Justia Iowa Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, who was employed as an engineer and paramedic for the City of Clinton fire department, requested light-duty assignments when she became pregnant. The fire chief denied Plaintiff’s request, determining that she was not entitled to light duty under the city administrative policy because she did not have a disabling injury that occurred on the job. When Plaintiff’s pregnancy had advanced, she took a leave of absence by using accrued vacation and sick leave time. Once she exhausted the vacation and sick leave, her leave of absence was unpaid. After Plaintiff gave birth, she brought a lawsuit against the City of Clinton and three of its employees, alleging pregnancy discrimination under Iowa Code 216.6(2) and violations of her equal protection and due process rights under the Iowa Constitution. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) the Court’s test for the evaluation of pregnancy discrimination claims is hereby adapted in this opinion; and (2) the material facts of this case do not support equal protection and due process claims under the Iowa Constitution. Remanded for consideration of the statutory civil rights claim under the new standard. View "McQuistion v. City of Clinton" on Justia Law

Employee strained his back while working for Employer. Two years later, Employer notified Employee that it would no longer pay for his medical care, believing that the two-year statute of limitations for workers’ compensation benefits had expired. Employee sought benefits from the Iowa Workers’ Compensation Commission. The deputy commissioner ruled that the two-year statute of limitations in Iowa Code 85.26 barred Employee’s claim and that, even though Employee filed a workers’ compensation proceeding within thirty days after receiving the notice from Employer, the discovery rule did not apply in this case. The district court reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the discovery rule applied under the circumstances presented in this case. View "Baker v. Bridgestone/Firestone" on Justia Law

The Workers’ Compensation Core Group of the Iowa Association for Justice filed a petition for declaratory order with the Workers’ Compensation Commissioner seeking a determination whether Iowa Code 85.25(2) mandates that employers or insurance carriers defending workers’ compensation claims must immediately provide copies of surveillance videos, photographs, and reports concerning a claimant’s physical or mental condition relative to the claim. The Commissioner concluded that section 85.27(2) overrides the work product immunity, thus requiring the disclosure of surveillance materials upon request from a claimant before the claimant is deposed. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 85.27(2) does not affect privileges and protections related to the litigation process such as the work product doctrine because the statute is limited to health-care-related privileges such as the physician-patient privilege. Remanded. View "Iowa Ins. Inst. v. Core Group of the Iowa Ass’n for Justice" on Justia Law

Employee was injured while working for Employer. Employee filed a workers’ compensation claim and submitted a report from a physician from whom she received an examination that was not authorized by Employer. The deputy workers’ compensation commissioner concluded that Employee suffered a permanent partial disability to her back and taxed as a cost against Employer the expense of the examination and report under the administrative rule governing the assessment of costs in a hearing. The district court affirmed, holding that the reimbursement was proper. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the reimbursement would be inconsistent with Iowa Code 85.39. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the commissioner may not tax the fees of a physician arising from the evaluation of an employee done outside the process set forth in section 85.39 as “costs incurred in the hearing” when the employee submits a written report of the evaluation at the hearing. View "Des Moines Area Reg’l Transit Auth. v. Young" on Justia Law

In 2006, Appellant was injured while working at Wal-Mart. In 2009, Appellant was injured while working at Warren Properties. Appellant filed a complaint against Warren Properties to recover compensation for her 2009 injury. The deputy workers’ compensation commissioner awarded benefits based on a finding of two successive injuries to the back and a shoulder injury and applied the full-responsibility rule with no apportionment for the preexisting disability. The workers’ compensation commissioner affirmed. The district court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the commissioner erred in failing to apportion Appellant’s preexisting disability that arose from the 2006 injury when calculating the benefits owed by Warren Properties for the 2009 injury. The court remanded to the case for a determination as to whether the 2009 injury resulted in any new back disability. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding that an employer who is liable to compensate an employee for a successive unscheduled work injury is not liable to pay for the preexisting disability that arose from employment with a different employer or from causes unrelated to employment if the employee’s earning capacity was not evaluated both before and after the successive injury. Remanded. View "Warren Props. v. Stewart" on Justia Law

