempted murder and was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. Defendant appealed, claiming his counsel provided ineffective assistance because counsel permitted him to plead guilty without an established factual basis for each element of the crime. The court of appeals vacated Defendant's conviction and sentence and remanded the case, concluding that the guilty plea colloquy failed to establish a factual basis for the underlying charge. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' decision and affirmed the conviction and sentence of the district court, holding that the minutes of testimony provided an adequate factual basis to support Defendant's guilty plea. View "State v. Finney" on Justia Law

The Attorney General brought an action against Corporation, which sold memberships in buying programs giving members the option to purchase various goods and services at discounted rates, alleging violations of the Buying Club Membership Law (BCL) and the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act (CFA) and seeking civil penalties for consumer frauds committed against the elderly. The district court concluded (1) many of Corporation's marketing and sales practices violated the BCL and CFA; (2) Corporation did not commit consumer frauds against the elderly; and (3) application of the BCL to Corporation's solicitation practices did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. The court awarded more than $25 million in consumer reimbursement, civil penalties, and attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and modified, holding (1) Corporation's telemarketing and Internet practices violated the CFA; (2) Corporation's solicitations and its memberships offering one or more discount features were subject to the terms of the BCL; (3) application of the BCL to Corporation's solicitations did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause; (4) affirmed the reimbursement award for BCL violations as modified; and (5) reversed the ruling that the State was not entitled to civil penalties for consumer frauds committed by the elderly.View "State ex rel. Miller v. Vertrue, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a construction supply business that entered into a dispute with City over a project upgrading City's wastewater treatment facility. After City excluded Plaintiff from its list of preapproved material suppliers, Plaintiff filed this action seeking a declaration that City's preapproval process violated Iowa's public construction bidding statute and constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process. In addition, Plaintiff sought relief under the Open Records Act, claiming that City's significant delay in responding to Plaintiff's open records request violated the Open Records Act. The district court rejected each of Plaintiff's claims. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment dismissing Plaintiff's public biding and constitutional claims, as (i) Plaintiff lacked standing to challenge City's preapproval process, and (ii) Plaintiff's constitutional claims failed on the merits; and (2) reversed the district court's ruling denying Plaintiff relief under the open records law, as City's substantial and inadequately explained delay in responding to Plaintiff's open records request violated the law. View "Horsfield Materials, Inc. v. City of Dyersville" on Justia Law

In an underlying termination of parental rights proceeding, the juvenile court concluded that while Mother, who was indigent, did not qualify for appointed counsel under Iowa Code 600A.6A, payment of the attorney’s fees at public expense was constitutionally required. The court subsequently appointed an attorney to represent Mother in the proceeding, and ultimately, Mother’s parental rights were terminated. The juvenile court ordered the State Public Defender to pay for the court-appointed counsel, but the Defender denied payment on the ground that the fees did not qualify for payment from the indigent defense fund. The appointed attorney sought judicial review, and the juvenile court subsequently ordered the Iowa Department of Management to pay the fees. The Defender and Department appealed the juvenile court’s appointment of counsel at public expense. The Supreme Court treated the appeal as a petition for an original writ of certiorari, which it granted as to the Department. The Court then annulled the writ, concluding that the juvenile court correctly appointed counsel at public expense to represent Mother in the contested termination proceeding under chapter 600A. View "Crowell v. State Pub. Defender" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with and convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence. Defendant appealed, contending that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the stop of his vehicle after the police received an anonymous tip reporting a drunk driver. The Supreme Court reversed and suppressed all evidence seized from the stop, holding that the investigatory stop of Defendant was illegal under the Fourth Amendment, as a bare assertion by an anonymous tipster reporting drunk driving, without relaying to the police a personal observation of erratic driving or other facts to establish the driver is intoxicated, does not provide reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Kooima" on Justia Law