Justia Iowa Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Shannon Breeden and Laura Hochmuth, both juveniles when their crimes were committed, were convicted of forcible felonies listed in Iowa Code 902.12. Both offenders were subject to the mandatory minimum requirement to serve at least seven-tenths of their sentences before becoming eligible for parole or work release. Each offender received a sentence with a mandatory minimum, and the Iowa Department of Corrections (IDOC) classified their sentences as category “B” for purposes of calculating earned-time credit. The Supreme Court subsequently decided State v. Lyle, which required resentencing of all offenders serving prison sentences with automatically imposed mandatory minimum terms for crimes committed as juveniles. The district court then resentenced Breeden and Hochmuth to an indeterminate term of years but without a mandatory minimum. The IDOC continued to classify the offenders’ sentences as category “B” such that their earned-time continued to accrue at a slower rate than the rate provided for under category “A.” The court of appeals reversed based on the plain language of section 903A.2(1), which provides that earned-time credit accrues at the faster rate for sentences lacking a mandatory minimum term. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that removal of the mandatory minimum triggers the faster accrual for earned-time credit. Remanded. View "Breeden v. Iowa Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Sondra Irving was employed as a medical assistant at the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics (UIHC). She was arrested on November 28, 2013, and incarcerated through December 24, but the charges were ultimately dismissed. Irving was scheduled to resume work on December 3. At Irving’s request, her mother called UIHC every work day between December 2 and December 11 to report that Irving would be absent from work. On December 11, an employee at UIHC told Irving’s mother that she did not need to call anymore because Irving had been placed on a leave of absence. Irving’s supervisors at UIHC visited her on December 5 and told her they were doing everything they could to make sure she did not lose her job. Irving’s supervisors continued to visit on visiting days, and they told her that she had been placed on a leave of absence. After she was released, Irving attempted to return to work and was told that she was no longer employed. Irving attempted to reapply for her job and was rejected. Irving applied for unemployment insurance benefits on January 16, 2014, under the Iowa Employment Security Law. Iowa Workforce Development denied her application in a letter stating, “Our records indicate you voluntarily quit work on 12/20/13, because you were arrested and confined in jail. Your quitting was not caused by your employer.” Irving appealed the decision. The district court affirmed. Irving then sought certiorari review. The Supreme Court found that the EAB record did not support a finding of misconduct, and that there was no substantial support to show that Irving's absence from the workplace due to her incarceration was a voluntary quit. Accordingly, the Iowa Supreme Court reversed the EAB's decision and remanded for further proceedings. View "Irving v. Employment Appeal Board" on Justia Law

In response to a 2009 executive order announcing a ten percent reduction in state departments and agencies for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2010, the Iowa Department of Human Services (IDHS) promulgated temporary rules adjusting the reimbursement rates paid to Medicaid service providers. Thereafter, the legislature passed a law directing IDHS to continue for the next fiscal year the rate reductions as specified under the 2009 executive order. Accordingly, IDHS promulgated permanent rules implementing certain rate reductions. IDHS, however, inadvertently omitted a reduction for one component of the rate calculation for certain Medicaid service providers. Nevertheless, IDHS continued to reimburse those service providers at the reduced rates established under the temporary rules. In an administrative proceeding, Plaintiffs, several providers, challenged the rate calculation, arguing that, even if the “missing” rule was an oversight, IDHS could not reimburse them at the reduced rate without a rule authorizing it to do so. An administrative law judge granted summary judgment for IDHS, and the decision was affirmed on review. The district court reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute provides sufficient authority for IDHS to reimburse service providers at the reduced rates without a rule authorizing it to do so. View "Exceptional Persons, Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t of Human Servs." on Justia Law

Employee injured her back during the course of her employment. Employer paid for the cost of care Employee received to treat her injury through September 2009. Employee later brought a workers’ compensation claim seeking workers’ compensation benefits and medical expenses she incurred for additional back treatment between May 2010 and April 2011. The Workers’ Compensation Commissioner concluded that the treatment Employee received between May 2010 and April 2011 was not causally related to her workplace injury but nonetheless awarded Employee medical expenses because Employer failed to notify Employee it was no longer authorizing treatment as required by Iowa Code 85.27(4). The district court reversed in part, concluding that the agency misinterpreted section 85.27(4) and that Employer was not liable for the expenses Employee incurred after September 2009. The court of appeals reversed the portion of the district court judgment reversing the agency’s determination that Employer was liable to Employee for the expenses she incurred from May 2010 through April 2011, concluding that the district court erroneously interpreted section 85.27(4). The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the decision of the court of appeals, holding that the Commissioner erroneously interpreted Iowa Code 85.27(4). Remanded. View "Ramirez-Trujillo v. Quality Egg, LLC" on Justia Law

