Justia Iowa Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In the underlying action, Plaintiff filed a personal injury action against Defendants, the State, and a volunteer driver for the Iowa Department of Human Services. The Supreme Court held that Defendants were entitled to summary judgment under the statute of limitations and the volunteer-immunity provisions of the Iowa Tort Claims Act. Plaintiff subsequently filed this malpractice action against her attorney (Attorney) in the underlying case. The jury returned a verdict finding Attorney was negligent and that his negligence caused damage to Plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed on appeal and reversed on cross-appeal, holding (1) the driver's volunteer immunity did not preclude the State's respondeat superior liability for Attorney's negligence, and therefore, Plaintiff's legal malpractice claim against Attorney did not fail because she could have recovered in the underlying case had the claim been timely filed; (2) Attorney could not reduce the malpractice-damage award by the contingent fee he would have taken if the underlying action had been successful because he did not earn the fee and because Plaintiff must pay new counsel who prosecuted the malpractice action; and (3) Plaintiff was entitled to interest running from the date by which her underlying action should have been tried, absent Attorney's negligence.View "Hook v. Trevino" on Justia Law

Larysa and Alan Asher filed an action individually and as parents and next friends of their minor child, asserting that Dr. Anthony Onuigbo was negligent in delivering their baby. The jury found in favor of Asher and awarded damages. Onuigbo appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court erred by providing the jury with a causation instruction based upon the Restatement (Second) of Torts rather than an instruction based upon the Restatement (Third) of Torts, as adopted by the Court in Thompson v. Kaszinski, but the error was harmless under the facts and circumstances of this case; and (2) substantial evidence supported submission of two challenged specifications of negligence to the jury. View "Asher v. OB-GYN Specialists, P.C." on Justia Law

Elmer Gaede, who owned a 120-acre farm together with his wife, died testate on February 2005. Elmer’s daughter, Diean, was named executor under the will. Diean designated Ivan Ackerman to render legal services in the administration of the estate. During the pendency of the probate proceedings, Elmer’s son James and his wife, who were leasing the farm, exercised the option under the lease agreement to purchase the farm. Diean later filed this legal malpractice lawsuit against Ackerman, alleging that Ackerman failed to adequately protect her personal interests relating to the enforceability of the option. The district court granted summary judgment for Ackerman, determining that Ackerman did not have a duty to protect Diean’s personal interests. The court of appeals reversed, holding that a factual dispute existed over the question of whether Diean had a reasonable expectation that Ackerman was representing her personal interests. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that insufficient facts supported Diean’s claim that Ackerman reasonably understood that Diean expected him to protect her personal interests in challenging the option. View "Sabin v. Ackerman" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Klever Miranda and Nancy Campoverde, entered the U.S. without documentation. Klever received a notice of removal order and was represented by attorney Michael Said. Said advised Klever and Nancy to leave the country and then file a document called a Form I-601 waiver, which permits an applicant who is otherwise ineligible to be admitted into the U.S. based on extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. Said told Plaintiffs that once their son Cesar obtained citizenship, he would be a qualifying relative. However, once Plaintiffs left the country and filed the Form I-601, the applications were denied. Plaintiffs later learned that Cesar was not a qualifying relative. Plaintiffs and Cesar brought a legal malpractice action against Said, including a claim for emotional distress damages and punitive damages. The district court allowed only the claim for economic damages to be considered by the jury and found Said negligent. The court of appeals reversed, finding the claims for emotional distress and punitive damages should have been submitted to the jury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court erred in concluding that emotional distress and punitive damages were not available to Plaintiffs. Remanded for a new trial.View "Miranda v. Said" on Justia Law

In this case the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the district court erred in admitting exhibits directed to the issue of fault in a pharmacy malpractice action that were not disclosed during the pretrial discovery. Plaintiff appealed the district court's adverse ruling. The court of appeals found the district court abused its discretion by not excluding the evidence as a sanction for violating both the pretrial order of the district court to disclose all exhibits prior to trial and the spirit and purpose of the discovery rules. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and affirmed the district court, holding (1) the pharmacy had a duty to disclose the newly discovered evidence prior to trial by supplementing its answers to interrogatories; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the request to exclude the evidence as a sanction, as the trial court pursued a reasonable course of action. View "Whitley v. C.R. Pharmacy Serv., Inc." on Justia Law

In this real estate dispute, some of the defendants filed a motion for sanctions, alleging Defendant brought the action to harass, cause unnecessary delay, and needlessly increase the cost of litigation. The district court ordered sanctions against Plaintiff's counsel for $1,000. The court of appeals affirmed the sanctions, ordering them payable to the jury and witness fund. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the court of appeals, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in fixing the amount of the sanction at $1,000; (2) the court abused its discretion by ordering the sanction be paid to the jury and witness fund; and (3) given Rule 1.413(1)'s preference of compensating victims, the district court should enter an order requiring Plaintiff's counsel to pay the sanction in equal sums to the defendants who sought the sanction as partial reimbursement of the legal fees they incurred in defending against the unfounded claims brought against them. Remanded. View "Rowedder v. Anderson" on Justia Law

A bank attempted to prove an accounting negligence claim by using an expert witness to testify regarding the accountant's audit of a lumber company. The district court refused to allow the expert to testify as to generally accepted CPA auditing standards, whether the accountant breached those standards, and causation. The district court left open the question of whether the expert could testify as to the accountant's work papers. At trial, the bank made an offer of proof as to the work papers but did not move to introduce them, and so the court never ruled on their admissibility. The jury returned a verdict finding the accountant did not negligently perform the audit. The court of appeals reversed the district court and remanded for a new trial. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding (1) the bank failed to preserve error on the work-paper issue, and (2) the expert was not qualified to testify on the ultimate issue of whether the accountant violated generally accepted accounting standards because the expert lacked the knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education to provide an adequate basis for this testimony. View "Quad City Bank & Trust v. Jim Kircher & Assocs., P.C." on Justia Law