Justia Iowa Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court vacated the order of restitution in this criminal case for the reasons explained today in State v. Davis, __ N.W.2d __ (Iowa 2020), concluding that interim orders on components of restitution requiring a reasonable ability to pay are neither appealable nor enforceable, but because the district court did not have the benefit of State v. Albright, 925 N.W.2d 144 (Iowa 2019) in issuing the restitution order, the order is vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings.Defendant entered a guilty plea to sexual abuse in the third degree. The court placed Defendant on probation, ordered him to register as a sex offender, and ordered that Defendant pay $204 in court costs, stating that additional amounts could be assessed at a later date. Defendant filed this direct appeal from his judgment of sentence, arguing that the district court erred in ordering him to pay restitution when it did not know the total amount of those costs and had not conducted a reasonable-ability-to-pay determination. The State argued in response that Defendant's appeal was unripe because no final restitution order had been entered. The Supreme Court vacated the restitution order and remanded the matter for further proceedings because the district court did not have the benefit of Albright. View "State v. Staake" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court holding that a commercial general liability (CGL) policy and a related excess liability declaration do not cover claims brought by the estate and spouse of an employee who was fatally injured while working for Adventureland Amusement Park, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment.The decedent was serving as a loading assistant on a river ride when he was fatally injured. The decedent's estate and his widow filed a district court action, later removed to federal court, alleging that the decedent's injuries were a result of grossly negligent acts by the ride's operator, the decedent's coemployee. The insurer filed a declaratory action in state court seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify the coemployee in the federal action. The district court granted summary judgment for the insurer. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that there remained a question of fact as to whether the estate has a claim that amounts to gross negligence but is within the scope of the coverage of the CGL policy. View "T.H.E. Insurance Co. v. Estate of Booher" on Justia Law

In this criminal case arising from Appellant's act of writing checks without authorization from a bank account that was not hers the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's motion for acquittal, holding that the State failed to present sufficient evidence supporting a conviction under Iowa Code 714.1(6).Appellant was convicted under section 714.1(6), which forbids knowingly presenting a check that will not be paid when presented. The checks the State charged Appellant with writing were paid when presented. On appeal, Appellant argued that presenting a check without authorization was different than providing a check one knows will not be paid when presented. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that Appellant knew the checks would not be paid when presented, and therefore, there was insufficient evidence to support Appellant's conviction under section 714.1(6). View "State v. Schiebout" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's sentence for indecent contact with a child, holding that Defendant satisfied the good-cause requirement to challenge his sentence as an abuse of discretion but that, on the merits, his challenge failed.Defendant pleaded guilty to indecent contact with a child. The court sentenced Defendant to two years in prison and to ten years' special parole after completion of his prison term. The court further ordered Defendant to register as a sex offender for ten years and complete the sex offender treatment program. Defendant appealed. The State filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing that entering an Alford plea is not good cause to appeal. The Supreme Court held that Defendant had shown good cause but failed to establish that any alleged errors warranted resentencing. View "State v. Henderson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's sentence for theft after Defendant pleaded guilty, holding that "good cause" under the newly amended Iowa Code 814.6 means a "legally sufficient reason," and the good cause requirement is satisfied when the defendant appeals a sentence that was neither mandatory nor agreed to in the plea bargain.Defendant pleaded guilty to two separate charges of theft in the third degree. The court sentenced Defendant to an indeterminate term of two years of incarceration for each case to run concurrently. Defendant appealed, arguing that the sentencing court abused its discretion by considering improper factors when imposing her sentence. The State responded that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction over Defendant's appeal without a showing of good cause under the newly amended Iowa Code 814.6. