Justia Iowa Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions for willful injury causing bodily injury and kidnapping in the first degree but vacated the restitution portion of the sentencing order and remanded the case to the district court to order restitution in a manner consistent with this opinion, holding that the restitution order did not comply with restitution law.Specifically, the Court held (1) substantial evidence supported Defendant’s conviction for first-degree kidnapping; (2) Defendant was not prejudiced when the court instructed the jury on a lesser included charge of kidnapping in the second degree; (3) this Court cannot reach Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims; and (4) the lower court’s finding that Defendant had the reasonable ability to pay and ordering restitution for certain items without having the amount of each item of restitution before it was contrary to the statutory scheme as outlined in this opinion. View "State v. Albright" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction of second-degree burglary and reversed the habitual offender judgment and Defendant’s sentence, holding that Defendant’s stipulation to being a habitual offender was not knowingly and voluntarily made.A jury found Defendant guilty of burglary in the second degree. While the jury was in deliberations, Defendant’s counsel informed the court that Defendant would stipulate to predicate priors for the habitual offender charge. The district court sentenced Defendant as a habitual offender to incarceration not to exceed fifteen years and ordered restitution. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court failed to comply with the requirements set forth in State v. Harrington, 893 N.W.2d 36 (Iowa 2017), in accepting his habitual offender stipulation. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the stipulation was not knowingly and voluntarily made because the stipulation proceedings did not comply with the Harrington requirements. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with Harrington. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court finding Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of operating while intoxicated (OWI) in violation of Iowa Code 321J.2, holding that an initial laboratory test that was positive for controlled substances was insufficient to support Defendant’s conviction.On appeal, Defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to establish the presence of a controlled substance in his system because the initial screen test found only the “possible presence” of drugs, not their actual presence. Without a confirmatory test, Defendant contended, the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of guilt. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding (1) without other evidence, a test that identifies only the “possible presence” of a controlled substance falls short of satisfying the reasonable doubt standard; and (2) the plain meaning of section 321J.2(1)(c) could not be satisfied in this case by relying on the circumstantial evidence of impairment. View "State v. Myers" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the district court on the question on whether the crimes of involuntary manslaughter by a public offense and delivery of a controlled substance merge, holding that the district court did not err in failing to merge the convictions.Defendant was convicted and sentenced for delivery of a controlled substance and involuntary manslaughter by a public offense other than a forcible felony or escape. On appeal, the court of appeals held, among other things, that the crimes did not merge. The Supreme Court granted further review to consider the merger question and then affirmed the judgments of the courts below, holding that Defendant’s crimes should not have merged. View "State v. West" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and reversed the judgment of the district court affirming the determination of the Department of Public Safety (DPS) that Appellant was required to register as a sex offender for life, holding that the DPS must accept an earlier court of appeals decision regarding the length of Appellant’s sex offender registration.In 2008, Appellant pled guilty to assault with intent to commit sexual abuse. At his sentencing hearing, the district court informed Appellant that he was only required to register as a sex offender for ten years, when, in fact, Appellant was subject to lifetime registration. When Appellant was informed he was required to register for life, Appellant sought postconviction relief. In 2015, the court of appeals determined that Appellant was only required to register as a sex offender for ten years. The DPS declined to accept the court of appeals’ decision. On judicial review, the district court and court of appeals affirmed the DPS’s determination, concluding that they lacked the authority to determine the length of Appellant’s sex offender registration requirements. The Supreme Court remanded this case to the DPS, holding that the 2015 court of appeals’ decision had preclusive effect over the DPS’s determination. View "Barker v. Iowa Department of Public Safety" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction of operating while intoxicated (OUI), second offense, holding that Defendant’s rights under Iowa Code 804.20 were not violated when a law enforcement officer denied Defendant’s request to call his wife until after sobriety testing occurred.Defendant was driving a motor vehicle when he was involved in an accident in the midst of a snowstorm. Because of the weather conditions, the law enforcement officer that responded to the scene transported Defendant to a protected location - the sally port of the nearby law enforcement center - for the completion of field sobriety testing. Before leaving the scene, Defendant asked to talk to his wife, but the request was denied. Defendant subsequently failed field sobriety tests. Defendant was later convicted of OUI. Defendant appealed, arguing that his rights were violated because he had been “restrained of his liberty” within the meaning of section 804.20 at the sally port. