Justia Iowa Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A manufacturer of specialized products for road construction and a supplier had a longstanding business relationship, with the supplier relying heavily on the manufacturer’s goods for government paving projects. In 2021, the manufacturer faced supply chain disruptions and increased material costs due to the COVID-19 pandemic, leading to missed deliveries and eventually an ultimatum: the supplier must accept significant price increases on existing contracts or the business relationship would end. The supplier rejected the increases, deemed the manufacturer in breach, and procured substitute products from other vendors at prevailing market rates, which were significantly higher than the manufacturer’s proposed increased prices.The Iowa District Court for Cedar County held a bench trial, finding that contracts existed and were breached by the manufacturer when it refused to honor the original prices. The court awarded damages to both parties for breaches but offset the sums, ultimately finding the supplier’s cover purchases reasonable under the circumstances. Both parties appealed. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s findings regarding contract formation, breach, and damages, including the reasonableness of the supplier’s cover purchases, but remanded for correction of prejudgment interest calculations.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed only the question of whether the supplier’s procurement of substitute goods constituted reasonable “cover” under Iowa Code section 554.2712, given the manufacturer’s post-breach offer to fill the orders at a higher price. The court held that a buyer is not obligated to accept a breaching seller’s new terms to mitigate damages and that “cover” does not require dealing with the breaching seller. Substantial evidence supported the lower court’s finding that the supplier’s cover purchases were reasonable, even though they cost more than the manufacturer’s increased prices. The district court’s judgment was affirmed in relevant part, except regarding double prejudgment interest, which was remanded for correction. View "CMT Highway, LLC v. Logan Contractors Supply, Inc." on Justia Law

A long-serving and well-regarded police sergeant with the Des Moines Police Department experienced significant mental health difficulties after his close friend and fellow officer died by suicide. Several months later, following a night of heavy drinking at a family event, the sergeant drove while intoxicated and was arrested after engaging in belligerent and threatening conduct toward other officers. He subsequently sought psychological help and was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) linked to his friend’s death. The police chief terminated his employment the day after he disclosed his PTSD diagnosis, despite his remorse and efforts to seek treatment.The sergeant brought suit in the Iowa District Court for Polk County under the Iowa Civil Rights Act, alleging that his termination constituted disability discrimination and that the city failed to provide a reasonable accommodation for his PTSD. At trial, the jury found in his favor on both claims and awarded substantial damages. The district court entered judgment for the plaintiff. The City appealed, arguing that the jury’s verdict was tainted by an erroneous jury instruction and that no reasonable accommodation was timely requested.On appeal, the Iowa Court of Appeals found that the evidence supported submitting the disability discrimination claim to the jury but determined that the jury instructions given—particularly one about stereotypes and unconscious bias—misstated the law and warranted a new trial on that claim. The appellate court also ruled that the failure-to-accommodate claim failed as a matter of law because the request for accommodation came only after misconduct occurred. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s decision, reversed the district court’s judgment, and remanded for a new trial on the disability-discrimination claim, holding that the instructional error required a new trial and that the failure-to-accommodate claim could not proceed. View "Hunter v. City of Des Moines, Iowa" on Justia Law

A school board in Iowa held two closed sessions in 2022 involving its then-superintendent. The first session was conducted at the superintendent’s request to evaluate his professional competency, following concerns raised by board members about conversations at a prior association meeting that some interpreted as attempts at undue influence in board leadership decisions. The board discussed these ethical concerns and whether to seek legal advice, before continuing the evaluation with the superintendent present. Later, after the superintendent left the district, the board held another closed session to discuss the possible filing of an ethics complaint against him, focusing on both the earlier conversations and an unrelated alleged disclosure of confidential information.The Iowa District Court for Woodbury County found that the first closed session violated the Iowa Open Meetings Act because the initial discussion was not directly related to the superintendent’s evaluation, but rather to a potential investigation and complaint. The court found no violation regarding the second session, reasoning that the records discussed were confidential and thus justified a closed meeting. For the first session, the court imposed statutory damages and attorney fees against one board member, while finding the other members acted in good faith.The Supreme Court of Iowa reviewed the case, considering whether the discussions in each session were permissible under the exceptions to the Iowa Open Meetings Act. The court concluded that the first session’s discussion of ethical concerns was directly related to evaluating the superintendent’s professional competency and thus fell within the statutory exception. Regarding the second session, the court held that the board's discussion of draft complaints intended for submission to a regulatory body qualified as review of confidential records, also justifying a closed session. The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the district court’s finding of a violation and attorney fee award for the first meeting, and affirmed the decision for the second meeting. View "Gausman v. Sioux City Community School District" on Justia Law

