Justia Iowa Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant pled guilty to two counts of sexual abuse in the third degree. The district sentenced Defendant to two concurrent, indeterminate ten-year sentences. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court applied the wrong Code section at his sentencing and that the error could not be corrected by the use of a nunc pro tunc order. The court of appeals agreed with Defendant and vacated the judgment and sentence to allow the district court to amend the judgment and sentence to reflect Defendant’s intent in entering the plea. On remand, the district court resentenced Defendant to two indeterminate ten-year sentences to be served consecutively instead of merely correcting the error in the sentencing order. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and sentence of the district court, holding that the district court exceeded its mandate when it resentenced Defendant upon remand. Remanded. View "State v. Pearson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of domestic abuse assault and domestic abuse assault causing bodily injury. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in (1) admitting hearsay statements made to police and medical personnel, and (2) failing to merge the two convictions for purposes of sentencing. The court of appeals (1) concluded that the district court erred by admitting the alleged victim’s statements to police but did not err in admitting the alleged victim’s statements made to the nurse or doctor and that Defendant was not prejudiced by the admission of the hearsay statements to police; and (2) merged the convictions and affirmed the judgment and sentence for domestic abuse assault causing bodily injury. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the decision of the court of appeals, holding that the trial court erred by admitting the alleged victim’s hearsay statements through the testimony of the emergency room nurse and doctor without sufficient foundation, and the error was prejudicial. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of lascivious acts with a child for inappropriately touching his granddaughter’s genitals over her clothing on more than one occasion. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions under Iowa Code 709.8 because he did not make skin-to-skin contact with his granddaughter’s genitals. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a person can “touch the pubes or genitals of a child” within the meaning of section 709.8(1) without making skin-to-skin contact, and therefore, the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions. View "State v. Alvarado" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of drug dealing, child endangerment, and possession of firearms. The trial court sentenced Defendant to 100 years in prison with a mandatory one-third minimum term. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the decision of the court of appeals, holding (1) the evidence was insufficient to prove Defendant’s constructive possession of firearms; (2) Defendant’s remaining convictions were supported by sufficient evidence; and (3) the court of appeals’ rejection of Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims remains intact. Remanded for resentencing without the firearm conviction and enhancement. View "State v. Reed" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated. Defendant was transported to a law enforcement center and placed in the booking room. Defendant telephoned an attorney, who went into the booking room to meet with Defendant. The attorney was aware that the room had audio and video monitoring but took no steps to disable them or to request another room. Defendant was subsequently charged with operating while intoxicated. Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained following the attorney-client meeting, alleging, inter alia, a failure to honor his rights under Iowa Code 804.20. The district court denied the motion to suppress. Thereafter, the jury returned a guilty verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, no violation of section 804.20 occurred. View "State v. Lamoreux" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant was found guilty of going armed with a dangerous weapon concealed on or about her person. The conviction stemmed from Defendant's act of carrying a stun gun with her in her purse. The court of appeals reversed the conviction, holding that there was insufficient evidence that the stun gun was a dangerous weapon. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether there was sufficient evidence to conclude that an inoperable stun gun - or a stun gun that has not been shown to be operable - qualifies as a dangerous weapon under Iowa Code 702.7. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that a stun gun, even if inoperable, is per se a dangerous weapon under Iowa Code 702.7. View "State v. Howse" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of forgery and falsifying a public document. Defendant filed a motion for new trial, arguing that the evidence of his efforts to avoid apprehension was improperly admitted. The court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the decision of the court of appeals, holding that the court of appeals (1) did not err in affirming the district court’s admission of evidence of Defendant’s flight from law enforcement on August 11, 2011 because it was evidence of his consciousness of guilt for the charged crimes; and (2) erred in affirming the district court’s admission of evidence of Defendant’s attempt to evade detection by law enforcement on September 20, 2011 because its probative value as circumstantial evidence of his consciousness of guilt for the charged crimes was marginal at best, but the improper admission of this evidence was harmless error. View "State v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Defendant was approached by law enforcement officers while walking on the side of the road at 1:10 a.m. The officers asked Defendant if he would consent to a search of his person, and Defendant consented to a search. Defendant was subsequently charged with possessing methamphetamine. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the warrantless search violated the Federal and State Constitutions. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Defendant voluntarily consented to the search. On appeal, Defendant argued that the search violated Iowa Const. art. I, section 8, which requires police to “advise an individual of his or her right to decline to consent to a search.” The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s article I, section 8 argument was not preserved for appellate review; and (2) because the totality of the circumstances indicated that Defendant voluntarily consented to the search, the search was valid under the Fourth Amendment. View "State v. Prusha" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued his former criminal defense attorneys for legal malpractice, alleging that they allowed him to plead guilty to a crime that lacked a factual basis. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the attorneys on the basis that Plaintiff could not show he was actually innocent of any offense that formed the basis for the underlying criminal case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a criminal defendant’s showing of actual innocence is not a prerequisite to bringing a legal malpractice against his or her former criminal defense attorney. Instead, innocence or guilt should be taken into account when determining whether the traditional elements of a legal malpractice claim have been established. Remanded. View "Barker v. Capotosto" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with first-degree burglary, third-degree burglary, and domestic abuse. The district court found Defendant to be indigent and appointed private counsel to represent him. Defendant pled not guilty and filed an application for appointment of a private investigator at state expense. After the district court hired a hearing on the application, Defendant filed a motion requesting the portion of hearing concerning the merits of his application to be conducted ex parte. The district court denied the motion for an ex parte hearing, concluding that the State had a right to participate in the hearing on the merits of the application. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant was entitled to an ex parte hearing on the merits of his application for appointment of a private investigator at state expense. Remanded. View "State v. Dahl" on Justia Law