Justia Iowa Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2006, Cable One, Inc., which offers cable television and internet access, began offering Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) service to its residential customers in Sioux City. In 2008 and 2009, the Iowa Department of Revenue determined that Cable One should be assessed based on the value of its telephone operating property in the state. Cable One appealed, arguing that it was not a telephone company subject to taxation under Iowa Code chapter 433 because VoIP is not the equivalent of telephone service. An administrative law judge (ALJ) in the Iowa Department of Inspections and Appeals entered summary judgment in favor of Cable One, concluding that the company did not fit the “historical context of a ‘telephone company.’” The Iowa State Board of Tax Review agreed with the ALJ that Cable One was not subject to assessment under chapter 433. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) wiring that was originally installed for cable television purposes but is now also used to provide VoIP service is a “telephone line”; and (2) therefore, Cable One, which operates these lines, is subject to central assessment for property tax purposes as a telephone company. View "Kay-Decker v. Iowa State Bd. of Tax Review" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance pursuant to a plea agreement. The district court deviated from the recommended sentence in the plea agreement. However, the court did not give its reason for Defendant’s sentence in the written sentencing order. The court of appeals affirmed the sentence because, under current caselaw, Defendant waived his appeal rights as to his sentence by waiving reporting of the sentencing hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the court of appeals, holding (1) a defendant who waives reporting of sentencing and fails to provide a recreated record does not waive error when the sentencing judge fails to indicate on the written record the reasons for the sentence imposed; and (2) the district court did not err by deviating from the plea agreement in this case. View "State v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a contractor-developer, bought a residential lot from a realtor in order to build townhomes for sale. Plaintiff filed a complaint against the original developers whose contractor had performed purportedly substandard soil work, alleging that the lot had improperly compacted backfill which required significant additional work to get it ready for construction. Plaintiff sued under the theory of breach of the implied warranty of workmanlike construction. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that the implied warranty did not apply to the sale of a lot without a dwelling. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the implied warranty of workmanlike construction does not apply to a for-profit developer’s purchase of a lot with no dwelling, regardless of the work performed by the seller to make the lot buildable. View "Rosauer Corp. v. Sapp Dev., LLC" on Justia Law

After a bank acquired an apartment complex by deed in lieu of foreclosure the bank discovered substantial black mold in the units. The bank sued the builder, alleging, inter alia, that the builder breached the implied warranty of workmanlike construction. The district court granted summary judgment to the builder on the implied warranty claim. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the bank may not recover under the implied warranty of workmanlike construction, as the implied warranty of workmanlike construction does not extend to a lender acquiring apartment buildings by a deed in lieu of foreclosure. View "Luana Savings Bank v. Pro-Build Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of sexual abuse in the second degree. The court of appeals reversed the conviction, concluding that Defendant was entitled to a new trial on the ground that an expert witness vouched for the credibility of the victim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that when the expert testified that the child victim’s “demeanor was completely consistent with a child who has been traumatized, particularly multiple times,” the expert indirectly vouched for the victim’s credibility, thereby commenting on Defendant’s guilt or innocence. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Jaquez" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of sexual abuse in the second degree. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Defendant was entitled to a new trial on the ground that a certain expert witness vouched for the credibility of the victim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court erred in allowing into evidence an objected to portion of the expert’s report to the jury, as the disputed portion of the testimony crossed the line and vouched for the victim’s credibility, and the expert’s statement prejudiced Defendant. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Brown" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of sexual abuse in the second degree. The court of appeals reversed the conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion by not dismissing the case due to the State’s alleged repudiation of a plea agreement; but (2) abused its discretion when it found the testimony of an expert witness did not amount to an impermissible comment on the victim’s credibility, as the testimony of two expert witnesses indirectly conveyed to the jury that the child’s out-of-court statements were credible. View "State v. Dudley" on Justia Law

In 2013, a child-in-need-of-assistance (CINA) petition was filed alleging that three minor children were in need. The guardian ad litem subsequently subpoenaed Mother’s therapist to testify at the CINA adjudicatory hearing regarding her mental health counseling of Mother. Thomas filed a motion to quash the subpoena, arguing that the information sought was confidential where Mother declined to waive the patient-psychotherapist privilege. The juvenile court concluded that Thomas must testify at the hearing. Thomas appealed, and the Supreme Court treated the appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court annulled the writ and remanded, holding that Iowa Code 232.96(5)’s statutory exception to the psychotherapist privilege in CINA adjudicatory hearings controlled in this CINA proceeding, and the juvenile court’s order enforcing the subpoena requiring Thomas to testify did not violate the confidentiality afforded mental health treatment under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). View "In re Interest of A.M." on Justia Law

After he was arrested for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI), Defendant sought legal advice regarding whether to submit to a chemical breath test during a teleconference with a lawyer. Defendant asked for privacy during the call, but rather than tell Defendant that private, in-person attorney-client consultations were permitted at the jail, the arresting officer simply told Defendant that he could not consult confidentially with his lawyer while “on the phone.” Defendant subsequently took the Breathalyzer test. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress the breath test results and convicted him of OWI. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) Defendant adequately invoked his statutory right to a confidential attorney-client consultation under Iowa Code 804.20, and therefore, the officer was required under the statute to inform Defendant that his attorney must come to the jail for a confidential conference; and (2) the remedy for such a violation of section 804.20 rights is suppression of the chemical test evidence. View "State v. Hellstern" on Justia Law

Fifteen-year-old D.S. was accused of harassing a peer during an after-school confrontation. The State filed a petition alleging that D.S. had committed a delinquent act, specifically harassment in the third degree. After an adjudicatory hearing, the juvenile court concluded that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that D.S. committed harassment in the third degree by means of intimidation. The court then adjudicated D.S. to have committed a delinquent act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was insufficient evidence in the record to support the finding that D.S. committed harassment, and therefore, the juvenile court erred when it adjudicated D.S. delinquent under the harassment statute. Remanded for an order dismissing the petition. View "In re Interest of D.S." on Justia Law