Justia Iowa Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant, a financial advisor to Decedent, was sued by identified beneficiaries of Decedent’s signed written estate plan. The beneficiaries alleged that Defendant was negligent in the performance of his duties, and therefore, the beneficiaries did not receive what they were supposed to receive under the plan. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, concluding that Defendant, a non-attorney, owed no duty to the beneficiaries. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the judgment entered against plaintiff Steve Bristol and his spouse, holding that Bristol was owed a duty by Defendant and that Bristol raised a genuine of material fact as to whether Defendant’s negligent performance of his agency responsibilities caused Bristol not to receive a specific devise set forth in Decedent’s will; and (2) affirmed the judgment with respect to the charitable recipient plaintiffs, as their damages were too speculative to establish damages. View "St. Malachy Roman Catholic Congregation of Geneseo, Ill. v. Ingram" on Justia Law

The parties in this case, William and Steven Burkhalter, were the sons of Louis Burkhalter. William challenged an unfavorable modification of Louis's revocable trust that occurred just before Louis's death, claiming (1) Steven unduly influenced Louis and tortiously interfered with the trust, and (2) Louis lacked the necessary testamentary intent when he made the modification. The district court directed a verdict for Steven on the tortious interference claim, and the jury returned a verdict for Steven on the testamentary capacity and undue influence claims. The court of appeals remanded the case for a new trial on the undue influence claim, concluding that the district court erroneously instructed the jury on undue influence, and the error prejudiced William. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and reinstated the jury verdict on the undue influence claim, holding that the district court's instruction accurately reflected the law of undue influence and did not unduly emphasize the causation element of the undue influence claim. View "Burkhalter v. Burkhalter" on Justia Law

Lender loaned Borrowers $52,000 pursuant to a loan agreement (agreement) and promissory note ( note). After Borrowers stopped making payments on the loan, Lender filed a petition to collect the total principal due on the agreement and note. The trial judge determined (1) Lender did not meet its burden to prove a breach of contract on the agreement and note because it did not show evidence of the terms of the agreement and repayment schedule, and (2) even if there was an enforceable contract, Lender failed to prove damages. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the record established as a matter of law that Lender proved the existence of a contract based upon the agreement and note; and (2) the district court applied the wrong burden of proof to determine a breach and the amount of damages owed, if any, on the agreement and note. Remanded. View "Iowa Mortgage Ctr., LLC v. Baccam" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against their sons, their former attorney, a limited liability company (SMP), and others, challenging the validity of their mortgages delivered to SMP. Without first seeking mediation, SMP counterclaimed to foreclose on a mortgage granted by Plaintiffs on their agricultural property. The district court foreclosed the mortgage and denied Plaintiffs' motion to quash or stay the sheriff's sale. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to foreclose on the agricultural property because SMP had not first obtained a mediation release as required by Iowa Code 654A.6(1). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that SMP was not required to obtain the mediation release prior to filing a counterclaim to foreclose its mortgage. View "Schaefer v. Putnam" on Justia Law

Plaintiff fled her home in Decatur County to escape Defendant, her abusive husband. Plaintiff found a safe house in Howard County and filed for an order of protection within two days of her arrival. After Defendant unsuccessfully moved to transfer venue from Howard County to Decatur County, the trial court entered the protective order. Defendant filed his notice of appeal thirty-one days later, as the county clerk's public window had closed at 2:30 p.m. the previous day pursuant to a order of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court affirmed the venue ruling and protective order entered by the district court, holding (1) the court order closing the clerk of the court's public window at 2:30 p.m. triggered Iowa Code 4.1(34) to allow a one-day extension of the deadline to file a notice of appeal; and (2) Plaintiff satisfied the residency requirement for venue under Iowa Code 236.3(1) to obtain a domestic abuse protective order in Howard County. View "Root v. Toney" on Justia Law

The Iowa Department of Natural Resources (DNR) revoked Plaintiffs' hunting licenses after finding that each Plaintiff did not meet the criteria to claim resident status under Iowa Code chapter 483A and that establishing residency solely for the purposes of hunting was improper under section 483A.1A(10). In each case, an administrative law judge affirmed the DNR's decision. The district court affirmed the agency action, concluding (1) to be considered a landowner for the purposes of obtaining landowner hunting privileges, a person must be a resident of Iowa, and (2) the ALJ's findings that Plaintiffs were not Iowa residents were supported by substantial evidence, notwithstanding the facts and each owned land in Iowa and paid taxes in Iowa. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the decisions of the ALJs in Plaintiffs' respective cases were supported by substantial evidence; and (2) Iowa's licensing scheme, which distinguishes between resident landowners and nonresident landowners, is not an unconstitutional impairment of privileges protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause. View "Democko v. Iowa Dep't of Nat. Res." on Justia Law

Anthony Geltz was prosecuted as a juvenile and adjudicated delinquent for sexual abuse in the second degree for an offense he committed when he was fourteen years old. After Geltz turned eighteen, the State petitioned to have him declared a sexually violent predator (SVP) under Iowa Code 229A.2(11). The district court ordered Geltz confined as an SVP based on Geltz's previous offense. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a juvenile adjudication does not constitute a predicate conviction required to commit an offender as an SVP pursuant to section 229A.2; and (2) therefore, the district court erred in committing Geltz as an SVP solely on the basis of his juvenile adjudication for the offense he committed at age fourteen. View "In re Detention of Geltz" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to four counts of fraudulent practices for willfully failing to file his Iowa income tax returns and pay taxes for the years 2006 through 2009. After a restitution hearing, the district court ordered Defendant to pay restitution in the form of unpaid taxes but denied the State's request for penalties and interest as part of the restitution order. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's denial of penalties and interest as part of the restitution order, holding that the court erred by not including in its restitution order (1) the requested civil tax penalties, as the civil tax penalties were properly awarded as an element of pecuniary damages in the restitution order; and (2) prejudgment and postjudgment interest at the statutory rate under Iowa Code 421.7. View "State v. Hagen" on Justia Law

Carl Hord's will created the Carl Hord Trust and directed that Carl's undivided one-half interest in 210 acres of farmland would pass to his niece and nephews upon the death of his wife, Lois, whom Carl named as a life beneficiary of the trust. The will also contained a spendthrift clause. While Lois was alive, five of the six remainder beneficiaries executed quitclaim deeds to Lois. Lois's will bequeathed her entire interest in the farmland to Waugh, including the remainder interests acquired from her nephews and niece. After Lois died, the remainder beneficiaries learned for the first time of the spendthrift clause. The beneficiaries filed a petition for construction of the trust and intervened in the probate action regarding Lois's estate, arguing that the spendthrift clause rendered their assignments and quitclaims deeds void. The probate court held that the beneficiaries' right to revoke their assignments terminated at Lois's death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the applicable statute of limitations barred the remainder beneficiaries from enforcing the terms of the spendthrift clause of Carl's will. View "In re Estate of Hord" on Justia Law

The majority shareholder of a family farm corporation served as a director and officer of the corporation. A minority shareholder of the corporation (Plaintiff) sued the corporation and the majority shareholder (collectively, Defendants), alleging that illegal, oppressive, and fraudulent acts by the majority shareholder resulted in waste of the corporation's assets and constituted a breach of fiduciary duty. At the close of Plaintiff's evidence at trial, Defendants moved for a directed verdict. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the action, concluding that Plaintiff had presented no evidence that Defendants had acted fraudulently, illegally, or oppressively. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiff's oppression claim because the court did not apply the correct legal standard in the adjudication of the oppression claim. Remanded. View "Baur v. Baur Farms, Inc." on Justia Law