Justia Iowa Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Claimant's petition for judicial review challenging the decision of the workers' compensation commissioner concluding that Claimant, who was receiving disability benefits for a traumatic injury, could not later recover disability benefits on a separate cumulative injury claim where the cumulative injury was based solely on aggravation of the earlier traumatic injury.Because the three-year statute of limitations for review-reopening had passed Claimant instead brought a separate cumulative injury claim. The commissioner declined to award benefits for the asserted cumulative injury. The district court upheld the commissioner's ruling. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that because Claimant was precluded by the statute of limitations from bringing an original proceeding or review-reopening she could recover by way of a cumulative-injury claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that sufficient record evidence sustained the commissioner's finding that Claimant's difficulties were merely the aggravation over time of her original injury and that Claimant did not suffer a distinct and discrete cumulative injury to support additional benefits. View "Gumm v. Easter Seal Society of Iowa, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the district court certifying a class action of employees with pending workers' compensation claims, holding that the district court abused its discretion by certifying this case as a class action.Employee filed this civil action on behalf of himself and other "similarly situated" employees who signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) as a condition of employment providing for short-term light duty and treatment in Des Moines after sustaining a work-related injury. Before the instant case was filed, an Iowa court determined the MOU as applied to Employee violated Iowa Code 85.18 and 85.27(4). The district court certified the case as a class action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the commonality requirement was lacking, individual issues predominated over common ones, and because workers' compensation claims must be resolved by the workers' compensation commission before judicial review, the district court erred in certifying this case as a class action. View "Roland v. Annett Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment for Defendants on Plaintiffs' medical malpractice claims, holding that Plaintiffs failed to set forth specific facts showing a prima facie case of causation and lost chance of survival.Sharon Susie lost her right arm and eight of her toes due to a disorder known as necrotizing fasciitis. Sharon and her husband (together, Plaintiffs) filed a negligence claim against Defendants seeking damages for the amputation of Sharon's arm and other injuries. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants were negligent because Sharon's condition was not properly diagnosed and treatment was not timely commenced and that Defendants' actions resulted in the lost chance to save Sharon's arm and toes from amputation. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that summary judgment was properly granted because Plaintiffs failed to set forth specific facts showing a prima facie case of causation and lost chance of survival. View "Susie v. Family Health Care of Siouxland, P.L.C." on Justia Law

In this action brought by a law firm seeking to enforce its payment due under a contingency fee contract the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court ordering judgment against the family that retained the law firm for one-third of their recovery plus interest, holding that the one-third contingency fee contract was reasonable at the time of its inception.After a car accident left a motorist in critical condition, the motorist's family (Appellants) retained a law firm to represent the motorist's interests. A contingency fee contract required Appellants to pay one-third of the recovery to the law firm for attorney fees. Appellants accepted a $7.5 million offer to settle the case. When Appellants failed to pay the contingency fee the law firm brought this action to enforce its payment. Appellants argued that the one-third contingency fee contract violated Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.5(a) because it was an unreasonable fee. Judgment was ordered against Appellants for one-third of the recovery plus interest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the one-third contingency fee agreement was reasonable at the time of its inception; and (2) this Court will not use the noncontingency fee factors under Rule 32:1.5(a) to reevaluate the contingency fee contract from a position of hindsight. View "Munger, Reinschmidt & Denne, LLP v. Plante" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court awarding Plaintiff compensatory and punitive damages in his action for first-party bad faith in connection with a workers' compensation claim, holding that the compensatory award must be reduced and that, under the federal Due Process Clause, the maximum amount of punitive damages that may be awarded under the facts of this case was $500,000.Plaintiff, who was severely injured at work, brought this lawsuit alleging that a workers' compensation insurance carrier acted in bad faith to delay the receipt of benefits to which Plaintiff was entitled. On retrial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff for $382,000 in compensatory damages and $6,750,000 in punitive damages. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiff failed to offer substantial evidence to support his claim that the insurance carrier engaged in bad faith in connection with an alleged delay in acquisition of a replacement wheelchair; (2) with respect to the permanently and totally disabled bad-faith claim, the evidence supported actual damages of no more than $58,452,42; and (3) the maximum amount of punitive damages that may be awarded in this case is $500,000. View "Thornton v. American Interstate Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court granting a Des Moines bar's motion for summary judgment and dismissing an injured party's dramshop action on the ground that the notice given to the bar or its insurance carrier did not comply with Iowa Code 123.93, holding that the notice given substantially complied with section 123.93.In its summary judgment motion, the bar contended that Plaintiff did not provide the bar with statutory notice of his intent to pursue a dramshop claim against the bar. The district court agreed and granted the motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff's notice substantially complied with the requirements of section 123.93. View "Hollingshead v. DC Misfits, LLC" on Justia Law

