Justia Iowa Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was whether the terms of two five-year leases, which automatically self-renewed for four additional five-year terms unless the tenant unilaterally opted out of the lease, offended Iowa Const. art. I, 24. James Gansen rented land used for agricultural purposes from the Charles Gansen Trust until the trustee unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate a higher rent from James. The trustee filed a petition for declaratory action, alleging, inter alia, that the leases violated Iowa Const. art. I, 24, which provides that no lease of agricultural lands “shall be valid for a longer period than twenty years.” The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Trust, concluding that the leases violated article I, section 24. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) although prior litigation took place between the parties involving the same agricultural leases, claim preclusion did not apply to bar the Trust’s claim that the leases violated the Iowa Constitution; and (2) the leases at issue violated article I, section 24 to the extent they remained in effect after the passage of twenty years from their inception. View "Gansen v. Gansen" on Justia Law

In 2012, the Iowa City Board of Review reclassified eighteen properties from commercial to residential for property tax purposes because the properties had recently been organized as multiple housing cooperatives. Two Iowa corporations organized the cooperatives under chapter 499A of the Iowa Code. The City of Iowa City appealed, arguing that the Board’s reclassification was improper because two natural persons, not two corporations, must organize multiple housing cooperatives under the Code. The City also argued that the organizers did not properly organize the cooperatives because each cooperative had more apartment units than members and section 499A.11 requires a one-to-one ratio. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Board and the intervening housing cooperatives. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) two Iowa corporations may organize a multiple housing cooperative under chapter 499A; and (2) the Code does not require a one-apartment-unit-per-member ownership ratio for a multiple housing cooperative to be properly organized. View "City of Iowa City v. Iowa City Bd. of Review" on Justia Law

Dolphin Residential Cooperative, Inc. owned an apartment complex in Iowa City that consisted of twenty-two buildings comprising four hundred residential units. The Iowa City assessor classified the multiunit apartment buildings as commercial property for tax assessment purposes. Dolphin challenged this classification, arguing that because it was a multiple housing cooperative, organized under chapter 499A of the Iowa Code, the property should have been classified as residential property. The Iowa City Board of Review denied Dolphin’s request to reclassify the property, determining that because Dolphin was not properly organized under chapter 499A, Dolphin failed the organizational test for residential cooperatives adopted by the Supreme Court in Krupp Place 1 Coop, Inc. v. Board of Review. On appeal, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Dolphin, concluding that Dolphin met the organizational test set forth in Krupp and ordering the Board to reclassify the subject property as residential property for tax assessment purposes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Dolphin was not properly established under section 499A.1(1), and therefore, the district court erred when it granted summary judgment to Dolphin and denied summary judgment to the Board. View "Dolphin Residential Coop., Inc. v. Iowa City Bd. of Review" on Justia Law

The Clarke County Reservoir Commission, comprised of several agencies located in Clarke County, decided to move ahead with plans to build a new public reservoir for drinking water. The Commission filed a declaratory action seeking a declaration that the proposed reservoir was a public use that would allow the Commission to condemn private land. Defendants, landowners whose property was to be condemned for the project, alleged that the Commission did not have the legal authority to initiate this condemnation proceeding because the Commission included private members that lacked eminent domain authority. The district court ruled for the Commission, concluding that the project qualified as a public use and that the Commission, as then constituted, was a proper acquiring agency. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred by ruling that the Commission, with private members, had eminent domain powers. View "Clarke County Reservoir Comm’n v. Abbott" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a contractor-developer, bought a residential lot from a realtor in order to build townhomes for sale. Plaintiff filed a complaint against the original developers whose contractor had performed purportedly substandard soil work, alleging that the lot had improperly compacted backfill which required significant additional work to get it ready for construction. Plaintiff sued under the theory of breach of the implied warranty of workmanlike construction. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that the implied warranty did not apply to the sale of a lot without a dwelling. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the implied warranty of workmanlike construction does not apply to a for-profit developer’s purchase of a lot with no dwelling, regardless of the work performed by the seller to make the lot buildable. View "Rosauer Corp. v. Sapp Dev., LLC" on Justia Law

