Justia Iowa Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Krisha Bowman, a single mother of three minor children, received Section 8 housing assistance for several years. The Des Moines Municipal Housing Agency (DMMHA) later discontinued Bowman's housing assistance based on five alleged occurrences of unreported income. A hearing officer found that Bowman's assistance had been properly terminated. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) DMMHA's determination that Bowman had five occurrences of unreported income was supported by substantial evidence; (2) DMMHA's policy of treating a failure to report each child's Social Security benefits as a separate occurrence of unreported income did not violate the Fair Housing Act; and (3) DMMHA did not improperly fail to consider Bowman's mitigating circumstances before terminating her assistance. View "Bowman v. City of Des Moines Mun. Hous. Agency" on Justia Law

Evercom Systems provided telephone services to inmates in correctional facilities throughout the country. When Evercom billed a customer for collect calls he did not accept, the customer lodged a complaint to the Iowa Utility Board. The Board imposed a civil penalty for a "cramming" violation based on improper billing for collect telephone calls under Iowa Code 476.103 and Iowa Admin. Code r. 199-22.23. The district court reversed the agency's decision and imposition of the civil penalty, concluding that the Board misinterpreted the law and that no cram occurred. The court of appeals reversed the district court and reinstated the civil penalty. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and affirmed the district court, holding that Evercom's actions did not constitute a cram under rule 199-22.23. Remanded for dismissal. View "Evercom Sys., Inc. v. Utils. Bd." on Justia Law

In this condemnation case, Plaintiffs brought an action against the Iowa Department of Transportation (IDOT) and the State. IDOT's motion to dismiss was granted. Subsequently, the district court granted summary judgment for the State, concluding that Plaintiffs' exclusive remedy was a mandamus action to compel condemnation proceedings. The court then dismissed the first action. Before the district court had entered its summary judgment ruling, Plaintiffs petitioned for writ of mandamus against IDOT in a second action. After the court granted summary judgment for the State, IDOT filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the dismissal of the first action barred Plaintiffs from bringing the second action under both claim and issue preclusion. The district court disagreed and granted Plaintiffs' requested writ of mandamus. Defendants appealed on the issue of claim preclusion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that when a court order dismissing an action reveals the court's intent to preserve a claim arising out of the same transaction that is pending in another lawsuit, the claim in the other lawsuit should be allowed to proceed. View "Lambert v. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

After Toby Welch was arrested for operating a vehicle while intoxicated, police officers requested a breath specimen to be used for chemical testing. Welch refused the request. After talking to his attorney, however, Welch told officers that he wanted to consent to the breath test. The officers declined the request, commenting that because Welch had already refused, it was too late to submit to the test. Based on his refusal to submit to chemical testing, the Iowa DOT revoked Welch's driver's license for one year. The DOT's administrative law judge sustained the revocation, and the reviewing officer affirmed. The district court affirmed the revocation. At issue on appeal was whether the "one refusal is determinative" rule set forth in Krueger v. Fulton should be abrogated in favor of a more flexible standard permitting a motorist's subsequent consent to cure a prior initial refusal to submit to chemical testing. The Supreme Court rejected Welch's appeal and upheld the revocation of his license, concluding that a rule treating the motorist's initial refusal as determinative was supported by Court precedents, was consistent with the general assembly's intent, and was easier for police and courts to administer. View "Welch v. Iowa Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Two corporations organized as multiple housing cooperatives appealed the classification of their real estate as commercial for property tax purposes to the Jasper County Board of Review. The board did not alter the classification of the properties, and the cooperatives appealed. The district court affirmed the board's determination, concluding that the cooperative was actually operating as a standard rental property. After granting the cooperatives' combined motion for amendment and enlargement of findings and for a new trial, the district court concluded the cooperatives had followed all proper corporate formalities and were set up exactly as prescribed by Iowa law. Accordingly, the court reversed its prior ruling and concluded the real estate should properly be classified as residential. The court of appeals affirmed. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Iowa law requires property owned by residential cooperatives, properly organized under chapter Iowa Code chapter 499A, to be classified as residential and taxed at residential property rates; and (2) because the cooperatives were operating on a nonprofit basis, there was no basis for penetrating the corporate veil. View "Krupp Place 1 Co-op, Inc. v. Jasper County Board of Review" on Justia Law

After the district court dismissed criminal charges against J.W., J.W. filed a motion to expunge any information pertaining to the dismissed charges pursuant to Iowa Code 692.17, specifically requesting that the information be removed from the Iowa Court Information System (ICIS), including the website Iowa Courts Online, and the computer data storage systems for the county sheriff, city police, state division of criminal investigation, and the FBI. The district court granted J.W.'s request. The attorney general petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted. The Court sustained the writ, holding that (1) Section 692.17(1) does not require criminal cases that ended in dismissal or acquittal to be removed from ICIS or the website Iowa Court Online; and (2) making dismissed criminal case information available to the public, while withholding public access to deferred judgments, does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Iowa Constitution. View "Judicial Branch v. Dist. Court for Linn County" on Justia Law

After the district court dismissed a criminal charge against C.R., C.R. filed an application to expunge the dismissed charge pursuant to Iowa Code 692.17. The district court granted the request and held (1) judicial review from the administrative process afforded by Section 692.5 was not the exclusive remedy for a person seeking deletion of records from the Department of Public Safety, Division of Criminal Investigation (DPS) computer system, and (2) electronic docket entries on the Iowa Courts Information System (ICIS) and the website Iowa Courts Online relating to C.R.'s dismissed case were covered by the statute. The Supreme Court granted the attorney general's petition for writ of certiorari. The Court sustained the writ and vacated the district court's order, finding that the district court acted without jurisdiction in reviving a dismissed criminal case for the purpose of ordering a nonparty such as DPS to delete records. The Court concluded that Section 692.5 provides the exclusive administrative remedy for a person such as C.R. seeking removal of criminal history data from DPS files, and it is not appropriate to bring a direct civil action or to use a prior criminal case for that purpose. View "Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Dist. Court for Polk County" on Justia Law