In this personal injury action, the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the district court granting a new trial on Plaintiff's claims against the driver of a motorcycle upon which Plaintiff was riding when the motorcycle collided with a farm tractor, holding that the district court correctly omitted the farmer from the new trial.Plaintiff brought negligence claims against both the farmer and the motorcyclist. When the claims were submitted to the jury, the jury answered "no" to the question of whether the farmer was at fault. The verdict form mistakenly instructed the jury to stop there. The jury was then discharged without deciding whether the motorcyclist was at fault. Plaintiff moved for a new trial, and the district court ordered a new trial solely against the motorcyclist. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case for a new trial involving both defendants. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals, holding that the district court properly granted a new trial on Plaintiff's claims against the motorcyclist alone because the farmer should be excused from retrial where the jury's no-liability finding was untainted by the error affecting the motorcyclist. View "Whitlow v. McConnaha" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiff's medical malpractice claims against Defendants, holding that there was no reversible error in the proceedings below.Plaintiff, through a conservator, sued Defendants for negligent acts or omissions that occurred during Plaintiff's birth. During the birth, Plaintiff's shoulder became stuck on his mother's pelvis, and while Defendants performed maneuvers to resolve the stuck shoulder, Plaintiff was born with a permanent injury preventing normal use and function of his left arm. Based upon the jury's verdict, the district court entered an order dismissing Plaintiff's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not commit reversible error in the specifications of negligence it submitted to the jury; (2) Plaintiff was properly prevented from introducing continuing medical education (CME) records to show a breach in the standard of care; (3) the district court abused its discretion by prohibiting the use of CME records as impeachment evidence, but the error was harmless; (4) Defendants’ expert opinion testimony was properly disclosed and did not reflect an opinion in anticipation of litigation; and (5) the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the jury’s access to video evidence during deliberation. View "Eisenhauer v. Henry County Health Center" on Justia Law

In this civil action filed against the police investigator, the prosecutors, and the municipalities that investigated and prosecuted a criminal case in which Plaintiff was eventually acquitted the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court denying Defendants' motions to dismiss, holding that the district court erred in concluding that Baldwin v. City of Estherville, 951 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 2018), displaced the judicial process immunity.Specifically, the Court held (1) the district court erred in part in denying the prosecutor defendants' motion to dismiss because the judicial process immunity barred all claims in the petition against the prosecutors and the county except for a claim relating to an ethics complaint; and (2) the district court correctly denied the motion to dismiss with respect to the police defendants' argument regarding the judicial process immunity but erred in denying the police defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's defamation claim. View "Venckus v. City of Iowa City" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the district court granting summary judgment to Defendants on all claims in this employment case, holding (1) Plaintiff's direct civil action under Iowa Code 70A.28(5), the whistleblower statute, is not precluded by the availability of an administrative remedy; and (2) the district court correctly granted summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims of age discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional distress.Specifically, the Court held (1) section 70A.28(5) expressly creates an independent cause of action in the alternative to administrative remedies under Iowa Code chapter 17A, and therefore, the district court erred when it determined that judicial review following the administrative process was the exclusive means to seek redress for alleged retaliation against a whistleblower; (2) the district court did not err in determining that Plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer age discrimination was the real reason for Plaintiff's termination; and (3) the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim because none of Defendants' conduct was sufficiently egregious to satisfy the "outrageousness" prong. View "Hedlund v. State" on Justia Law