Justia Iowa Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Testator executed a last will and testament devising property to her adult son and daughter. After the will was executed but before Testator’s death, Son was adopted by his paternal aunt. After Testator’s death, Daughter filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment establishing that the adoption terminated Son’s ability to inherit under Mother’s will, which identified him as a beneficiary both by name and by membership in a class. The district court concluded that Son’s adoption out of his biological family did not preclude him from taking under Mother’s will. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the testamentary gift to Son as a named beneficiary and as a member of a class did not fail because of his adoption as an adult after Testator executed her will. View "Roll v. Newhall" on Justia Law

The administrators of Decedent’s estate listed residential real estate for sale. Decedent’s common law spouse objected to the proposed sale, claiming it was her marital home. The district court recognized the surviving spouses’s common law rights but nonetheless approved the sale. The buyers took possession and made improvements to the home. Thereafter, the court of appeals reversed and remanded for consideration of the homestead interest of the spouse. On remand, the district court gave the surviving spouse the option of taking possession of the home upon paying the buyers a substantial part of the cost of their improvements to the home or receiving the proceeds from the estate’s sale of the real estate. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) the surviving spouse could retake possession upon payment of the approximate value of the home before the improvements were made less any credit to which she was entitled from the buyers for rent during the period the spouse had been dispossessed; and (2) the spouse could transfer title to the buyers and receive the proceeds from the estate’s sale of the home plus credit for rent from the date of the conveyance to the buyers until the date of judgment. View "In re Estate of Waterman" on Justia Law

In 1991, Husband and Wife were married in Florida. Later that year, the couple signed a postnuptial agreement expressly providing that Florida law would apply. The agreement contained a provision stating that Wife waived all claims against Husband’s estate upon his death, including her elective share. In 2005, the couple moved to Iowa. After Husband died in 2012, Wife claimed her spousal elective share under Iowa law. The agreement was enforceable under Florida law, but Wife argued that the agreement could not be enforced in Iowa because it would violate Iowa’s public policy against postnuptial agreements waiving a spouse’s elective share. The district court denied relief based on the choice of law provision in the agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Florida law applied to the enforceability of Wife’s waiver of her spousal elective share contained in the agreement. View "Hussemann v. Hussemann " on Justia Law

Elmer Gaede, who owned a 120-acre farm together with his wife, died testate on February 2005. Elmer’s daughter, Diean, was named executor under the will. Diean designated Ivan Ackerman to render legal services in the administration of the estate. During the pendency of the probate proceedings, Elmer’s son James and his wife, who were leasing the farm, exercised the option under the lease agreement to purchase the farm. Diean later filed this legal malpractice lawsuit against Ackerman, alleging that Ackerman failed to adequately protect her personal interests relating to the enforceability of the option. The district court granted summary judgment for Ackerman, determining that Ackerman did not have a duty to protect Diean’s personal interests. The court of appeals reversed, holding that a factual dispute existed over the question of whether Diean had a reasonable expectation that Ackerman was representing her personal interests. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that insufficient facts supported Diean’s claim that Ackerman reasonably understood that Diean expected him to protect her personal interests in challenging the option. View "Sabin v. Ackerman" on Justia Law

Arnold and Vesta Melby were trustors of separate irrevocable trusts. Both Arnold and Vesta received Medicaid benefits. After the Melbys’ deaths, the Iowa Department of Human Services notified Arnold’s estate that it would seek reimbursement for all Medicaid expenses it had paid on behalf of Arnold and Vesta. The Department then filed an application in the estate seeking a judgment declaring the Melbys had interests in the corpus of their trusts that should be counted as assets available for repayment of the Department’s Medicaid claim. The district court concluded (1) the Melbys’ interests in the trusts were limited to their right to receive the net income from the trusts’ assets, and (2) the Department’s right to recover the Medicaid payments could be enforced against such income, but not against the corpus of the trusts. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Department’s right to recover Medicaid payments under the facts of this case extended beyond the Melbys’ net income interests; and (2) the district court erred in determining the scope of medical assistance for which recovery was authorized by the general assembly. Remanded. View "In re Estate of Melby" on Justia Law

