Justia Iowa Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court upheld Defendant's convictions and sentences for several drug offenses and other misdemeanors, holding that the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress or in denying Defendant's retained attorney's requests to enter limited appearances.On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the arresting officer's recollection that Defendant had a driving status of "barred" as of several months before did not amount to a reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) while the officer's information about Defendant's driver's license status was several months old, it gave the officer reasonable suspicion to justify stopping Defendant's vehicle; and (2) if a constitutional right to have a retained attorney enter a limited appearance exists, it is subject to reasonable regulation by the district court, and the district court in this case did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's requested limited appearances. View "State v. Sallis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court entering summary judgment in favor of Defendants and dismissing Plaintiff's action with prejudice, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on any of his claims of error.Plaintiff sued a neighboring confined animal feeding operation (CAFO) alleging common law nuisance, trespass, and drainage law violations. Defendants moved for summary judgment based on the statutory immunity in Iowa Code 657.11. Plaintiff, relying on , argued that section 657.11, as applied, violated the Iowa Constitution's inalienable rights clause. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the three-part test set forth in Gacke is overruled; (2) under rational basis review, Plaintiff's constitutional challenge to section 657.11 was unavailing; (2) Plaintiff failed to preserve error on his takings claim; and (3) as to Plaintiff's trespass and drainage claims Plaintiff failed to generate a question of fact precluding summary judgment on statutory nuisance immunity or causation. View "Garrison v. New Fashion Pork LLP" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first-degree murder arising from events in 1990 after his fourth trial, held almost thirty years after the crime, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on any of his claims of error.On appeal, Defendant argued that his conviction must be reversed due to juror misconduct, the improper admission of certain testimony, the erroneous exclusion of hearsay evidence, and a violation of due process. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed his conviction, holding that none of Defendant's allegations of error warranted reversal of his convictions. View "State v. Liggins" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the district court finding Iowa Code 815.1(4)(c) to be unconstitutional, holding that the State is not constitutionally required to provide ancillary services to an indigent defendant represented by private counsel if funds available to the counsel can reasonably be expected to cover the services.In 2019, the General Assembly enacted section 815.1, thereby changing the process by which an indigent defendant can obtain state funding for investigation costs when the defendant chooses to be represented by privately-retained counsel. The district court found section 815.1 unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment, severed section 815.1(4)(c) from the statute, and granted Defendant's request for ancillary services at state expenses. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State is constitutionally permitted to consider the funds available to a retained attorney in determining whether it is required to provide state funding for ancillary services. View "Amaya v. State Public Defender" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of the cities of Pella and Oskaloosa regarding the validity of an agreement between the cities and Mahaska County to establish a regional airport authority, holding that Landowners had standing to challenge the agreement.Landowners brought this action seeking a judgment that the agreement at issue was illegal and an injunction to prevent the transaction. The district court held that Landowners lacked standing to bring the suit and granted summary judgment in favor of the Cities. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) by entering into the agreement, the County's Board of Supervisors bound future board to a particular course of legislative action, in violation of the Iowa Constitution; (2) the agreement violated precedent regarding delegation of a municipality's legislative power; and (3) therefore, the district court erred in declaring the agreement to be valid and ordering specific performance by the County of its obligations under the agreement. View "Site A Landowners v. South Central Regional Airport Agency" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Iowa Constitution is not the source of a fundamental right to an abortion necessitating a strict scrutiny standard of review for regulations affecting that right.In Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v. Iowa Board of Medicine (PPH I), 865 N.W.2d 252 (Iowa 2015), the Supreme Court applied the federal undue burden test established in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), under the Iowa Constitution. In Planned Parenthood of the Heartland v. Reynolds (PPH II), 915 N.W.2d 206, (Iowa 2018), the Supreme Court rejected the undue burden test and found that the due process clause of the Iowa Constitution protected abortion as a fundamental right. In 2020, the general assembly added a mandatory 24-hour waiting period for abortion to pending legislation limiting courts' ability to withdraw life-sustaining procedures. Planned Parenthood successfully sued in district court to block the statute from taking effect. The district court granted summary judgment for Planned Parenthood. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) PPH II is overruled; and (2) therefore, the Casey undue burden test applied in PPH I remains the governing standard. View "Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v. Reynolds ex rel. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for drug- and firearm-related offenses, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting defense counsel's motion to withdraw and did not err in concluding that Defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to counsel.The district court granted defense counsel's motion to withdraw from representation of Defendant approximately three weeks before Defendant's speedy trial expiration date. Although the district court offered to appoint another attorney to represent Defendant, Defendant demanded that he represent himself with the assistance of standby counsel. After conducting colloquies the district court allowed Defendant to proceed pro se with the assistance of standby counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion by granting defense counsel’s motion to withdraw based on defense counsel’s statements that professional considerations required termination of the representation; and (2) correctly concluded that Defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel after engaging in a thorough colloquy. View "State v. Miller" on Justia Law