This case arose after the City of Davenport settled three harassment claims with city employees for approximately $1.9 million. The settlements were publicly approved by the city council in December 2023, but there were allegations suggesting that the agreements were reached before the November 2023 city election and were intentionally announced afterward. The Iowa Auditor of State initiated a reaudit focusing on these settlements and issued a subpoena to the City requesting documents, including minutes and recordings of closed city council sessions. The City provided some documents but withheld others, citing attorney–client privilege and the attorney work-product privilege, and sought to modify the subpoena in Scott County District Court.The Iowa District Court for Scott County reviewed the matter and initially ordered the City to produce the closed-session materials for in camera review to determine if they constituted attorney work product. In a subsequent order, the court held that while the Auditor could not access attorney work product, Iowa law did permit access to attorney–client privileged communications, as the statutory exceptions did not explicitly include such privilege. The court planned an evidentiary hearing to clarify relevance but confirmed its intent to review the materials in camera, potentially granting the Auditor access to attorney–client privileged communications.The Supreme Court of Iowa reviewed the case on interlocutory appeal. The Court held that the attorney–client privilege is a longstanding protection under Iowa law and is not displaced by the statutory provisions governing the Auditor’s subpoena power, which do not expressly override the privilege. The Court concluded that the attorney–client privilege limits the Auditor’s access to materials, just as it does for other investigative bodies. The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the district court’s ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "City of Davenport v. Office of Auditor of State of Iowa" on Justia Law

A vehicle was reported stolen in La Crosse, Wisconsin. The following day, Dillon Heiller was found in possession of the vehicle in Waukon, Iowa, and was arrested by local police after being observed acting suspiciously by a homeowner, who then called authorities. Heiller was charged in Allamakee County with theft by taking, specifically for taking possession or control of the vehicle with intent to deprive the owner. At trial, the State presented evidence that Heiller was in possession of the vehicle in Iowa, but did not call the vehicle’s owner as a witness. Heiller testified that he had purchased the vehicle from another individual. The jury convicted him of theft in the second degree.The Iowa District Court for Allamakee County denied Heiller's motion for acquittal on jurisdictional grounds, and the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Heiller had not preserved error on the issue of Iowa’s criminal jurisdiction because he did not request a related jury instruction. The court of appeals applied its earlier decision in a companion case, concluding that the jurisdictional issue could not be raised for the first time on appeal.Upon further review, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that Iowa’s criminal jurisdiction statute (Iowa Code section 803.1) establishes nonwaivable prerequisites for prosecution, and the question of criminal jurisdiction is a question of law for the court, not an element for the jury. The court found that no element of theft by taking occurred in Iowa; the act of taking occurred in Wisconsin. Accordingly, Iowa lacked statutory authority to prosecute Heiller for theft by taking or any lesser included offense. The Supreme Court of Iowa vacated the court of appeals’ decision, vacated the conviction and sentence, and remanded the case to the district court. View "State of Iowa v. Heiller" on Justia Law

An employee of a plumbing subcontractor was injured when a trench collapsed at a residential construction site, resulting in serious physical and emotional harm. The employee had been directed by his supervisor to enter a trench that did not comply with OSHA safety regulations. The general contractor for the project was not present at the site and only learned of the accident months later, after an OSHA investigation. The subcontractor, not the general contractor, was responsible for the trenching work and the day-to-day safety of its employees.After receiving workers’ compensation and settling gross negligence claims against his co-employees, the injured worker proceeded to trial solely on a negligence claim against the general contractor. The Iowa District Court for Polk County denied the general contractor’s motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, allowing the case to go to a jury, which found the general contractor liable and awarded substantial compensatory and punitive damages.The Supreme Court of Iowa reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The court held that, as a general rule, a general contractor does not owe a duty of care to the employees of an independent contractor. The court found that neither the “retained control” nor “peculiar risk” exceptions to this rule applied. The general contractor did not retain operative control over the subcontractor’s work, either by contract or by conduct, and residential trenching work is not inherently or peculiarly dangerous as a matter of law under Iowa precedent. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that the general contractor was entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict and reversed the lower court’s ruling. View "Kono v. D.R. Horton, Inc." on Justia Law

