Justia Iowa Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case was the companion interlocutory appeal with facts that mirrored Iowa Dep’t of Human Servs. v. DeWitt Bank and Trust Co., decided on the day of this opinion. As in DeWitt Bank, the Iowa Department of Human Services filed an application for relief against defendant healthcare providers under Iowa Code 249A.44. The district court appointed a receiver. Bank Iowa, a lender that held perfected security interests in Defendants’ property, intervened and challenged the receiver’s applications for fees and expenses. The district court concluded that receivership expenses should be paid out of property in which the Bank had prior lien interests. The Supreme Court reversed based on the reasoning set forth in DeWitt Bank, holding that Iowa follows the common law rule that a receiver may be charged against a third party’s security interest only to the extent the secured creditor has received a benefit from the receivership or the secured creditor has consented to the receivership. Remanded. View "Iowa Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Morse Healthcare Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

DeWitt Bank & Trust Company (Bank) held perfected security interests on real and personal property of Community Care, Inc. (CCI). When the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) determined that CCI had committed Medicaid fraud, DHS filed an application for injunctive relief under Iowa Code 249A.44. The district court enjoined CCI from transferring property or taking action inconsistent with DHS’s right to recover overpayments of medical assistance from CCI. CCI subsequently ceased operations, and the district court appointed a receiver for CCI. The Bank sought clarification that the receiver’s fees and expenses would not be paid out of CCI assets in which the Bank had a prior perfected security lien. The district court denied substantive relief, concluding that Iowa law requires the expenses of the receiver to be paid before secured creditors. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Iowa law does not authorize a receiver to be paid out of assets that are subject to a prior perfected line; and (2) rather, Iowa follows the common law rule that the costs of a receiver may be charged against a third party’s security interest only to the extent the secured creditor has received a benefit from the receivership or the secured creditor has consented to the receivership. View "Iowa Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Cmty. Care, Inc." on Justia Law

The Clarke County Reservoir Commission, comprised of several agencies located in Clarke County, decided to move ahead with plans to build a new public reservoir for drinking water. The Commission filed a declaratory action seeking a declaration that the proposed reservoir was a public use that would allow the Commission to condemn private land. Defendants, landowners whose property was to be condemned for the project, alleged that the Commission did not have the legal authority to initiate this condemnation proceeding because the Commission included private members that lacked eminent domain authority. The district court ruled for the Commission, concluding that the project qualified as a public use and that the Commission, as then constituted, was a proper acquiring agency. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred by ruling that the Commission, with private members, had eminent domain powers. View "Clarke County Reservoir Comm’n v. Abbott" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was the constitutionality of the statutory framework under which Iowa taxes the delivery of natural gas at variable tax rates depending on volume and the taxpayer’s geographic location within the state. Plaintiff filed with the Iowa Department of Revenue a claim for a refund of replacement tax Plaintiff paid for certain tax years, asserting that the replacement tax in Iowa Code 437A.5(2) violates the federal Equal Protection Clause, Iowa Const. art. I, 6, and the dormant Commerce Clause because it is based on the natural gas competitive service area in which a taxpayer is located. An administrative law judge denied Plaintiff’s refund claims and rejected the constitutional challenges to the replacement tax. The district court also denied each of Plaintiff’s constitutional challenges. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a rational basis exists for the variable excise tax imposed on the delivery of natural gas under section 437A.5, and therefore, Plaintiff failed to establish a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment or Iowa Const. art. I, 6; and (2) the natural gas delivery tax framework does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. View "LSCP, LLLP v. Kay-Decker" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of third-degree burglary for entering a soon-to-be demolished, dilapidated house to obtain scrap metal. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that he entered an occupied structure, (2) the district court erred in submitting the adopted-for-overnight-accommodation and the used-for-the-storage-or-safekeeping-of-anything-of-value alternatives defining occupied structure to the jury; and (3) the district court erred in overruling his motion for mistrial based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for burglary. View "State v. Rooney" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a tort action against, among other defendants, a fellow university student (Defendant), claiming monetary damages for his injury. Plaintiff’s damage claim included damages for mental pain and mental disability. Defendant requested Plaintiff to provide him with a release, waiving Plaintiff’s privilege to his mental health records and allowing the student to access the mental health records pertaining to Plaintiff’s treatment for anger management while he was in elementary school. Plaintiff refused. The district court ordered Plaintiff to sign an unrestricted patient’s waiver for records, concluding that Plaintiff waived his privilege to his mental health records by putting his mental well-being at issue in this case and that Defendant’s request did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional right to privacy. The Supreme Court reversed on interlocutory review upon adopting a protocol balancing a patient’s right to privacy in his or her mental health records against a tortfeasor’s right to present evidence relevant to the injured party’s damage claims. Remanded to the district court to allow the parties to present the appropriate evidence called for by this protocol and to apply the protocol before deciding if Defendant should sign a patient’s waiver. View "Fagen v. Grand View Univ." on Justia Law