Defendant, a financial advisor to Decedent, was sued by identified beneficiaries of Decedent’s signed written estate plan. The beneficiaries alleged that Defendant was negligent in the performance of his duties, and therefore, the beneficiaries did not receive what they were supposed to receive under the plan. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, concluding that Defendant, a non-attorney, owed no duty to the beneficiaries. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the judgment entered against plaintiff Steve Bristol and his spouse, holding that Bristol was owed a duty by Defendant and that Bristol raised a genuine of material fact as to whether Defendant’s negligent performance of his agency responsibilities caused Bristol not to receive a specific devise set forth in Decedent’s will; and (2) affirmed the judgment with respect to the charitable recipient plaintiffs, as their damages were too speculative to establish damages. View "St. Malachy Roman Catholic Congregation of Geneseo, Ill. v. Ingram" on Justia Law

The parties in this case, William and Steven Burkhalter, were the sons of Louis Burkhalter. William challenged an unfavorable modification of Louis's revocable trust that occurred just before Louis's death, claiming (1) Steven unduly influenced Louis and tortiously interfered with the trust, and (2) Louis lacked the necessary testamentary intent when he made the modification. The district court directed a verdict for Steven on the tortious interference claim, and the jury returned a verdict for Steven on the testamentary capacity and undue influence claims. The court of appeals remanded the case for a new trial on the undue influence claim, concluding that the district court erroneously instructed the jury on undue influence, and the error prejudiced William. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and reinstated the jury verdict on the undue influence claim, holding that the district court's instruction accurately reflected the law of undue influence and did not unduly emphasize the causation element of the undue influence claim. View "Burkhalter v. Burkhalter" on Justia Law

Carl Hord's will created the Carl Hord Trust and directed that Carl's undivided one-half interest in 210 acres of farmland would pass to his niece and nephews upon the death of his wife, Lois, whom Carl named as a life beneficiary of the trust. The will also contained a spendthrift clause. While Lois was alive, five of the six remainder beneficiaries executed quitclaim deeds to Lois. Lois's will bequeathed her entire interest in the farmland to Waugh, including the remainder interests acquired from her nephews and niece. After Lois died, the remainder beneficiaries learned for the first time of the spendthrift clause. The beneficiaries filed a petition for construction of the trust and intervened in the probate action regarding Lois's estate, arguing that the spendthrift clause rendered their assignments and quitclaims deeds void. The probate court held that the beneficiaries' right to revoke their assignments terminated at Lois's death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the applicable statute of limitations barred the remainder beneficiaries from enforcing the terms of the spendthrift clause of Carl's will. View "In re Estate of Hord" on Justia Law

Decedent's last will and testament and her correspondence with family members included specific directions to bury her in a plot she had already purchased at a cemetery in Montana. Decedent's surviving husband, Appellant, sought to bury her in Iowa and claimed the sole right to decide because Decedent had never executed a declaration under the Final Disposition Act designating anyone else to make that decision. The probate court granted a motion by the executor of Decedent's estate compelling burial in Montana. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the operative statutory language requires enforcement of the surviving spouse's decision; and (2) therefore, the probate court erred in concluding that Decedent's wishes trumped her surviving husband's right to control disposition of her remains under the Final Disposition Act. View "In re Estate of Whalen" on Justia Law

This dispute centered around a revocable trust Settlor created during her lifetime. Settlor was the trustee of the trust until shortly before her death, when she substituted Judith Cunningham as trustee. After Settlor died, Marylynn Miller, a beneficiary, asked the probate court to order Cunningham to account for the activities of the trust since her appointment and to order Cunningham to reimburse her for attorney fees. Upon the probate court's order, Cunningham rendered the accounting. The probate court then ordered Cunningham to personally pay attorney fees and costs incurred during the course of the proceeding. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the ruling that Cunningham had a duty to account to Miller for the period preceding Settlor's death, as, pursuant to Iowa Code 633A.3103, the settlor alone is entitled to accounting for the period the trust is revocable; and (2) reversed the order requiring Cunningham to personally pay the fees and costs incurred litigating that issue, as there was no evidence Cunningham was guilty of malfeasance, fraud, or abuse. View "In re Trust of Trimble" on Justia Law