Former employees of Warren County sued the County and its Board of Supervisors, alleging a violation of the open meetings law contained in Iowa Code chapter 21. The district court dismissed the action, concluding that the board members’ activities did not constitute a “meeting” as defined in Iowa Code 21.2(2). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the open meetings law prohibits a majority of a governmental body gathering in person through the use of agents or proxies to deliberate any matter within the scope of its policy-making duties outside the public view; and (2) the district court in this case incorrectly interpreted section 21.2(2) in applying the open meetings law. Remanded. View "Hutchison v. Shull" on Justia Law

The Polk County assessor set the 2011 valuation of Wellmark, Inc.’s corporate headquarters located in Des Moines at $99 million. Wellmark protested. The Polk County Board of Review denied the protest. On appeal, the district court found the value of the property on January 1, 2011 was $78 million. At issue in this case was whether the property should have been valued as if it were a multi-tenant office building, which would likely be the result if the property were sold, or whether the property should have been valued according to its current use as a single-tenant headquarters building. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that while there had been a showing of no active market for a single-tenant office building such as the Wellmark property, value should be based on the presumed existence of a hypothetical buyer at the property’s current use. View "Wellmark, Inc. v. Polk County Bd. of Review" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a tort claim with the state appeal board for wrongful death, alleging that the Iowa Department of Transportation’s negligent maintenance of a highway caused her husband’s death. The appeal board took no action on the claim for more than six months. Plaintiff finally withdrew the claim and filed suit in the district court, both individually and as administrator of her deceased husband’s estate. The district court dismissed the suit, concluding that Plaintiff had failed to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit as administrator of the estate. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff exhausted her administrative remedies and properly presented her claim to the appeal board. View "McFadden v. Dep’t of Transp." on Justia Law

Employee strained his back while working for Employer. Two years later, Employer notified Employee that it would no longer pay for his medical care, believing that the two-year statute of limitations for workers’ compensation benefits had expired. Employee sought benefits from the Iowa Workers’ Compensation Commission. The deputy commissioner ruled that the two-year statute of limitations in Iowa Code 85.26 barred Employee’s claim and that, even though Employee filed a workers’ compensation proceeding within thirty days after receiving the notice from Employer, the discovery rule did not apply in this case. The district court reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the discovery rule applied under the circumstances presented in this case. View "Baker v. Bridgestone/Firestone" on Justia Law

Petitioners petitioned for judicial review of a decision by the City Development Board approving the annexation of certain land. The district court affirmed. Petitioners filed a notice of appeal and a motion for extension of time to appeal, claiming that the annexation was improper. The Board filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as untimely filed. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the time to file a notice of appeal in an electronically filed case begins on the day the notice of filing is electronically submitted or on the day the court order from which the appeal is taken has been electronically filed. The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal, holding (1) the notice of appeal from a final judgment or order of the district court must be filed within thirty days of the date the judgment or order was electronically filed, rather than the date of the notice of filing; and (2) the notice of appeal in this case was untimely filed. View "Concerned Citizens of Southeast Polk Sch. Dist. v. City Dev. Bd. of Iowa" on Justia Law

After an investigation, the Iowa Department of Natural Resources (DNR) determined that the release of sweet corn silage runoff from Appellant’s farming operation caused fish kill on the Winnebago River. The DNR submitted a restitution assessment to Appellant, which included a restitution amount of $61,794. After a contested hearing, an administrative law judge issued a proposed decision that affirmed the restitution assessment. The Natural Resource Commission affirmed. The district court reversed and struck the restitution assessment. On remand, the Commission reduced the restitution assessment to Appellant as a result of the fish kill to $5298. Appellant then applied for an award of attorney fees pursuant to Iowa Code 625.29. The district court denied the motion, finding that three exceptions to the requirement to award attorney fees applied. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that none of the exceptions found in section 625.29(1) applied to Appellant’s case to preclude an award of attorney fees and that the district court should have found Appellant was the prevailing party under the statute. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that the State’s role in this case was primarily adjudicative, precluding an award of attorney fees. View "Brandstad v. State ex rel. Nat. Res. Comm’n" on Justia Law