Justia Iowa Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial in 2007, Tammy Smith was convicted of child endangerment resulting in serious injury against her four-year-old son. The court of appeals affirmed on appeal. In 2009, Smith applied for postconviction relief based on evidence that her son communicated that his injury occurred when he placed his arm in the washing machine. The court of appeals held that this was newly discovered evidence and remanded for a new trial. On remand, the district court vacated Smith’s conviction and dismissed the case against Smith. In 2011, Smith filed a petition for wrongful imprisonment. The district court found that Smith did not establish by clear and convincing evidence neither she nor anyone else committed the crime of child endangerment. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supported the district court’s finding that Smith did not establish her wrongful imprisonment action by clear and convincing evidence. View "Smith v. State" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to three counts of intimidation with a dangerous weapon with intent and one count of a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that his counsel was ineffective for allowing him to plead guilty to three counts of intimidation with a dangerous weapon with intent, as there was no factual basis to support three separate and distinct acts. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court on the three separate charges of intimidation with a dangerous weapon, holding that trial counsel was ineffective for allowing Defendant to plead guilty to the three separate charges when no factual basis existed to establish Defendant's shooting of his gun in the air was three separate and distinct acts. Remanded. View "State v. Gines" on Justia Law

Defendant approached two separate tellers at a bank and demanded that each teller give him money from their cash drawers. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of robbery in the second degree. On appeal, Defendant contended that only one robbery occurred and that substantial evidence did not support the two robbery convictions. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not impose an illegal sentence by failing to combine the two robbery convictions into a single count, as the record contained substantial evidence that Defendant had the intent to commit two separate and distinct thefts; and (2) substantial evidence supported the two robbery convictions. View "State v. Copenhaver" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and five counts of intimidation with a dangerous weapon with intent. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant’s convictions on three counts of intimidation with a dangerous weapon with intent and affirmed his remaining convictions, holding (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a judgment of acquittal after the verdict on the intimidation counts because the evidence did not support the verdicts that Defendant committed five separate and distinct acts of intimidation with a dangerous weapon with intent; (2) however, substantial evidence supported two separate and distinct crimes of intimidation with a dangerous weapon with intent; (3) the record was inadequate to decide Defendant’s separate allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel; and (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to admit certain photographs into evidence. Remanded. View "State v. Ross" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of six counts of child endangerment and sentenced to fifty years in prison. The victim was Defendant's seven-week-old son. The baby suffered fifteen rib fractures, a broken arm, and a permanent brain injury over a three-week period. The victim's mother (Mother) pled guilty to child endangerment. On appeal, the Supreme Court (1) vacated Defendant's convictions as to two counts for the baby's broken ribs, holding that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions; (2) reversed the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion for an in camera review of Mother's mental health records under Iowa Code 622.10(4), a statute the Court upheld as constitutional; and (3) otherwise affirmed. View "State v. Neiderbach" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the second-degree murder of his live-in girlfriend. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not reversibly err by (1) failing to submit an instruction on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, as the evidence of provocation was insufficient to support admission; (2) excluding hearsay evidence relevant to Defendant's diminished-capacity defense based on his posttraumatic stress disorder, as Defendant failed to lay a foundation supporting any exception to the hearsay rule; (3) declining to obtain and review the victim's mental health records for exculpatory information; and (4) denying Defendant's motion for a new trial. View "State v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Defendant, a juvenile, was convicted of first-degree murder and mandatorily sentenced to life without parole. Defendant subsequently pursued numerous postconviction relief actions, including an application to correct his sentence. After the Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court to consider the constitutionality of Defendant's sentence, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, which held that the constitution prohibited a sentencing scheme mandating life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders. Before Defendant's hearing, the Governor commuted Defendant's sentence to life with no possibility for parole for sixty years. At the hearing before the district court, Defendant argued he should still be resentenced under Miller. The district court (1) concluded that the Governor exceeded his authority by commuting Defendant's sentence because the commutation circumvented the individualized sentencing required under Miller, and (2) resentenced Defendant to life in prison with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's commuted sentence still amounted to cruel and unusual punishment; and (2) consequently, the district court properly resentenced Defendant in light of Miller.View "State v. Ragland" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, seventeen-year-old Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree robbery and two counts of first-degree burglary. The district court imposed a fifty-year sentence, of which Defendant was required to serve thirty-five years, at which point she would become eligible for parole. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's sentence, holding (1) Defendant's sentence of a minimum of thirty-five years without the possibility of parole for the crimes involved in this case violated the core teachings of Miller v. Alabama; and (2) an individualized sentencing hearing was required in this case. Remanded. View "State v. Pearson" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and first-degree robbery. Defendant was sixteen years old at the time he committed the offenses. The district court imposed a seventy-five-year aggregate sentence, of which Defendant was required to serve 52.5 years. Defendant's alleged actions took place before the Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. Alabama. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions but vacated his sentence, holding (1) Defendant's 52.5-year minimum prison term triggered the protections to be afforded under Miller - namely, an individualized sentencing hearing to determine the issue of parole eligibility; and (2) a district court must recognize and apply the core teachings of Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, and Miller in making sentencing decisions for long prison terms involving juveniles. Remanded.View "State v. Null" on Justia Law

In 2002, David Buchwald pleaded guilty to a single count of lascivious acts with a child. Upon his release from prison in 2004, Buchwald was required to register as a sex offender for ten years. In 2011, Buchwald petitioned for modification of this requirement. After determining that Buchwald met the requirements of the statutory registration modification provision, the district court granted modification and reduced the duration of Buchwald’s registration obligation to five years. Because five years had elapsed before Buchwald petitioned for modification, the district court ordered Buchwald removed from the registry. The State filed a petition for writ of certiorari, arguing that the district court erred in determining that Buchwald was eligible for modification under the provision. The Supreme Court granted the petition and transferred the case to the court of appeals. Upon further review, the Supreme Court annulled the writ, holding that the district court’s modification and removal order was legal under the statutory provision. View "State v. Iowa Dist. Court for Story County" on Justia Law