Grady Billick sought workers’ compensation benefits for a series of work-related injuries. Roberts Dairy, Billick’s current employer, contended that its liability for Billick’s industrial disability should be apportioned because Billick was previously compensated for his losses of earning capacity arising from previous injuries through settlements with previous employers. The Workers’ Compensation Commissioner concluded that Roberts’s liability for permanent partial disability benefits could not be apportioned under the circumstances of this case. The district court reversed, concluding that the Commissioner misapprehended the relevant statutes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was no error in the Commissioner’s interpretation of the relevant statutes. View "Roberts Dairy v. Billick" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with theft in the third degree based on her current crime and two prior theft convictions. Defendant moved to strike her 2003 conviction of theft in the third degree as a basis to support the charge of third-degree theft, asserting that the conviction was constitutionally infirm because she was not represented by counsel when she pled guilty and served a term of incarceration. In fact, Defendant was held in jail for one day prior to her initial appearance and then, upon pleading guilty, was sentenced to one day in jail, with credit for time served. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Defendant’s situation was not one in which she faced the possibility of imprisonment requiring the appointment of counsel. Defendant was subsequently found guilty of theft in the third degree. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) under the right to counsel provision under Iowa Const. art. I, 10, a misdemeanor defendant has a right to counsel when the defendant faces the possibility of imprisonment; and (2) because Defendant was not provided the assistance of counsel and the State stipulated there was not a valid waiver, the 2003 misdemeanor conviction could not be used as a predicate offense to enhance a later punishment. Remanded. View "State v. Young" on Justia Law

Amish Connection Inc. purchased a business insurance policy from State Farm Fire and Casualty Company that only insured damage “caused by rain” if an insured event first ruptured the roof or exterior walls to allow the rain to enter. The policy covered a store Amish Connection operated in a leased space in a shopping mall. The store was damaged when an interior drainpipe failed, allowing rain from the evening’s rainstorm to flood the store. Amish Connection submitted a claim under its policy. State Farm declined the claim based on the rain limitation of the property. Amish Connection filed suit against State Farm for breach of its insurance contract. The district court granted summary judgment for State Farm based on the rain limitation. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that to the extent the limitation of coverage for damage “caused by rain” was ambiguous, it must be construed against State Farm. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that under the unambiguous terms of State Farm’s policy, damage from rainwater released by a breaking drainpipe during a rainstorm is not an insured loss because the damage was caused by rain within the meaning of the rain limitation. View "Amish Connection, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder and attempt to commit murder. The trial court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment for the murder conviction and a term of twenty-five years for the attempted murder conviction, to be served consecutively. The court of appeals affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, there was no abuse of discretion in the imposition of the sentences, and defense counsel provided effective assistance; and (2) the district court erred in refusing to give an instruction describing the affirmative defense of intoxication, but Defendant was not prejudiced by the refusal. The Supreme Court vacated the portion of the court of appeals’ opinion that concluded that the district court erred in failing to submit the intoxication instruction to the jury and otherwise affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to instruct the jury on how to apply the evidence of intoxication in deciding if the State established the specific-intent elements of the crimes. View "State v. Cordero" on Justia Law