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant satisfied the good-cause requirement to proceed with her appellate challenge to the sentence; and (2) on the merits, Defendant's challenge to her sentence failed. View "State v. Damme" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court reversing the decision of the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) that a child-care provider must pay back benefits the provider received during agency review of her cancelled provider agreement, holding that DHS erred in refusing to consider the provider's unjust enrichment defense to the recoupment proceeding.At issue was whether the provider was given constitutionally sufficient notice of DHS's intent to recoup payments. DHS sent the provider a notice cancelling the provider agreement and noted that any benefits the provider got while her appeal was being decided "may have to be paid back if the Department's action is correct." DHS affirmed its decision to cancel the provider's agreement but did not find, until years later, that the provider had to pay back the $16,000. The district court reversed DHS's decision on recoupment and denied attorney fees under Iowa Code 625.29(1)(b). The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) DHS's notice met procedural due process requirements, but the DHS should have been allowed an opportunity to raise unjust enrichment as an offset to DHS's effort to recoup overpayments; and (2) where DHS's role was primarily adjudicative, DHS was not liable for attorney fees. View "Endress v. Iowa Department of Human Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the court of appeals' decision and affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court, holding that a child-care provider whose provider agreement and registration was cancelled should be allowed to raise unjust enrichment as an offset to the Iowa Department of Human Services' (DHS) effort to recoup $31,815 for child-care services the provider rendered during agency review.This appeal was a companion case to Endress v. Iowa Department of Human Services, __ N.W.2d __ (Iowa 2020), also decided today. DHS attempted to recoup child-care service payments during agency review of the provider's cancelled provider agreement and registration. On appeal, the court of appeals held that DHS's notice concerning recoupment of overpayments was constitutionally deficient. The Supreme Court (1) vacated the court of appeals' decision on the constitutional issue, holding that DHS's notice of recoupment met procedural due process requirements; and (2) remanded the case to the district court to remand to DHS for consideration of the provider's equitable relief, holding that the provider should have been allowed to pursue her claim for unjust enrichment. View "Pfaltzgraff v. Iowa Department of Human Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Jane Doe's petition for writ of certiorari, sustained the writ, and vacated the order of the district court denying Doe's application to expunge her criminal record as to three separate cases pursuant to Iowa Code 901C.2, holding that the court erred in denying the application on the ground that Doe had court-ordered financial obligations in other cases.In the three separate cases at issue the charges were all dismissed. Doe later filed an application for expungement of the record in each of the cases. The district court denied the application on the ground that Doe had "[m]onies owed in other matters." The Supreme Court vacated the district court's order denying expungement, holding (1) pursuant to State v. Doe, __ N.W.2d __ (Iowa 2020), filed today, the requisite condition for expungement requires that the defendant establish only that he satisfied all of the court-ordered financial obligations in the criminal case for which expungement was sought; and (2) in the instant case, the district court erred in concluding that Iowa Code 901C.2(1)(a)(2) required Defendant to establish that she also satisfied all court-ordered financial obligations in other cases. View "Doe v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Jane Doe's petition for writ of certiorari, sustained the writ, and vacated the order of the district court denying Doe's application to expunge her criminal record as to a particular case pursuant to Iowa Code 901C.2, holding that the court erred in denying the application on the ground that Doe had court-ordered financial obligations in other cases.In 2011, Doe was charged with one count of unauthorized use of a credit card. The charge was dismissed, and Doe subsequently satisfied all of her financial obligations in the dismissed case. In 2019, Doe filed her application to expunge the criminal record. The district court denied the application because Doe had court-ordered financial obligations remaining in other cases and thus did not meet the requisite condition set forth in section 901C.2(1)(a)(2). The Supreme Court vacated the district court's order, holding that the district court (1) erred in concluding that section 901C.2(1)(a)(2) required Defendant to establish that she satisfied all financial obligations in both this case and in any other case; and (2) erred in denying Doe's application on that ground. View "Doe v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted John Doe's petition for writ of certiorari, sustained the writ, and vacated the order of the district court denying Doe's application to expunge his criminal record as to a particular case pursuant to Iowa Code 901C.2, holding that the court erred in denying the application on the ground that Doe had court-ordered financial obligations in other cases.In 2000, Doe was charged with escape. The charge was later dismissed. In 2019, Doe filed an application for expungement of the record. The district court denied the application on the ground that Doe had court-ordered financial obligations in other cases. The Supreme Court vacated the district court's order denying expungement, holding (1) pursuant to State v. Doe, __ N.W.2d __ (Iowa 2020), filed today, the requisite condition for expungement requires that the defendant establish only that he satisfied all of the court-ordered financial obligations in the criminal case for which expungement was sought; and (2) in the instant case, the district court erred in concluding that section 901C.2(1)(a)(2) required Defendant to establish that he also satisfied all court-ordered financial obligations in other cases. View "Doe v. State" on Justia Law