Justia Iowa Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the juvenile court granting the State's delinquency petition against Defendant and its motion to waive jurisdiction to allow for Defendant's prosecution as an adult, holding that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in granting the waiver and that there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant's conviction.One month after his seventeenth birthday Defendant committed second-degree sexual abuse. The juvenile court issued an order waiving jurisdiction, concluding that there were not reasonable prospectives for rehabilitating Defendant if the juvenile court retained jurisdiction and that the waiver was in the bests interests of Defendant and the community. Defendant was found guilty after a jury trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a rational fact finder could determine beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant committed second-degree sexual abuse based on the evidence presented; and (2) the juvenile court's waiver decision was supported by the evidence and reasonable. View "State v. Erdman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court concluding that Desira Johnson, a teacher at the West Des Moines Community Schools (the District), was not subject to individual liability under the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA) on Plaintiff's claim of constructive discharge, holding that there was no error.Plaintiff, a teacher's associate who worked with special education students in the District, sued the District and Johnson, alleging that Johnson engaged in racial discrimination, leading to Plaintiff's constructive discharge in violation of the ICRA. The jury returned a defense verdict in favor of the District. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district did not err in overruling Plaintiff's Batson challenge to Defendants' peremptory strike of the only Black potential juror; (2) the district court did not err in granting Johnson's motion for directed verdict for correction of errors at law; and (3) Plaintiff was not entitled to relief on her allegations of error in the district court's evidentiary rulings. View "Valdez v. West Des Moines Community Schools" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court in this wrongful discharge action, holding that the district court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims against the State but erred in denying the motion to dismiss the claims against the Governor and the Governor's communications director.In her complaint, Plaintiff alleged that she was forced out of her employment with the Iowa Department of Public Health because she refused to stifle certain public records requests to the Department. In their motion to dismiss, Defendants argued, among other claims, that qualified immunity barred Plaintiff's claims. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) correctly denied Plaintiff's motion to dismiss the claims against the State; but (2) erred in denying Plaintiff's motion to dismiss her claims against the Governor and his communications director for wrongful discharge under Iowa Code 70A.28 and wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. View "Carver-Kimm v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiff's claim alleging she suffered permanent lung injury from toxic vapors that spread throughout the building where she worked, holding that Plaintiff did not present evidence to create a dispute of material fact as to the element of causation.A maintenance worker at the multistory medical office building where Plaintiff worked used a chemical drain cleaner to clear a clogged restroom sink on a lower level. Plaintiff claimed that her inhalation of the fumes the building aggravated her preexisting asthmatic condition and permanently caused reduced pulmonary function. The district court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that there was insufficient evidence presented that the chemical fumes caused the lung injury alleged by Plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff presented insufficient evidence about whether the dose of toxin to which she was exposed was capable of causing her alleged permanent injury. View "Uhler v. Graham Group, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court denying Thomas L. Cardella & Associates' (Cardella) motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict in this case alleging common law negligent supervision or retention, holding that the claim was barred by the Iowa Workers' Compensation Act (IWCA), Iowa Code ch. 85.Plaintiff sued Cardella two years after she quit her employment there. Because she missed the deadline for bringing a hostile work environment claim under the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA), Iowa Code ch. 216, Plaintiff sued for common law negligent supervision or retention and presented her claim to the jury seeking emotional distress damages related to her mental health as a negligent supervision claim premised on Cardella failing to protect her from assault and battery. After a trial, the jury awarded Plaintiff $400,000 in emotional distress damages. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, as presented to the jury, Plaintiff's claim was barred by IWCA. View "McCoy v. Thomas L. Cardella & Associates" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court affirming the decision of the Iowa Utilities Board (IUB) to grant MidAmerican Energy Company's petition for a franchise to build electric transmission lines in Madison County, some of which would run through a road right-of-way encumbering Appellant's land, holding that MidAmerican satisfied the statutory requirements for a franchise.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) MidAmerican satisfied the statutory requirement that new electric transmission lines must be necessary for a public use; (2) Iowa Code 306.46(1) provides utilities like MidAmerican with statutory authority to construct, operate, repair, or maintain their utility facilities with a public road right-of-way, including that right-of-way at issue in this case; and (3) as to the question of whether the construction of electric transmission lines within Appellant's right-of-way could result in a constitutional taking requiring compensation, this Court is evenly divided. View "Juckette v. Iowa Utilities Bd." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court denying three plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in this suit brought to challenge the City of Des Moines' use of the state's income offset program to collect automated traffic citation penalties and granting summary judgment in favor of the City, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment as to a preemption claim and a claim for unjust enrichment.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court properly dismissed Plaintiffs' claims that, among other things, the City's use of the income offset program amounted to an unconstitutional taking and that their right to procedural due process was violated. As to Plaintiffs' contention that the City's use of the program was preempted by state law, however, the district court reversed in part, holding that the district court erred in dismissing one plaintiff's preemption claim with respect to his requests for declaratory and injunctive relief and in dismissing two plaintiffs' claim for unjust enrichment. The Court remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Livingood v. City of Des Moines" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court granting Larry Hedlund's motion seeking retrospective application of the amendments to Iowa's whistleblower-protection law, Iowa Code section 70A.28, holding that section 70A.28(5)(a) did not apply retrospectively to Hedlund's claims.Hedlund brought a lawsuit against the State asserting a claim for wrongful discharge under section 70A.28. While the lawsuit was pending, the legislature amended the statute to allow aggrieved employees to pursue damages beyond those allowed by the prior version of the statute. Thereafter, Defendant filed a motion asserting that the new amendments applied retroactively to him. The district court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the legislature made to express provision for retrospective application the amendments to chapter 70A.8 did not apply in this case. View "Hedlund v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the district court denying Polk County's motion to dismiss this tort action under Iowa Code 670.4A, a new provision of the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act, and Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.421, holding that only two of the four counts met the applicable pleading standards.Plaintiff, a former County employee, brought this tort action against the County and members of the Polk County Board of Supervisors challenging his termination. In denying Defendants' motion to dismiss, the district court concluded that Iowa's recently-enacted qualified immunity provision did not apply retrospectively and that Plaintiff satisfied section 670.4A's new pleading requirement for qualified immunity defenses. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision allowing counts one and four to proceed and reversed the district court with respect to the five remaining counts, holding (1) because the legislature did not expressly make subsection 670.4A(3) retrospective, it could not be applied in this case; and (2) of the petition's seven counts, only counts one and four met the applicable pleading standards and survived Defendants' motion to dismiss as a matter of law. View "Nahas v. Polk County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment granted by the district court in favor of the City of Muscatine on claims seeking to hold the City vicariously liable for a former police officer's sexual assault, holding that Plaintiff was not entitled to relief as to her allegations of error.Plaintiff, who was drunk, was offered a ride to a hotel by a police officer. The officer followed Plaintiff to her room and raped her. The officer was convicted of third-degree sexual abuse of an incapacitated person. Plaintiff later sued the officer and the City alleging several tort causes of action. The district court granted summary judgment to the City, determining that Plaintiff failed to prove that the assault was within the scope of the officer's employment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in determining that Plaintiff's sexual assault fell outside his scope of employment; and (2) this Court declines to adopt Plaintiff's proposed aided-by-agency theory to impose vicarious liability on the City. View "Martin v. Tovar" on Justia Law