Justia Iowa Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court dismissing this lawsuit brought by an injured pedestrian against a city over a defective city sidewalk, holding that the trial court erred in dismissing the case for failure to state a claim based on the public duty doctrine.Plaintiffs sued the City of Urbandale claiming that the City had failed properly to maintain, repair, and warn about a dangerous and uneven sidewalk, causing her injuries. The district court granted the City's motion to dismiss, concluding that the public-duty doctrine barred Plaintiffs' claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the pleading was sufficient to avoid application of the public-duty doctrine for motion-to-dismiss purposes. View "Fulps v. City of Urbandale" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court determining that Jason Carter was civilly liable for the death of his mother, Shirley Carter, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion.Jason was civilly accused by his father and brother of intentionally shooting his mother. After a jury determined that Jason was civilly liable the State charged Jason with first degree murder. As a result of discovery from that criminal proceeding, Jason was acquitted murder. Jason later filed a second petition to vacate the judgment based on newly discovered evidence. The district court dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion in denying Jason’s motion for continuance, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, first petition to vacate the judgment, and motion for recusal; (2) properly denied Jason's motion to quash a subpoena to the Iowa Department of Criminal Investigations; and (3) lacked jurisdiction to hear this second petition to vacate the judgment because it was untimely. View "Carter v. Carter" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the juvenile court terminating Father's parental rights to his two-year-old daughter, holding that the phrase "the proceeding" in Iowa Code 232.114(3) includes the appeal from the order terminating parental rights.In a 2013 amendment to section 232.114(3), the statue applicable to terminations, the legislature provided that when the county attorney and the State disagree, the county attorney may continue to appear "in the proceeding" and present his or her position regarding the appropriate action to be taken. The Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS), the attorney general, and Father all favored restoring Father's parental rights and placing the child in his custody under supervision. The Polk County Attorney and the child's foster parents and guardian ad litem all favored termination. At issue was whether the county attorney may be heard in this appeal. The Supreme Court held (1) the county attorney was authorized to participate in this appeal; and (2) the grounds for termination were not proven by clear and convincing evidence in this case. View "In re C.Z." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the order of the juvenile court terminating Mother's parental rights to her two children, holding that the juvenile court appropriately handled this case in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.The juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence that the children could not be returned to Mother and that termination was appropriate under Iowa Code 232.116(1)(f) and (h). The court of appeals affirmed, but a dissenting judge argued that the pandemic had thwarted Mother's efforts to demonstrate that her children could safely be returned to her. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the best interests of the children supported termination of Mother's parental rights; and (2) COVID-19 did not adversely affect Mother's ability to reunify. View "In re A.B." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the district court ordering a new trial on damages in this action against a golf course for owner liability under Iowa Code 321.493 and common law premises liability, holding that the district court erred by ordering a new trial.Plaintiff was ejected from a golf cart and severely injured when the cart struck a bridge. Plaintiff settled his claims against the driver and signed a release expressly reserving his claims against the owner. Plaintiff then sued the golf course for owner liability and premises liability. A jury found the golf course not negligent for premises liability and the driver one hundred percent at fault for damages. Plaintiff moved for a new trial because the evidence showed the past medical expenses were many times the amount awarded. The trial court granted Plaintiff's motion for a new trial on damages against the owner. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff's release of the driver extinguished the vicarious liability claims against the golf course as the golf cart owner under section 321.493 for the damages caused by the driver's negligent driving. View "Jones v. Glenwood Golf Corp." on Justia Law

In this garnishment proceeding, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court concluding that Robert McGowen's deferred compensation plan benefits paid upon him reaching the age of sixty-seven were not exempt under Iowa Code 627.6(8)(e), holding that the payments made to McGowen fell within the scope of the statutory exemption.Commerce Bank obtained a judgment against McGowen in the amount of $1.5 million. Commerce Bank then caused to be issued a writ of general execution directing the sheriff to levy on McGowen's employer (the company). McGowen moved to exempt all payments made to him under the company's deferred compensation plan under section 642.15. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that McGowen's deferred compensation payments were exempt under the statute. View "Commerce Bank v. McGowen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissing Plaintiff's claims for negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent misrepresentation, and breach of contract, holding that Plaintiff's claims were subject to the two-year statute of limitations set forth in Iowa Code 614.1(9) and were untimely.On Defendants' motion for summary judgment, the district court held that Plaintiff's causes of action arose out of patient care and were barred by section 614.1(9), the two-year statute of limitations governing malpractice action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that each of Plaintiff's allegations originated from representations regarding patient care and the patient care Defendants provided, and therefore, Plaintiff's claims were untimely under section 614.1(9). View "Kostoglanis v. Yates" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of a finance company in this contract dispute, holding that the contract was properly ratified despite any allegation of forgery.Natalya Rodionova Medical Care (NRMC) allegedly entered into a financing agreement with GreatAmerica Financial Services Corporation for the leasing of telephone and copier products. Pursuant to the agreement, NRMC made monthly payments totaling seven months worth of installments but then attempted to cancel the finance agreement. When NRMC discontinued further payments GreatAmerica sued for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. In its answer NRMC alleged that the finance agreement appeared to be signed by NRMC's sole shareholder but that the signature was a forgery. The district court granted summary judgment for GreatAmerica, reasoning that NRMC ratified the contract through its conduct regardless of who signed the contract. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that NRMC's failure to reject goods over a seven-month period and its payment of periodic invoices amounted to a ratification. View "GreatAmerica Financial Services Corp. v. Natalya Rodionova Medical Care, P.C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of driving while intoxicated (OWI), holding that defense counsel was not ineffective in declining to seek suppression of certain evidence on the basis that Defendant was subjected to an unconstitutional seizure.An officer observed Defendant illegally park her vehicle and stopped her to enforce the parking violation. Upon smelling marijuana and observing signs of Defendant's intoxication the officer inquired about her intoxication. The officer asked Defendant for her registration and insurance and discovered that her driver's license was revoked. Defendant was convicted of second-offense OWI and driving while license was revoked. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant's OWI conviction; and (2) Defendant's counsel was not ineffective in failing to seek suppression of the evidence because the officer had probable cause to seize Defendant based upon his observation of her traffic violation. View "State v. Warren" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals and the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of attempted murder and related crimes, holding that any error that occurred in the proceedings below was harmless.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) whether Defendant's counsel breached an essential duty in failing to object to certain questions, any error was harmless; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence a policy body-cam video taken immediately after the shooting, a recorded call, or a recording of a police interview with the victim taken five days after the shooting. View "State v. Swift" on Justia Law