Justia Iowa Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Eagle Point Solar proposed to enter into a long term financing agreement with the City of Dubuque that would provide the City with renewable energy. Under the agreement, Eagle Point would construct a solar energy system, and the City would purchase all of the electricity generated by the system. However, if Eagle Point was a “public utility” under Iowa Code 476.1 or an “electric utility” under Iowa Code 476.22 it would be prohibited from serving customers, such as the City, who were located within the exclusive service territory of Interstate Power and Light Company, another electric utility. The Iowa Public Utilities Board (IUB) concluded that Eagle Point would be a public utility under the proposed business arrangement. The district court reversed, concluding that Eagle Point’s proposed arrangement with the City did not make it an electric utility for purposes of the statutes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Eagle Point was not a public utility under section 476.1 or section 476.22. View "SZ Enters., LLC v. Iowa Utils. Bd." on Justia Law

Susan Heathcote and Carrie La Seur served on the Environmental Protection Commission during a period of time when the Commission considered the adoption of rules to prevent the degradation of Iowa’s water resources. In 2009, the Commission voted to approve two antidegradation rules and procedures, which were approved by the EPA. Plaintiffs sought to overturn the rule and regulation, alleging that Heathcote was disqualified to vote because she engaged in activities in her employment in support of the rule and that La Seur was disqualified to serve on the Commission at the time she voted because she had moved to Montana and lost her status as an elector in Iowa. The district court granted summary judgment to the Commission regarding both Heathcote’s and La Seur’s participation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the nature of rulemaking does not disqualify a Commission member from voting to adopt rules she personally and professionally supported; and (2) the disqualification of a Commission member did not invalidate the action taken by the Commission when the disqualification did not undermine the integrity of the process and the public interest supported validating the rule despite the disqualification. View "Iowa Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Envtl. Prot. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Russell Phillips, an employee of the Chicago Central & Pacific Railroad, filed a negligence action against the railroad. The jury returned a general verdict in favor of Phillips, and the district court awarded Phillips damages. The railroad paid Phillips the amount of the judgment but withheld a portion of the award to pay taxes allegedly due under the Railroad Retirement Act (RRTA). Phillips refused to execute a satisfaction of judgment, arguing that the railroad should have withheld any amount for tax purposes. Subsequently, the railroad moved for an order of satisfaction and discharge of judgment. The district court sustained the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an award for time lost is subject to tax withholding under the RRTA; and (2) the railroad fully satisfied the judgment. View "Phillips v. Chicago Cent. & Pac. R.R. Co." on Justia Law

Aaron Cannon, a student at Palmer College of Chiropractic, was blind and requested that Palmer make accommodations for his visual disability. Palmer denied the request, explaining that it could not provide the proposed accommodations and curricular modifications because they would fundamentally alter its educational program. Cannon eventually withdrew from the program. Cannon filed a complaint with the Davenport Civil Rights Commission, arguing that Palmer had discriminated against him on the basis of his disability. The Commission granted relief, finding that Palmer had failed to comply with the applicable federal and state disability laws. The district court reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commission did not erroneously interpret or irrationally apply the applicable law in concluding that Palmer failed to establish that Cannon’s suggested accommodations would fundamentally alter its curriculum. View "Palmer College of Chiropractic v. Davenport Civil Rights Comm’n" on Justia Law

John Goodpaster worked as a customer service manager for Schwan’s Home Service, Inc., the largest home delivery frozen foods company in the nation, at Schwan’s Des Moines location. Goodpaster’s duty was to sell and deliver company products, and a basic requirement of Goodpaster’s job was that he drive a commercial vehicle. When Goodpaster began experiencing medical problems, his sales began to decrease, and he was eventually terminated. Goodpaster sued Schwan’s under the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA) for disability discrimination and retaliation, claiming his employment was terminated because he had multiple sclerosis. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Schwan’s. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) multiple sclerosis is a disability contemplated by the ICRA; and (2) a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether Goodpaster was qualified to perform the essential functions of his position. Remanded. View "Goodpaster v. Schwan’s Home Serv., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who attended school in the New London Community School District, was fourteen years old when Gina Sisk, a teacher who also served as Plaintiff’s track coach, began to engage in improper sexual conduct toward Plaintiff. The alleged abuse occurred in the early 2000s. In 2012, Plaintiff filed a petition against the District asserting several tort claims. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations in the pre-2007 Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act (IMTCA). The district court denied Defendants’ motions. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether a discovery rule was available to Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the common law discovery rule does not apply to claims under the pre-2007 IMTCA; (2) the limitations provision in Iowa Code 614.8A does not apply to individuals who were fourteen years or older when the alleged sexual abuse occurred; and (3) the absence of a discovery rule in the pre-2007 IMTCA does not violate the Iowa Constitution’s equal protection clause. View "Doe v. New London Cmty. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded no contest to second-degree sexual assault of a child, a felony, in Wisconsin. The Wisconsin trial court deferred judgment of conviction (DJOC), which allowed the Wisconsin court to refrain from entering an adjudication of guilt and a judgment for four years if Defendant agreed to certain terms. Before the termination of the DJOC, the state of Iowa charged Defendant with a violation of Iowa’s felon-in-possession statute, Iowa Code 724.26, which prohibits felons from possessing firearms in Iowa. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the Iowa charge, arguing that the predicate Wisconsin felony was not a conviction for purposes of section 724.26. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that district court properly denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss the case where the Wisconsin court found Defendant guilty upon his tendering of a no contest plea and where Defendant had not completed the terms of his deferred judgment on his felony count. View "State v. Olsen" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree sexual abuse for performing a sex act on a two-year-old girl. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred by admitting as prior bad acts evidence the fact that child pornography was found on Defendant’s computer and other electronic devices. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence that Defendant possessed specific videos involving child sexual abuse, as the evidence was relevant to the issue of the identity of the perpetrator, and the evidence’s probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. View "State v. Putnam" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with and pled guilty to criminal transmission of HIV in violation of Iowa Code 709C.1. The district court accepted the plea, sentenced Defendant to twenty-five years suspended and placed Defendant on probation for five years. Defendant subsequently filed an application for postconviction relief, claiming that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance for allowing him to plead guilty, by failing to challenge the factual basis of the plea, and failing to complete a proper investigation before the plea hearing. The district court denied the application, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the guilty plea record did not contain a factual basis to support the plea, and the court in this case could not use the rule of judicial notice to establish the factual basis in the guilty plea record. Remanded. View "Rhoades v. State" on Justia Law

Grain Processing Corporation (GPC) operated a local corn wet milling facility in Muscatine. Plaintiffs, eight individuals who resided within one and one-half miles of GPC’s facility, filed a lawsuit on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated Muscatine residents, claiming that GPC’s operations caused harmful pollutants and noxious odors to invade their land. Plaintiffs based their claims on common law and statutory nuisance and the common-law torts of trespass and negligence. GPC filed a motion for summary judgment prior to class certification, claiming (1) Plaintiffs’ common law and statutory claims were preempted by the Federal Clean Air Act; (2) alternatively, the common law claims were preempted by the state statutory companion to the CAA; and (3) the issues raised by Plaintiffs were political questions. The district court granted summary judgment for GPC. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiffs’ claims (1) were not preempted by the CAA; (2) were not preempted by Iowa Code 455B; and (3) were not subject to dismissal by operation of the political question doctrine. View "Freeman v. Grain Processing Corp." on Justia Law