Employers filed a petition against the City claiming that a city ordinance prohibiting discrimination by all employers violated their constitutional rights. The Supreme Court held that the antidiscrimination ordinance exceeded the City’s home rule authority and remanded. On remand, Employers argued that the City was liable under 42 U.S.C. 1983 as a matter of law for attempting to enforce the antidiscrimination ordinance in violation of Employers’ rights of freedom of speech and freedom of association and their federal constitutional rights of due process and equal protection. The district court granted summary judgment for the City. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the ordinance did not violate Employers’ federal constitutional rights; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed Employers to amend their petition. View "Baker v. City of Iowa City" on Justia Law

Grady Billick sought workers’ compensation benefits for a series of work-related injuries. Roberts Dairy, Billick’s current employer, contended that its liability for Billick’s industrial disability should be apportioned because Billick was previously compensated for his losses of earning capacity arising from previous injuries through settlements with previous employers. The Workers’ Compensation Commissioner concluded that Roberts’s liability for permanent partial disability benefits could not be apportioned under the circumstances of this case. The district court reversed, concluding that the Commissioner misapprehended the relevant statutes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was no error in the Commissioner’s interpretation of the relevant statutes. View "Roberts Dairy v. Billick" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs initiated suit in federal district court against Defendant, their former employer, alleging employment discrimination. Plaintiff’s complaint included claims that Defendant had violated Iowa Code 216.6A, Iowa’s equal pay law. Defendants moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiffs’ claims under section 216.6A should be dismissed to the extent that they arose before the effective date of that provision. After hearing oral arguments, the district court certified two questions to the Supreme Court to clarify Iowa law with respect to wage discrimination claims. The Supreme Court answered (1) section 216.6A applies on a prospective basis only to conduct occurring after its effective date; and (2) plaintiffs may recover damages for wage discrimination under the preexisting law, Iowa Code 216.6, and recoverable damages for loss of income are based on discriminatory wage payments that occurred within 300 days before the plaintiff filed a complaint with the civil rights commission. View "Dindinger v. AllSteel, Inc." on Justia Law

Kevin Fink filed a petition requesting alternate medical treatment for knee injuries allegedly sustained during the course of his employment with Denison Municipal Utilities (DMU). The workers’ compensation commissioner sent DMU a notice providing that DMU was required to file a first report of injury pursuant to Iowa Code 86.12. When DMU failed to file the first report of injury, the deputy commissioner assessed $1,000 against DMU. The district court reversed the $1,000 assessment, concluding that the deputy commissioner incorrectly interpreted section 86.12 as authorizing the commissioner to demand DMU to file a first report of injury, that the first report of injury was not required by section 86.11, and therefore, the record lacked substantial evidence to support the assessment against DMU. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in this case, DMU was required to file a first report of injury; and (2) the deputy commissioner’s decision that DMU failed to make a sufficient showing of good cause to avoid the $1,000 assessment pursuant to section 86.12 was supported by substantial evidence. View "Denison Mun. Utils. v. Iowa Workers’ Comp. Comm’r" on Justia Law

The Workers’ Compensation Commission found Employee to be totally and permanently disabled under the odd-lot doctrine and denied Employer and its Insurer (collectively, Employer) certain credits for disability payments previously received by Employee from other sources. The district court affirmed the Commission’s finding that Employee was totally and permanently disabled but reversed on the credit issue. The court of appeals reversed, holding (1) substantial evidence did not support the Commission’s award of permanent total benefits, and (2) the Commission was correct in its decision concerning the credits. On further review, the Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court’s finding that substantial evidence supported the Commission’s findings that Employee was totally and permanently disabled under the odd-lot doctrine; and (2) reversed the district court’s judgment regarding the issues concerning the credit due Employer. View "Gits Mfg. Co. v. Frank" on Justia Law