After a bank acquired an apartment complex by deed in lieu of foreclosure the bank discovered substantial black mold in the units. The bank sued the builder, alleging, inter alia, that the builder breached the implied warranty of workmanlike construction. The district court granted summary judgment to the builder on the implied warranty claim. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the bank may not recover under the implied warranty of workmanlike construction, as the implied warranty of workmanlike construction does not extend to a lender acquiring apartment buildings by a deed in lieu of foreclosure. View "Luana Savings Bank v. Pro-Build Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

The City of Waterloo agreed to transfer to a residential developer property the City originally acquired for use as a road right-of-way. Taxpaying residents of the City challenged the legality of the proposed transfer, arguing that the City failed to follow statutory procedures for the sale of unused right-of-way, including compliance with certain appraisal, notice, right-of-first refusal and public bid requirements. The district court dismissed the case, concluding that the subject property was not unused right-of-way. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the property was unused right-of-way, and therefore, the City could not sell or transfer it to the developer without first following the procedure prescribed in Iowa Code 306.23. View "Hartog v. City of Waterloo" on Justia Law

Elmer Gaede, who owned a 120-acre farm together with his wife, died testate on February 2005. Elmer’s daughter, Diean, was named executor under the will. Diean designated Ivan Ackerman to render legal services in the administration of the estate. During the pendency of the probate proceedings, Elmer’s son James and his wife, who were leasing the farm, exercised the option under the lease agreement to purchase the farm. Diean later filed this legal malpractice lawsuit against Ackerman, alleging that Ackerman failed to adequately protect her personal interests relating to the enforceability of the option. The district court granted summary judgment for Ackerman, determining that Ackerman did not have a duty to protect Diean’s personal interests. The court of appeals reversed, holding that a factual dispute existed over the question of whether Diean had a reasonable expectation that Ackerman was representing her personal interests. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that insufficient facts supported Diean’s claim that Ackerman reasonably understood that Diean expected him to protect her personal interests in challenging the option. View "Sabin v. Ackerman" on Justia Law

In 2009, Scott Schulte and Marisel Del Valle (together, Appellants) executed a promissory note and, as security for the note, a mortgage on real property. The note and mortgage were later assigned to BAC Home Loans Servicing. In 2010, BAC filed a foreclosure petition alleging Appellants were in default, and the district court entered a decree of foreclosure. In 2012, Bank of America, as successor by merger to BAC, filed a notice of rescission of foreclosure and, contemporaneously, filed a motion to set aside decree. Appellants opposed the motion to set aside decree, arguing that neither the motion nor the notices of rescission were timely filed within one year of the entry of judgment as required by Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1012 and 1.1013 and were therefore time barred. The district court found the rescission notices timely filed, concluding that a two-year limitations period applied under Iowa Code 654.17, and accordingly, granted Bank of America’s motion to set aside the decree. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it confirmed that the rescission action was timely filed and granted the motion to set aside decree. View "Bank of Am., N.A. v. Schulte" on Justia Law

Appellants owned residential real estate in West Des Moines. In 2011, the Dallas County Board of Review established an assessment value of Appellants’ property for tax purposes. In 2012, the Board established a new, greater value for the property. Appellants filed a petition with the Board protesting the assessment. The petition stated that the protest was lodged against the 2011 property valuation. At a hearing before the Board, Appellants stated that they wished to protest the valuations for both 2011 and 2012. The Board denied Appellants’ protest, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the 2011 protest was untimely. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Appellants’ petition was sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the Board and bring Appellants’ protest within the Board’s authority to review; and (2) the Board had the authority to entertain a request for amendment of Appellants’ petition and relate it back to the original filing. Remanded. View "Allen v. Dallas County Bd. of Review" on Justia Law