Justia Iowa Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals finding substantial evidence that the juvenile in this case committed a sex offense by force and that the sex offender registry requirements imposed upon the juvenile by law did not violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment under either the state or federal Constitutions.The juvenile court found the juvenile committed a sex offense by force and required him to register as a sex offender under Iowa Code 692A.103(4), the mandatory sex offender registry statute. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that automatic, mandatory registration for certain juvenile sex offenders is punishment but that such registration does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment. View "In re T.H." on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice action, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part the judgment of the district court removing Plaintiffs’ informed consent claims from this case and entering judgment for Defendants on Plaintiffs’ specific negligence claim.Plaintiffs, a patient and his family, brought this lawsuit against Defendants, a physician and the physician’s employer. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on the informed consent claim based on the physician’s failure to disclose his lack of training and experience in performing the procedure and, during trial, refused to allow the informed consent claim based on the physician’s failure to disclose the risk of the surgery considering the patient’s bad heart. The jury then returned a verdict for Defendants on the specific negligence claim. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment on the specific negligence claim but remanded the case to allow Plaintiffs to proceed on their two informed consent claims, holding that the district court erred in removing the two informed consent claims from the case. View "Andersen v. Khanna" on Justia Law

The district court correctly granted summary judgment in favor Humboldt County on Plaintiff’s claim that the county was liable for the injuries she received when her vehicle went off the county road and into a ditch then struck a concrete embankment in the ditch based on the public-duty doctrine.The embankment in this case had been constructed by a private landowner and was on the private landowner’s land, but the county had a right-of-way easement where part of the embankment was located. In her complaint, Plaintiff alleged that the county should have caused the removal of the concrete embankment from the ditch. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment, holding that the public-duty doctrine is “alive and well in Iowa” and applies to the facts of this case. View "Johnson v. Humboldt County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court affirmed the decision of the workers’ compensation commissioner that Claimant was not entitled to healing period benefits under Iowa Code 85.34(1).Claimant filed a petition seeking workers’ compensation benefits after developing bilateral carpal tunnel injuries allegedly arising out of and in the course of her employment with Employer. Employer admitted liability and authorized Claimant to undergo medical care with its chosen medical providers. Claimant, however, sought medical treatment from an unauthorized physician. The physician performed two surgeries on Claimant, and Employer refused to pay healing period benefits for the time Claimant was recovering from the unauthorized surgeries. The commissioner concluded that Claimant was not entitled to healing period benefits because Employer provided a valid authorization defense. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that where Claimant received unauthorized medical care she was not entitled to healing benefits. View "Brewer-Strong v. HNI Corp." on Justia Law

At issue was negligence and defamation claims brought by two female parishioners and their spouses against a church based on sexual abuse and exploitation perpetrated on the women by the church pastor and the subsequent response by the governing body of the church.The district court granted summary judgment for the church on all claims except negligent supervision. The court then found that the negligent supervision claims brought by the female parishioners were barred by the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Religion Clauses of the Iowa and United States Constitutions barred two of the negligence claims brought against the church; (2) the First Amendment does not bar negligent supervision claims against religious entities, and while the relevant statute of limitations barred one parishioner’s claim of negligent supervision, it did not bar the other female parishioner’s negligent supervision claim; and (3) the district court properly dismissed the defamation claims. View "Bandstra v. Covenant Reformed Church" on Justia Law

Appraisers may determine the factual cause of damage to insured property to ascertain the amount of the loss, but coverage questions are to be resolved by the court.In the instant case, the district court rejected an insurance appraisal award for hail damage to roofing shingles. The property insurer denied coverage for hail caused damage to the asphalt shingles based on a preexisting manufacturing defect. The insured townhome association sued the insurer for breach of contract and invoked the appraisal provision of the property insurance policy to ascertain the amount of the loss from the hailstorm. The appraisal panel valued the hail damage loss at $1.4 million. The district court found no shingle damage from hail, applied an exclusion for defective materials, and rejected the appraisal award. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding (1) the district court erred by disregarding the appraisal award’s determination of the amount of the loss for shingles damaged by the hailstorm; and (2) the issue of the extent of preexisting shingle damage excluded from coverage must be decided by the court on remand. View "Walnut Creek Townhome Ass’n v. Depositors Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court in favor of the Board of Adjustment in this action brought of developers seeking the right to build apartments on adjoining properties they owned in Iowa City and remanded with directions to enter judgment in favor of the developers.After the City denied the developers’ plans, the developers brought actions against the City and its Board of Adjustment. The district court ruled against the developers, thus rejecting the developers’ argument that a 1987 court order allowed them to proceed. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s ruling in favor of the Board, holding (1) the Board should have permitted the developers to proceed in accordance with the 1987 decree, and the developers were entitled to enforce the decree as “successors and assigns”; (2) the statute of limitations did not bar enforcement of the decree; and (3) the Board’s argument that the decree had expired by its terms because “a use [had] been developed or established” on the properties failed. View "TSB Holdings, LLC v. City of Iowa City, Iowa" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court remanded this case alleging negligence and products liability for a new trial, holding that statements made by Plaintiff’s counsel during closing arguments were prejudicial.On appeal, the Supreme Court reviewed numerous issues that arose during litigation between the estate of Larry Kinseth, who passed away from mesothelioma, and Weil-McLain, a boiler manufacturer whose products exposed Kinseth to asbestos. The jury awarded Kinseth's Estate compensatory and punitive damages. The Supreme Court remanded the case for a new trial, holding that to the extent the Estate’s counsel made repeated, deliberate references to Weil-McLain’s expenditures in defending this suit and other asbestos actions and issued instructions to use this case to send a message about such expenditures, counsel’s rhetoric prejudiced Weil-McLain. View "Kinseth v. Weil-McLain" on Justia Law

The thirty-day period set forth in Iowa Code 414.15, which requires a petition for writ of certiorari seeking review of a decision of a city zoning board of adjustment to be filed in district court “within thirty days after the filing of the decision in the office of the board,” is triggered when the board posts the decision on its public website, and what is posted must be an actual decision.Plaintiffs filed a petition for certiorari challenging two of the Board of Adjustment’s decisions. The City filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the petition was untimely because it was not filed within thirty days of the challenged decisions. The district court granted the City’s motion. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order to the extent it dismissed the challenge brought by Plaintiffs to the Board’s refusal to revoke a special use permit but affirmed the order to the extent it dismissed their challenge to the Board’s initial recognition of that special use permit, holding that the challenge to the refusal to revoke the permit was timely because the unapproved minutes of a meeting posted to the Board’s website did not amount to “the filing of the decision.” View "Burroughs v. City Of Davenport Zoning Board Of Adjustment" on Justia Law

At issue was Mother’s and Father’s parental responsibility for postsecondary education for their daughter following the dissolution of their marriage.On Mother’s motion, the district court entered an order requiring the parents to each pay $6629 toward their daughter’s education for the 2016-2017 school year. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the presumptive cost of attending an in-state institution under section 598.21F(2)(a) is the cost of attendance as published by the in-state public institution; (2) a child’s scholarship funds, work earnings, and savings may be considered as part of a child’s expected contribution to her education, but available student loans should not be considered as part of a child’s expected contribution; and (3) in this case, Mother and Father must each contribute $6362 toward their daughter’s postsecondary education. View "Larsen v. Larsen" on Justia Law