Justia Iowa Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A credit union filed a claim in probate court, asserting that the decedent owed money on a car loan. The estate mailed a notice of disallowance to the credit union, but the credit union claimed it never received the notice. The estate argued that the claim was time-barred because the credit union did not request a hearing within twenty days of the notice. The credit union conducted an internal investigation and submitted an affidavit stating it never received the notice and that the person who signed for it was not an employee of the credit union but an agent of the U.S. Postal Service.The Iowa District Court for Linn County imposed sanctions on the credit union and its attorneys for violating Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.413(1), which requires that filings be well-grounded in fact and law after reasonable inquiry. The court found that the credit union's investigation was insufficient and that the attorneys made incorrect assertions about the mailing. The Iowa Court of Appeals upheld the sanctions.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the district court abused its discretion in awarding sanctions. The Supreme Court found that the credit union and its counsel conducted a reasonable investigation under the circumstances, given the time constraints and the information available. The court emphasized that the reasonableness of the investigation should be assessed based on the time of the filing, not with hindsight. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals, sustained the writ of certiorari, vacated the sanctions, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Dupaco Community Credit Union v. Iowa District Court for Linn County" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over the will of Richard D. Janssen, who had six children: Dean, Sheryl, Debra, Jeff, Larry, and Gary. Richard and his wife Melva owned three parcels of farmland, which they held as tenants-in-common. Over the years, they executed several "mirror image" wills, with the final one in 2014 leaving the farmland to Larry and Gary, $60,000 each to Dean, Jeff, and Debra, and nothing to Sheryl. After Melva's death in 2017, Richard, upset about the terms of his 2014 will, drafted a new will in 2018 with the help of his daughter Sheryl. This will left his one-half interest in each of the farm properties to Debra and Sheryl, and the remainder of his estate would be equally divided between Larry, Gary, Sheryl, and Debra. Richard passed away in June 2018.After Richard's 2018 will was admitted to probate, Dean, Larry, Gary, and Jeff filed a petition for will contest against Sheryl, Debra, and Security National Bank, seeking to set aside Richard’s 2018 will based on lack of testamentary capacity or undue influence exercised by their sisters. The first trial ended in a hung jury. Before the second trial, Gary and Larry sought dismissal of all claims against Debra. The second trial resulted in a verdict in favor of Larry and Gary, concluding that Sheryl had unduly influenced Richard in drafting his 2018 will and that her tortious interference caused actual damages to Larry and Gary in the amount of $480,000.After the verdict, the district court granted Sheryl’s posttrial motion to dismiss for lack of an indispensable party (Debra), ordering a new trial instead of dismissal. Larry and Gary appealed this decision, arguing that Debra's dismissal did not entitle Sheryl to a new trial where section 633.312’s joinder requirement was satisfied.The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the district court's decision, holding that when a party, once joined and actively participating in a will contest, affirmatively agrees to be dismissed from the lawsuit without objection from any other party, section 633.312 has been satisfied and does not prevent their dismissal. The court remanded the case for the district court to address any unresolved issues in the pending posttrial motions and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Janssen v. The Security National Bank of Sioux City" on Justia Law

In Iowa, a ten-year-old boy was treated at the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics (UIHC) for a dislodged feeding tube and died the next day. The boy's mother filed administrative tort claims on behalf of the child's estate prior to being appointed as the estate's administrator. The child's parents also individually claimed loss of consortium. The claims were dismissed by the district court, which ruled that the mother lacked authority to file a claim on behalf of the estate prior to her official appointment, and that the parents had not properly filed individual administrative tort claims.The Supreme Court of Iowa held that the district court was correct to dismiss the parents' individual claims as no individual administrative tort claims were filed. However, the court determined the district court had erred in dismissing the estate's claims, arguing that the mother's administrative tort claims were valid despite her not being appointed as the estate's administrator at the time of filing. The court explained that a representative may act to protect an estate's interests before being officially appointed and can ratify pre-appointment acts, granting them the same effect as acts that would occur after appointment. The court also confirmed that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to permit the plaintiffs' new evidence. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Anderson v. State of Iowa" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court concluding that the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) was entitled to a detailed accounting and all of the residual funds The Center for Special Needs Trust Administration, Inc. had retained from Steven Muller's trust subaccount, holding that the district court erred.The Center for Special Needs Trust Administration, Inc. acted as trustee over a pooled special needs trust subaccount for the benefit of Muller. After Muller died, the Center retained all residual funds in his trust subaccount. DHS sought judicial intervention to obtain a detailed accounting of the retained funds. The district court decided in favor of DHS and ordered the Center to pay DHS all of the funds it had retained from the subaccount. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Center provided an adequate accounting, and therefore, the district court lacked authority to grant the relief it provided to remedy the Center's alleged failure to account for the retained funds. View "In re Medical Assistance Pooled Special Needs Trust of Steven Muller" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment for the Center for Special Needs Trust Administration, Inc., as trustee of a polled special needs trust held for the benefit of Scott Hewitt, and dismissing this action brought by the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) claiming it was entitled to a detailed accounting, holding that the trustee provided an adequate accounting.Title XIX of the Social Security Act required that the funds remaining in Hewitt's trust subaccount when he died must first be used to reimburse the state for its Medicaid expenditures. DHS filed a petition to invoke jurisdiction over the irrevocable trust, claiming that it was entitled to a detailed accounting to ensure that the funds retained by by the pooled special needs trust were used for a proper purpose. The district court granted summary judgment for the Center, concluding that no further accounting was required absent evidence that the Center breached its duties as trustee. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that DHS was not entitled to relief on its claims of error. View "In re Medical Assistance Pooled Special Needs Trust Of Scott Hewitt" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court in this appeal concerning attorney fees, holding that the court abused its discretion in ordering an eighty-nine-year-old protected person under a conservatorship to pay for two sets of attorneys to litigate the same position in the same litigation.At issue in this contentious intrafamily litigation was whether the trustee of an individual retirement account (IRA) was entitled to recover more than $200,000 in attorney fees from the assets of the IRA for prevailing in its view of who was the property beneficiary of the account. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) there was no abuse of discretion in the district court's conclusion that fees were potentially recoverable and that $200,000 was a reasonable sum; but (2) the district court abused its discretion in ordering Joan Bittner, the sole beneficiary of the IRA who was under a conservatorship, to pay for both her own and the trustee's attorneys fees. View "Bittner v. U.S. Bank National Ass'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court and the decision of the court of appeals in this dispute over the beneficiary designation of an individual retirement account (IRA), holding that the designation unambiguously conveyed the IRA to the decedent's spouse rather than an unnamed family trust.Plaintiff, one of four children of the decedent in this case, argued that his father's IRA beneficiary designation designated an unnamed family trust as the primary beneficiary. The beneficiary designation, however, began by stating that the decedent's spouse was the 100 percent primary beneficiary of the IRA. The district court entered judgment determining that the decedent's spouse should receive the entire IRA account outright. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the lower courts correctly determined that the spouse was entitled to the IRA. View "U.S. Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Bittner" on Justia Law

In this dispute - between a revocable trust and a man who had provided the settlor with services during the settlor's lifetime - over the sale of certain trust property, the Supreme Court held that the net proceeds from the sale of the property should be divided equally between the man and the trust.Helen Schardein, the settlor, purchased a lakeside lot and put it in joint tenancy with Dan Sickels. Schardein arranged that the property be deeded to herself and Sickels as joint tenants with right of survivorship. Schardein's nephew assisted her in creating a revocable trust, into which she transferred all her property, including her interest in the lot. After Schardein died, the lakeside lot was sold. The nephew filed a petition for partition of the lot, naming Sickels as a defendant. The district court ruled that the transfer of Schardein's interest into the trust had severed the joint tenancy and that the trust was entitled to 100 percent of the net sale proceeds. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) Schardein's transfer of her interest into the trust severed the joint tenancy; and (2) the net proceeds from the sale should be divided equally between Sickels and the trust, after giving the trust credit for expenses it paid during the course of the joint tenancy. View "Grout v. Sickels" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of a beneficiary and ruling that an amendment to an irrevocable trust was invalid, holding that the surviving settlor of an irrevocable trust cannot, with the consent of all of the beneficiaries, modify the dispositive terms of an irrevocable trust without court approval.Donald and Collen Davis established the trust at issue. After Collen died, Donald sought to amend the dispositive terms of the trust. Donald and his four children signed a consent document on different days and then Donald executed an amendment altering the disposition of the trust estate. Katina Little, one of the children, brought this action challenging the validity of the amendment. The district court granted summary judgment for Little, concluding that the amendment to the trust agreement was void for lack of authority. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the consent of Donald and the four beneficiaries was insufficient to modify the trust after Collen's death. View "Little v. Davis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the beneficiary of an estate cannot file a separate suit outside probate against the personal representative of the estate for claims arising out of and related to the personal representative's fees for administering the estate.After Roger Rand died testate, attorney Larry Storm informed Security National Bank that it had been nominated as the personal representative of the estate. Plaintiff, a beneficiary of the estate, later received a document entitled "Estate Administration Overview" that included a statement regarding fees for the estate's administration. The document reflected the maximum fees for ordinary services that a personal representative could receive. Plaintiff objected, arguing that Security National deprived the beneficiaries of the opportunity to replace the personal representative with another that required a smaller fee. The probate court reduced the fees to Security National below the requested amounts. Plaintiff then brought this suit against Security National arising from Security National's service as the personal representative of the estate. The district court held that Plaintiff's claims should have been asserted in the probate court or otherwise failed as a matter of law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly granted summary judgment to Security National on all claims. View "Rand v. Security National Corp." on Justia Law