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant’s rights under section 804.20 were not violated when the officer refused to allow Defendant the opportunity to speak with his wife until after field sobriety testing had been completed at the sally port because the sally port was a location for testing, not a “place of detention” within the meaning of section 804.20. View "State v. Davis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court sentencing Defendant to prison for a maximum of ten years for theft in the first degree, to be served consecutively with five years for theft in the second degree, holding that Defendant failed to preserve his due process claim for direct appeal and that this Court could not reach Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel due process claim on direct appeal for the reasons stated in State v. Gordon, __ N.W.2d __ (Iowa 2018), also decided today.On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court violated his due process rights by using an Iowa Risk Revised assessment report (IRR) in sentencing. In the alternative, Defendant argued that the court abused its discretion by considering the IRR without understanding the contours of the IRR. Defendant further asserted an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The Supreme Court affirmed for the reasons set forth in Gordon. View "State v. Buesing" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals finding that there is no legislative authority supporting the use of the Iowa Risk Revised risk assessment tool (IRR) at sentencing and affirmed the decision of the district court, holding that the court’s use of the IRR in sentencing Defendant did not violate his due process rights.Defendant pled guilty to burglary in the second degree as part of a plea agreement. Defendant later violated the conditions of release and pled guilty to the additional charge of interference with official acts. The presentence investigation report stated that the interviewer completed an IRR, which recommended that Defendant be supervised at an intensive level. The district court sentenced Defendant to prison for an indeterminate term, not to exceed ten years plus ninety days in jail, to be served concurrently with the burglary sentence. The court of appeals vacated the sentence. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding (1) the court did not infringe on Defendant’s due process rights based on its use of the IRR at sentencing; and (2) the court did not abuse its discretion by discussing an unproven or unprosecuted offense. View "State v. Guise" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals reversing Defendant’s sentence and affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that Defendant failed to preserve error on his due process claim and that the district court did not use an unproven or unprosecuted offense when it sentenced Defendant.Defendant pled guilty to third-degree sexual abuse. As part of the presentence investigation, Defendant underwent a psychosexual evaluation, resulting in a psychosexual assessment report. The district court ultimately sentenced Defendant to a prison term not to exceed ten years. The court of appeals reversed, holding the the legislature has not deemed sex offender risk assessment tools relevant in imposing prison sentences. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and affirmed the district court’s sentence, holding (1) the district court did not violate Defendant’s due process rights by consideration of and reliance on the sex offender risk assessment tools in imposing its sentence; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by relying on an unproven or unprosecuted offense. View "State v. Gordon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court ordering Defendant to pay restitution to the City of Davenport for damage to patrol vehicles after Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal mischief and eluding an officer, holding that a government entity may, under the right circumstances, be a victim under the Iowa criminal restitution statute, Iowa Code chapter 910, under this Court’s precedents.On appeal, Defendant conceded that the Davenport police vehicles incurred damage when police officers attempted to stop him during a high-speed chase but argued that damage to police cars from a chase of a fleeing suspect is not recoverable under Iowa’s restitution statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under the causation standard in the Restatement (Third) of Torts, the damage to the police vehicles would be within the scope of liability in a negligence action against Defendant; (2) the firefighter’s rule has no application in this case; and (3) the express legislative adoption of limited restitution for emergency response costs in drunk driving cases under Iowa Code 910.1(4) does prevent a restitution to the City of Davenport in this case. View "State v. Shears" on Justia Law