A patient underwent surgery on September 4, 2020, and died twelve days later. Her estate and children brought a medical malpractice suit against the surgeon and hospital, alleging negligence. The defendants sought dismissal, arguing the plaintiffs had not satisfied Iowa’s certificate of merit requirements under Iowa Code section 147.140(1), which mandates a supporting expert affidavit early in medical malpractice litigation. The district court denied the motion to dismiss.The defendants then sought interlocutory review from the Iowa Supreme Court. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the district court’s denial, finding the plaintiffs had not complied with the statutory affidavit requirement, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case with prejudice. Following the remand, the plaintiffs attempted to file dismissals without prejudice before and after the district court’s order of dismissal with prejudice. Despite these filings, the district court entered a dismissal with prejudice as directed by the Iowa Supreme Court. The plaintiffs then filed a new lawsuit asserting the same claims against the same defendants. The defendants moved to dismiss this second action, citing claim preclusion (res judicata) and the statute of limitations. The Iowa District Court for Clinton County dismissed the second action.On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. The court held that its prior mandate required dismissal with prejudice, and any attempt by the plaintiffs to dismiss without prejudice was contrary to that mandate and thus ineffective. The court found that the elements of claim preclusion were satisfied: the parties and claims were identical to the prior action, and there was a final judgment on the merits. Accordingly, the second lawsuit was barred. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal on claim preclusion grounds. View "Shontz v. Mercy Medical Center-Clinton, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves two drainage districts in Pottawattamie County, Iowa, which undertook a reclassification process after proposing improvements to levees under their management. The reclassification determined how costs for the improvements would be apportioned among properties benefitting from the work. The Iowa Department of Transportation (IDOT) owns state highway land running through the districts, comprising less than 5% of the land but, under the reclassification, was assigned more than 75% of the costs. The method for assessing IDOT’s benefit relied largely on projected benefits to motorists, such as avoided delays from fewer road closures, rather than on direct benefits to the highway property or its owner.The boards of trustees for the districts approved the reclassification despite IDOT’s objections. IDOT then sought judicial review in the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, arguing that the assessment method violated Iowa Code section 307.45 and that assessments should be based on benefits to the property or its owner, not third-party users. The district court set aside the reclassifications, agreeing that section 307.45 applied and that the assessments were not conducted in a uniform manner as required by that statute. However, the district court did not limit the scope of “benefits” solely to those accruing to the property or its owner.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed the district court’s decision to set aside the reclassification but modified the reasoning. The court held that Iowa Code section 307.45 does not apply to drainage districts, as they are not cities, counties, or subdivisions thereof. The court further held that assessments against IDOT highway property must be based only on benefits to the property and its owner—the State—not on benefits to non-owner users such as motorists. The judgment was affirmed as modified. View "State of Iowa, ex rel. Iowa Department of Transportation v. Honey Creek Drainage District No. 6 Board of Trustees" on Justia Law

During a period of foggy weather near Anamosa, Iowa, Margaret McQuillen was driving southbound on Highway 151 when her vehicle collided with a semitrailer operated by Clifford Takes, who was employed by West Side Transport, Inc. Takes made an unprotected left turn across Margaret’s lane, resulting in a severe underride collision that caused Margaret catastrophic injuries, including traumatic brain injuries and numerous fractures. The state patrol cited Takes for failing to yield, and he pleaded guilty. Margaret’s parents, acting as her guardians, filed suit against Takes and West Side, alleging negligence and vicarious liability.The Iowa District Court for Linn County tried the case. The jury found both parties negligent, assigning 73% of the fault to Takes and West Side, and 27% to Margaret. Margaret’s damages were assessed at over $35 million, leading to a judgment in her favor for approximately $26 million after comparative fault reduction. The defendants’ motions for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict were denied.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case after the defendants appealed, arguing errors in the plaintiffs’ closing arguments warranted a new trial, and the plaintiffs moved to dismiss the appeal, claiming a settlement had rendered the appeal moot. The court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding the parties had not reached a full settlement disposing of the appeal. On the merits, the court found no abuse of discretion by the district court in its handling of closing arguments, finding that the arguments did not warrant a mistrial or new trial, and that any improper argument did not likely affect the trial’s outcome. The court also concluded the defendants had not preserved error regarding arguments about present value. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "McQuillen v. West Side Transport, Inc." on Justia Law

Johnathon and Lanora Sprague, divorced parents of three children, entered into a stipulation at the time of their divorce that provided for joint legal and physical custody. In 2022, Lanora sought to modify the custody provisions due to ongoing communication difficulties. On the day set for trial of the modification, the parties believed they had reached a verbal settlement agreement, though it was not reduced to writing or made part of the record. Subsequent drafts of the settlement were exchanged, but disagreements arose over the terms, leading Lanora to file a motion to enforce the settlement agreement, attaching her version of the proposed settlement and related correspondence.The Iowa District Court for Scott County held an unreported hearing and granted Lanora’s motion, finding her draft accurately reflected the parties’ agreement and ordering both parties to sign it. The court also found that Johnathon’s objections referenced provisions that were not part of the original agreement. Johnathon appealed, arguing that factual disputes remained and that the district court had not properly considered evidence. The Iowa Court of Appeals, in a split decision, reversed and remanded for a trial to determine whether a binding settlement existed and its terms, reasoning that material factual disputes precluded summary enforcement.The Iowa Supreme Court granted further review, vacated the appellate court’s decision, and affirmed the district court’s enforcement of the settlement. The Supreme Court held that because Johnathon, as appellant, failed to provide a record of the hearing, there was no basis to overturn the district court’s factual findings. The court reiterated that when an appellant does not ensure the record is adequate, affirmance is required unless the ruling is facially erroneous. Additionally, the Supreme Court awarded Lanora appellate attorney fees, finding she was required to defend a judgment that could not be meaningfully reviewed due to the incomplete record. View "In re the marriage of Sprague" on Justia Law