Justia Iowa Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In an underlying termination of parental rights proceeding, the juvenile court concluded that while Mother, who was indigent, did not qualify for appointed counsel under Iowa Code 600A.6A, payment of the attorney’s fees at public expense was constitutionally required. The court subsequently appointed an attorney to represent Mother in the proceeding, and ultimately, Mother’s parental rights were terminated. The juvenile court ordered the State Public Defender to pay for the court-appointed counsel, but the Defender denied payment on the ground that the fees did not qualify for payment from the indigent defense fund. The appointed attorney sought judicial review, and the juvenile court subsequently ordered the Iowa Department of Management to pay the fees. The Defender and Department appealed the juvenile court’s appointment of counsel at public expense. The Supreme Court treated the appeal as a petition for an original writ of certiorari, which it granted as to the Department. The Court then annulled the writ, concluding that the juvenile court correctly appointed counsel at public expense to represent Mother in the contested termination proceeding under chapter 600A. View "Crowell v. State Pub. Defender" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with several crimes based on his involvement in a shooting. The jury found Defendant guilty of intimidation with a dangerous weapon with intent, among other crimes. At the same time, the jury answered “no” to a special interrogatory asking whether Defendant had possessed a firearm. The district court concluded that the verdicts were inconsistent and proposed that the matter be resubmitted to the jury. However, Defendant and the State requested that the court accept the verdicts as rendered. Accordingly, the district court accepted the verdicts. Defendant subsequently appealed. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial on the intimidation charge, finding the special interrogatory answer in direct conflict with the jury’s guilty verdict. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that the verdicts were not inconsistent based on how the case was charged to the jury. View "State v. Merrett" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, several nursing homes approved by the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) as Medicaid providers, submitted annual reports disclosing their income and expenses to DHS. DHS used the reports to calculate the Medicaid per diem reimbursement rates for the nursing homes. Some of the facilities' expenses were disallowed by DHS, and DHS reduced reimbursement rates accordingly. The facilities appealed the adjustments. The director of human services upheld the action. The district court affirmed. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the DHS rules did not support its decision that the disputed costs were not allowable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that DHS's exclusion of the facilities' lab, x-ray, and prescription drug costs from the nursing homes' reports was based on an incorrect interpretation of its rules.View "Sunrise Ret. Cmty. v. Iowa Dep't of Human Servs." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with and convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence. Defendant appealed, contending that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the stop of his vehicle after the police received an anonymous tip reporting a drunk driver. The Supreme Court reversed and suppressed all evidence seized from the stop, holding that the investigatory stop of Defendant was illegal under the Fourth Amendment, as a bare assertion by an anonymous tipster reporting drunk driving, without relaying to the police a personal observation of erratic driving or other facts to establish the driver is intoxicated, does not provide reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Kooima" on Justia Law

Arnold and Vesta Melby were trustors of separate irrevocable trusts. Both Arnold and Vesta received Medicaid benefits. After the Melbys’ deaths, the Iowa Department of Human Services notified Arnold’s estate that it would seek reimbursement for all Medicaid expenses it had paid on behalf of Arnold and Vesta. The Department then filed an application in the estate seeking a judgment declaring the Melbys had interests in the corpus of their trusts that should be counted as assets available for repayment of the Department’s Medicaid claim. The district court concluded (1) the Melbys’ interests in the trusts were limited to their right to receive the net income from the trusts’ assets, and (2) the Department’s right to recover the Medicaid payments could be enforced against such income, but not against the corpus of the trusts. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Department’s right to recover Medicaid payments under the facts of this case extended beyond the Melbys’ net income interests; and (2) the district court erred in determining the scope of medical assistance for which recovery was authorized by the general assembly. Remanded. View "In re Estate of Melby" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a passenger who was injured while riding in the vehicle of his brother, who had coverage, including underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage, with Defendant. The policy contained a provision limiting the time to file an action to recover UIM benefits. Plaintiff brought this action to recover UIM benefits approximately one month after the deadline set forth in the policy. Defendant moved for summary judgment, claiming Plaintiff’s petition was untimely because he failed to file it within the policy’s two-year deadline. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiff, as an insured and a third-party beneficiary of the policy, did not have greater rights than the policyholder, and therefore, Plaintiff could not avoid the contractual time limitation unless the policyholder under similar circumstances would have been able to avoid it; and (2) the record did not demonstrate either that the policy’s time limit was unreasonable or that Defendant should be equitably estopped from enforcing it. Remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of Defendant. View "Osmic v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff formed a contract with Imperial Premium Finance with regard to a financing arrangement for life insurance. Imperial later assigned its interest in the arrangement to Defendant, a limited partnership with its principal place of business in California. Plaintiff filed a petition for declaratory judgment in Iowa, claiming that the contract was not valid. The district court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, concluding that that contacts of Imperial, the assignor, did not impute to Defendant, the assignee. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) an assignor’s contacts with Iowa are not automatically imputed to the assignee for purposes of obtaining personal jurisdiction over the assignee, but this assignee is subject to personal jurisdiction in Iowa based on its own contacts with this forum through the contractual relationships it assumed by the assignment; and (2) Defendant in this case did have the required minimum contacts to subject Defendant to personal jurisdiction in Iowa. Remanded. View "Ostrem v. PrideCo Secure Loan Fund, LP" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were employees of limited liability corporations located in Iowa. Plaintiffs filed lawsuits against the businesses and certain individuals affiliated with the businesses, alleging that Defendants violated the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA) by engaging in sexual harassment, sex discrimination, and retaliation. The lawsuits demanded punitive damages. Defendants moved to strike the claim for punitive damages. The district court granted the motion, concluding that punitive damages were not available under the ICRA. Plaintiffs sought, and the Supreme Court granted, interlocutory appeal. The Court then affirmed the district court, holding that an award of punitive damages is not permitted under the ICRA.View "Ackelson v. Manley Toy Direct, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was the mother of a fourteen-year-old special education student, D.E. D.E. was raped by M.F., a nineteen-year-old special education student after the two students left school early. The sexual assault took place after school hours and off campus. Plaintiff sued D.E.'s school district (Kennedy) for damages, alleging Kennedy breached a duty of reasonable care. After a trial, the jury found Kennedy was negligent in failing adequately to supervise D.E. and awarded $500,000 in damages. The district court denied Kennedy's posttrial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, concluding that Kennedy waived error on its claim that any failure to call the police was not a factual cause of D.E.'s injuries. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Kennedy failed to preserve error in the district court on the duty and factual causation issues raised on appeal; and (2) whether D.E.'s injuries were within Kennedy's scope of liability was an issue for the jury. View "Mitchell v. Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of escape. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the district court abused its discretion when it refused to instruct the jury that the crime of absence from custody was a lesser included offense of escape. The court of appeals denied each claim raised by Defendant and affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and reversed the judgment of the district court, holding that the crime of absence from custody is a lesser included offense of the crime of escape. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Miller" on Justia Law