Justia Iowa Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case concerns Sandra Selden, an employee at the Des Moines Area Community College (DMACC), who alleged that she was a victim of illegal wage discrimination based on sex and wrongful retaliation. Selden discovered that a male colleague was receiving a higher salary for the same job. When her employer did not act on her complaint, attributing the pay gap to the male employee's greater seniority and initial higher salary because of his relevant experience, Selden filed a civil rights complaint. She also applied for a supervisory position, but her application was screened out due to her lack of required educational qualifications. The case went to trial and the jury awarded damages to Selden on both claims. DMACC appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the lower court's decision, holding that the record did not contain substantial evidence of an illegal pay practice. The court found that the pay gap was due to gender-neutral factors, specifically a neutral seniority system, and the decision to hire the male employee at a higher rate due to market conditions and his significant experience. The court also found that the retaliation claim was not supported by substantial evidence, as the employer consistently screened out all applicants who lacked the required qualifications. The court concluded that the lower court should have directed a verdict in favor of the defendants and remanded the case for that purpose. View "Selden v. Des Moines Area Community College" on Justia Law

In a workers' compensation case, an employee was injured and sought compensation from her employer and its insurance carrier. The employee failed to provide her expert witness's evidence in a timely manner, serving them only two weeks before the arbitration hearing began. The employer and its insurance carrier objected, arguing that this late submission of evidence was unfairly prejudicial. The deputy workers’ compensation commissioner agreed with the employer and excluded the evidence. This decision was affirmed by the commissioner, but was later reversed on judicial review by the district court. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling. However, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that the commissioner’s decision to exclude untimely evidence was entitled to deference. The court found that the commissioner did not abuse his discretion by excluding the untimely evidence since the employee had disregarded multiple deadlines and submitted the reports only about two weeks before the hearing. Moreover, the reports were not from the employee’s treating physicians and the vocational report reached a conclusion that no other expert in the case shared. Therefore, the supreme court vacated the court of appeals decision, reversed the district court decision, and remanded the case back to the district court to enter a judgment affirming the commissioner's decision to exclude the untimely evidence. View "Hagen v. Serta/National Bedding Co., LLC" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Iowa was asked to interpret and apply three provisions of the Iowa Code relating to workers' compensation. The plaintiff, Corey Tweeten, worked on his father's farm and sustained a right arm injury on July 25, 2017. He filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits on January 21, 2020, more than two years after the incident. The defendants, his father's farm and their insurance carrier, appealed a district court order partially granting Tweeten's claim.The Supreme Court was called upon to interpret three provisions of the Iowa Code: (1) whether a compromise settlement between a claimant and the Second Injury Fund precludes further benefits from the employer, (2) whether the discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations for filing a claim for workers’ compensation benefits, and (3) how amendments to the Iowa Code affect reimbursement for independent medical examinations.The Supreme Court of Iowa held that the compromise settlement between Tweeten and the Second Injury Fund did not bar Tweeten's claims against his employer and their insurance carrier. The Court reasoned that the compromise settlement concerned a dispute over whether a previous injury triggered the Second Injury Compensation Act, separate from the claim against the employer for the current injury. Therefore, the compromise settlement did not bar the separate and distinct claim against the employer.Regarding the second issue, the Court ruled that the discovery rule as previously applied by the courts did not survive the 2017 revisions to the relevant section of the Iowa Code. The Court held that the two-year statutory period begins to run when the employee knows or should know that an injury is work-related, without regard to whether the injury is also serious enough to be compensable. As such, the plaintiff's claim was time-barred, as he knew he had a right-arm injury that was work-related more than two years before he sought benefits.Finally, the court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to reimbursement for the independent medical examination under Iowa Code section 85.39, since the injury for which he was examined was not compensable.The court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Tweeten v. Tweeten" on Justia Law