A father going through a contentious divorce was accused by his young daughter of sexual abuse. A Department of Human Services social worker observed the forensic interview, believed it was credible, obtained additional information primarily from the mother, and obtained an ex parte court order requiring the father to leave the family home. An ensuing adversary proceeding determined that the allegation was unfounded and that the mother had “wanted [the father] out of the house.” The DHS finding was set aside and, eventually, the father obtained physical care of the children. In the father's subsequent suit, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment.The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed. The claim of intentional interference with the parent-child relationship fails because that claim applies to extralegal actions— such as absconding with a child—not to judicially-approved acts. The claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress fails because the conduct here did not reach the level of an “outrage” necessary to sustain such a claim. The unreasonable search and seizure claim cannot succeed because there was no showing that the DHS social worker falsified the affidavit she submitted to the court or that the removal order would not have been granted without her questioned statements. The substantive due process claim fails because DHS’s conduct does not “shock the conscience.” A procedural due process claim cannot prevail because the father was provided with adequate process, which ultimately cleared his name. View "Lennette v. State of Iowa" on Justia Law

In 2005, Sandoval was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and two counts of attempted murder. He was sentenced to serve concurrent terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the murder convictions and 25 years’ imprisonment for the attempted murder convictions. Sandoval unsuccessfully challenged his convictions on direct appeal and in three different applications for postconviction relief.The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Sandoval’s fourth application for postconviction relief, which the district court held was barred by the three-year statute of limitations of Iowa Code section 822.3. Sandoval argued that because he was only 19 at the time he murdered two people, his mandatory life sentences without the possibility of parole violated the federal and state constitutional prohibitions against “cruel and unusual punishment.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII; Iowa Const. art. I. The court disagreed. Sandoval’s mandatory sentences of lifetime incarceration without the possibility of parole for committing these offenses are not categorically prohibited by either the Federal Constitution or the state constitution. View "Sandoval v. State of Iowa" on Justia Law

In 1994, Dorsey shot and killed a woman when he was 18 years and five days old. He was found guilty of murder in the first degree and was sentenced to a mandatory term of life in prison without the possibility of parole.In Dorsey’s fifth attempt to obtain post-conviction relief, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed his sentence, rejecting Dorsey’s argument that the sentence violates his state constitutional right to be free from “cruel and unusual punishment.” He argued the state constitution prohibits imposing a mandatory punishment on a young adult offender and instead requires the district court to hold an individualized sentencing hearing before imposing any sentence and that his life sentence without the possibility of parole is grossly disproportionate to the crime. Considerations of efficiency and certainty require a bright line separating adults from juveniles. There is nothing unique about the facts of this case that raise an inference of gross disproportionality. Dorsey’s willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder of an unarmed woman in her own home justifies the most severe sentence allowed under our law. View "Dorsey v. State of Iowa" on Justia Law