Justia Iowa Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's sentence for indecent contact with a child, holding that Defendant satisfied the good-cause requirement to challenge his sentence as an abuse of discretion but that, on the merits, his challenge failed.Defendant pleaded guilty to indecent contact with a child. The court sentenced Defendant to two years in prison and to ten years' special parole after completion of his prison term. The court further ordered Defendant to register as a sex offender for ten years and complete the sex offender treatment program. Defendant appealed. The State filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing that entering an Alford plea is not good cause to appeal. The Supreme Court held that Defendant had shown good cause but failed to establish that any alleged errors warranted resentencing. View "State v. Henderson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Jane Doe's petition for writ of certiorari, sustained the writ, and vacated the order of the district court denying Doe's application to expunge her criminal record as to three separate cases pursuant to Iowa Code 901C.2, holding that the court erred in denying the application on the ground that Doe had court-ordered financial obligations in other cases.In the three separate cases at issue the charges were all dismissed. Doe later filed an application for expungement of the record in each of the cases. The district court denied the application on the ground that Doe had "[m]onies owed in other matters." The Supreme Court vacated the district court's order denying expungement, holding (1) pursuant to State v. Doe, __ N.W.2d __ (Iowa 2020), filed today, the requisite condition for expungement requires that the defendant establish only that he satisfied all of the court-ordered financial obligations in the criminal case for which expungement was sought; and (2) in the instant case, the district court erred in concluding that Iowa Code 901C.2(1)(a)(2) required Defendant to establish that she also satisfied all court-ordered financial obligations in other cases. View "Doe v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted John Doe's petition for writ of certiorari, sustained the writ, and vacated the order of the district court denying Doe's application to expunge his criminal record as to a particular case pursuant to Iowa Code 901C.2, holding that the court erred in denying the application on the ground that Doe had court-ordered financial obligations in other cases.In 2000, Doe was charged with escape. The charge was later dismissed. In 2019, Doe filed an application for expungement of the record. The district court denied the application on the ground that Doe had court-ordered financial obligations in other cases. The Supreme Court vacated the district court's order denying expungement, holding (1) pursuant to State v. Doe, __ N.W.2d __ (Iowa 2020), filed today, the requisite condition for expungement requires that the defendant establish only that he satisfied all of the court-ordered financial obligations in the criminal case for which expungement was sought; and (2) in the instant case, the district court erred in concluding that section 901C.2(1)(a)(2) required Defendant to establish that he also satisfied all court-ordered financial obligations in other cases. View "Doe v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Jane Doe's petition for writ of certiorari, sustained the writ, and vacated the order of the district court denying Doe's application to expunge her criminal record as to a particular case pursuant to Iowa Code 901C.2, holding that the court erred in denying the application on the ground that Doe had court-ordered financial obligations in other cases.In 2011, Doe was charged with one count of unauthorized use of a credit card. The charge was dismissed, and Doe subsequently satisfied all of her financial obligations in the dismissed case. In 2019, Doe filed her application to expunge the criminal record. The district court denied the application because Doe had court-ordered financial obligations remaining in other cases and thus did not meet the requisite condition set forth in section 901C.2(1)(a)(2). The Supreme Court vacated the district court's order, holding that the district court (1) erred in concluding that section 901C.2(1)(a)(2) required Defendant to establish that she satisfied all financial obligations in both this case and in any other case; and (2) erred in denying Doe's application on that ground. View "Doe v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court ordering restitution in the amount of $2740.95 based upon testimony and exhibits submitted by the Crime Victim Compensation Program (CVCP), holding that the restitution order was not supported by substantial evidence.Defendant was convicted of sexual abuse in the third degree and supplying alcohol to a minor. The State filed a motion for restitution. The district court approved of the restitution claim in its entirety, largely relying on testimony about the general process conducted by the CVCP in evaluating potential restitution. The Supreme Court vacated the restitution order, holding (1) the CVCP fell short of establishing restitution in the amount of $2740.95; and (2) based on the Court's review of the record, the record supported only $285.50 in restitution. View "State v. Delong" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying Defendant's motion to dismiss four additional arson charges as breach of his plea agreement with the State as to second-degree arson, holding that the State remained bound by its plea agreement under the circumstances of this case.The plea agreement provided that Defendant would plead guilty to second-degree arson, that Defendant would cooperate in an interview regarding other suspicious fires, and that the State would not bring charges regarding the other fires. Defendant pled guilty. Thereafter, the State decided not to hold the interview and advised Defendant that he would be charged with other arsons. The State gave Defendant an opportunity to withdraw from the plea agreement, but Defendant declined to withdraw. The State brought four additional arson charges, and Defendant moved to dismiss them as breach of the plea agreement. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the State could not unilaterally withdraw from the plea agreement by declining to conduct the interview; and (2) Defendant did not ratify the State's modification of the plea agreement by refusing the State's offer of rescission. View "State v. Beres" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for assault on a peace officer with a dangerous weapon, a felony, and several misdemeanors, holding that Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel.After Defendant pleaded guilty, he absconded. He was later returned to custody. On appeal, Defendant argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because the plea bargain contained an unlawful term. Specifically, Defendant argued that the plea bargain's provision that he would be released from jail for a forty-eight-hour furlough after pleading guilty was illegal and that his trial counsel committed ineffective assistance in obtaining the illegal benefit for him. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that where Defendant entered into the plea agreement with the illegally lenient sentence, he could not benefit from that sentence and then attack the plea bargain. View "State v. Gordon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first-degree murder after declining Defendant's invitation to change constitutional precedent to further limit the admissibility of eyewitness identifications following police photo arrays, holding that the double-blind procedures used in this case were not unduly suggestive and that Defendant received effective assistance of counsel.On appeal, Defendant argued (1) because the police used unduly suggestive photographic identification procedures the district court erred by failing to grant his motion to suppress the resulting identification; and (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request jury instructions on eyewitness identifications that reflect modern scientific research. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction while preserving for possible postconviction relief action Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the court of appeals' decision, holding (1) the eyewitness identification was not unduly suggestive; and (2) contrary to the decision of the court of appeals, the record was adequate to decide the ineffective assistance of counsel claim challenging the jury instruction on eyewitness identification, and this claim is rejected on the merits. View "State v. Booth-Harris" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated in part and affirmed in part the decision of the court of appeals declining relief on Defendant's claims that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to object to the crime victim's first-time, in-court identification of Defendant, holding that Defendant's trial counsel did not provide constitutionally deficient representation for failing to object to the victim's trial testimony.The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction, concluding that the record was inadequate to decide Defendant's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims but preserved those claims for post conviction proceedings. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment in part, holding (1) the record was adequate to decide Defendant's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, but the claim is rejected because precedent permits first-time, in-court identifications; and (2) the court of appeals decision stands on the remaining issues. View "State v. Doolin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in the second degree, holding that Defendant's Fifth Amendment rights were invaded when the trial judge instructed the jury that Defendant was required to notify law enforcement of his use of deadly force, but the error was harmless.During trial, Defendant asserted the defense of justification in his shooting of the victim. At issue on appeal was whether the district court abused its discretion by giving a jury instruction incorporating the terms of Iowa Code 704.2B. The instruction included a statement that a person using deadly force is required to notify law enforcement about his use of deadly force. Defendant argued before the Supreme Court that both section 704.2B and the jury instruction incorporating that section violated his Fifth Amendment rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) instructing the jury that a homicide defendant is required to notify a law enforcement agency of his use of deadly force violates the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights; but (2) any error in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Gibbs" on Justia Law