In this case, Scott Olson, an employee of BNSF Railway Company, sued the company under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, seeking damages for injuries he sustained in a workplace accident. A jury found in favor of Olson and awarded him significant damages. The railway company appealed, alleging three specific instances of error by the district court. The Supreme Court of Iowa vacated the decision of the court of appeals, which had granted a new trial, and affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that the railway company did not properly preserve its challenge to the verdict form for appeal, as the company had failed to object to the form until after the jury returned its verdict. The court also ruled that the district court did not err by allowing Olson to present new negligence claims during the trial that were not alleged in the pleadings or identified during discovery, as the company was clearly on notice that Olson alleged that the company failed to reasonably train all employees as one of the specific allegations of negligence at trial. Lastly, the court found that the company was not prejudiced by Olson's counsel's alleged misconduct during his rebuttal closing argument. View "Olson v. BNSF Railway Company" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court ruling that an Employer's refusal to collect dues from Union members' paychecks was a breach of certain collective bargaining rights and awarding money damages to Union, holding that there was no error.Union brought suit against Employer alleging that Employer breached its contracts by failing to deduct dues. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Union as to Employer's liability for breach of contract for refusing to deduct dues. After a bench trial on the issue of damages the court awarded $1,046,835 to Union. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Employer breached the contracts' written terms by failing to collect dues; and (2) the money damages remedy was appropriate and without legal error. View "UE Local 893/IUP v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court concluding that Desira Johnson, a teacher at the West Des Moines Community Schools (the District), was not subject to individual liability under the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA) on Plaintiff's claim of constructive discharge, holding that there was no error.Plaintiff, a teacher's associate who worked with special education students in the District, sued the District and Johnson, alleging that Johnson engaged in racial discrimination, leading to Plaintiff's constructive discharge in violation of the ICRA. The jury returned a defense verdict in favor of the District. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district did not err in overruling Plaintiff's Batson challenge to Defendants' peremptory strike of the only Black potential juror; (2) the district court did not err in granting Johnson's motion for directed verdict for correction of errors at law; and (3) Plaintiff was not entitled to relief on her allegations of error in the district court's evidentiary rulings. View "Valdez v. West Des Moines Community Schools" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court in this wrongful discharge action, holding that the district court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims against the State but erred in denying the motion to dismiss the claims against the Governor and the Governor's communications director.In her complaint, Plaintiff alleged that she was forced out of her employment with the Iowa Department of Public Health because she refused to stifle certain public records requests to the Department. In their motion to dismiss, Defendants argued, among other claims, that qualified immunity barred Plaintiff's claims. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) correctly denied Plaintiff's motion to dismiss the claims against the State; but (2) erred in denying Plaintiff's motion to dismiss her claims against the Governor and his communications director for wrongful discharge under Iowa Code 70A.28 and wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. View "Carver-Kimm v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court denying Thomas L. Cardella & Associates' (Cardella) motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict in this case alleging common law negligent supervision or retention, holding that the claim was barred by the Iowa Workers' Compensation Act (IWCA), Iowa Code ch. 85.Plaintiff sued Cardella two years after she quit her employment there. Because she missed the deadline for bringing a hostile work environment claim under the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA), Iowa Code ch. 216, Plaintiff sued for common law negligent supervision or retention and presented her claim to the jury seeking emotional distress damages related to her mental health as a negligent supervision claim premised on Cardella failing to protect her from assault and battery. After a trial, the jury awarded Plaintiff $400,000 in emotional distress damages. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, as presented to the jury, Plaintiff's claim was barred by IWCA. View "McCoy v. Thomas L. Cardella & Associates" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court granting Larry Hedlund's motion seeking retrospective application of the amendments to Iowa's whistleblower-protection law, Iowa Code section 70A.28, holding that section 70A.28(5)(a) did not apply retrospectively to Hedlund's claims.Hedlund brought a lawsuit against the State asserting a claim for wrongful discharge under section 70A.28. While the lawsuit was pending, the legislature amended the statute to allow aggrieved employees to pursue damages beyond those allowed by the prior version of the statute. Thereafter, Defendant filed a motion asserting that the new amendments applied retroactively to him. The district court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the legislature made to express provision for retrospective application the amendments to chapter 70A.8 did not apply in this case. View "Hedlund v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment to Defendants as to some of Plaintiff's claims and the judgment entered on the defense verdicts on Plaintiff's remaining defamation claims, holding that Plaintiff had not shown grounds for reversal.Plaintiff, the former principal at St. Joseph's Catholic School, brought this action against Father Josephs Pins, St. Joseph's Church, and the Diocese of Des Moines after her employment was terminated, alleging fraud and defamation by all defendants and breach of contract against Father Pins. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants as to Plaintiff's fraud, breach of contract, and defamation claims, and then a jury returned defense verdicts on the remaining defamation claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff was not entitled to reversal on his allegations of error. View "Konchar v. Pins" on Justia Law