Justia Iowa Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of possession of marijuana and crack cocaine with intent to deliver. The court of appeals reversed, holding that there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions. The Supreme Court reinstated Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) considering the totality of the evidence in this case, the evidence was sufficient to sustain a jury verdict of guilt; and (2) the district court correctly found that the State provided a race-neutral explanation for striking a potential alternate juror, and therefore, there was no Batson error in jury selection. View "State v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to theft and agreed to enter a drug court program. The district court also ordered that Defendant participate in residential treatment at the Iowa Residential Treatment Center (IRTC). As a result of drug court program violations, Defendant was incarcerated in jail for a period of time. Defendant was later arrested for another violation of the terms of the drug court program. The district court then removed Defendant from participation in the drug court program and imposed a sentence for second-degree theft as a habitual offender pursuant to the plea bargain. Upon resentencing, the district court denied Defendant credit for time spent at IRTC and for the time Defendant spent in jail. The Supreme Court vacated the district court sentence in part, holding that Defendant was entitled to credit for time spent at the IRTC and for time spent in jail as a result of his drug court program violations. View "State v. Calvin" on Justia Law

Defendant was the driver in an accident that resulted in the deaths of Mark Empen and Lindsay Gibbs. Defendant entered into civil settlement agreements with the estates of Empen and Gibbs. Defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to two counts of homicide by vehicle. The district court sentenced Defendant to a term of imprisonment and ordered Defendant to pay restitution to the victims' families. Several years later, Defendant applied for an order stating he had satisfied his restitution obligation, arguing that the settlement amounts paid to the victims' estates should be set off against the restitution amounts he was ordered to pay the families. The district court denied the applications. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant was entitled to a setoff for the settlement payments made to each estate.View "State v. Driscoll" on Justia Law

In 1991, Husband and Wife were married in Florida. Later that year, the couple signed a postnuptial agreement expressly providing that Florida law would apply. The agreement contained a provision stating that Wife waived all claims against Husband’s estate upon his death, including her elective share. In 2005, the couple moved to Iowa. After Husband died in 2012, Wife claimed her spousal elective share under Iowa law. The agreement was enforceable under Florida law, but Wife argued that the agreement could not be enforced in Iowa because it would violate Iowa’s public policy against postnuptial agreements waiving a spouse’s elective share. The district court denied relief based on the choice of law provision in the agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Florida law applied to the enforceability of Wife’s waiver of her spousal elective share contained in the agreement. View "Hussemann v. Hussemann " on Justia Law

The Iowa Utilities Board (IUB) allowed an independent transmission company, ITC Midwest, to use the pay-and-go procedure of Iowa Code 476.27, the railroad-crossing statute, to run electrical power lines across a railroad at three locations, at the objection of the Hawkeye Land Company. Hawkeye Land owned the railroad-crossing easement but did not own or operate a railroad. An administrative law judge (ALJ) upheld the use of the pay-and-go procedure and denied compensation beyond the $750 standard per crossing fee the utility pays to the owner of the railroad right-of-way under the crossing statute. After concluding that it had interpretive authority over the crossing statute, the IUB issued a final order that reached the same conclusions as the ALJ. The district court affirmed on judicial review. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the IUB lacked interpretive authority over the terms of the crossing statute; and (2) the crossing statute applied to Hawkeye Land, but because ITC Midwest was not a public utility, it was not allowed to use the pay-and-go procedure. View "Hawkeye Land Co. v. Iowa Utils. Bd." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of operating while intoxicated, second offense. Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress the breath-test result obtained after his arrest, arguing that he had been denied his statutory right to an independent chemical test. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the district court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s statutory right to an independent chemical test was violated when he made statements that could be reasonably construed as a request for an independent test under Iowa Code 321J.11 but law enforcement denied his request, and (2) the error was not harmless. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Lukins" on Justia Law

Rick Bertrand, a Republican, and Rick Mullin, a Democrat, were candidates for the Iowa Senate in the 2010 general election. During campaigning, Mullin approved of a television commercial, titled “Secrets,” which stated that Bertrand was a sales agent for a drug company that marketed a dangerous sleep drug to children. After the commercial aired, Bertrand filed a lawsuit against Mullin seeking injunctive relief and monetary damages based on defamation. The jury returned a verdict of $31,000 against Mullin and $200,000 against the Iowa Democratic Party. Mullin appealed, contending that the district court erred by failing to grant his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court and dismissed the case, holding that sufficient evidence did not support a finding of actual malice. View "Bertrand v. Mullin" on Justia Law

Husband died in 1993, and his will was probated. Wife received almost all of Husband's property pursuant to a residuary clause in the will. In 2011, Wife died. Subsequently, several relatives (Relatives) who had not been formally notified of the 1993 probate proceedings reviewed Husband's will. Relatives brought an action to reopen the estate, claiming that a different residuary clause in Husband's will entitled them to Husband's property. The coexecutors of Wife's estate filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the petition was time-barred under Iowa Prob Code 633.488, which states that a party who did not receive formal notice of the final report and accounting has five years from the final report to reopen settlement of an estate. The district court denied the motion, concluding that section 633.489, which allows estates to be reopened without time limit under certain circumstances, governed Relatives' claim. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 633.488 was the applicable statute in this case. Remanded.View "In re Estate of Sampson" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with and found guilty of driving under revocation. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court’s admission of a certified abstract of his driving record and affidavits of the mailing of suspension notices violated his rights under the Confrontation Clauses of the United States and Iowa Constitutions. The court of appeals concluded that the admission of the disputed documents did not violate the Confrontation Clauses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the admission of the certified abstract of Defendant’s driving record did not violate the Confrontation Clauses; and (2) the admission of the affidavits of the mailing of suspension notices violated the Confrontation Clauses, but their admission into evidence was harmless error. View "State v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked as a service dog trainer but was not disabled. Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Drake University Law School, where she was a student, alleging that Drake barred her from bringing with her a dog she was training into the classroom and to another event in violation of Iowa Code 216C.11(2). The district court granted Drake’s motion to dismiss after applying the four-factor test adopted from Cort v. Ash for determining whether an Iowa statute provides an implied private right of action, concluding that section 216C.11(2) creates no private enforcement action. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that, under an application of the Cort factors, section 216C.11(2) does not provide a service dog trainer with a private right to sue. View "Shumate v. Drake Univ." on Justia Law