Justia Iowa Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The City of Albia was statutorily immune from a homeowner’s nuisance claim stemming from reoccurring flooding in the basement of her home due to rainwater discharge from a storm sewer located near the home.The Supreme Court held (1) Iowa Code 670.4(1)(h), which grants immunity to municipalities for tort claims based on claims of negligent design and construction of public improvements and facilities, or failure to upgrade public improvements and facilities, bars those nuisance claims based on conditions created by public improvements and facilities designed and constructed pursuant to generally recognized engineering or safety standards in existence at the time of construction and without evidence that the harmful condition creating the nuisance was inherent in the operation of the improvement or facility itself or evidence of negligent conduct other than the designated conduct immunized under statute; and (2) because the homeowner in this case did not offer any evidence that the City’s storm sewer system was inherently dangerous beyond the dangers associated with failing to upgrade the pipe to accommodate increased water flow, or that the claim was otherwise based on conduct not given immunity, summary judgment on the homeowner’s nuisance claim was properly granted. View "Kellogg v. City of Albia" on Justia Law

Iowa Code 902.1(2)(a)(1), which gives the district court the option to sentence a juvenile offender convicted of murder in the first degree to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, is unconstitutional based on the Supreme Court’s holding in State v. Sweet, 879 N.W.2d 811 (Iowa 2016), which held that such a sentence for all juvenile offenders violates article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution. However, the unconstitutional portion of the statute does not render the remainder of section 902.1(2)(a) unconstitutional.Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder as a juvenile offender. Defendant challenged his sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after serving a minimum term of twenty-five years confinement. Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that the sentencing scheme for juvenile offenders convicted of first-degree murder set forth in section 902.1(2) was cruel and unusual punishment under the Iowa Constitution. The Supreme Court held (1) section 902.1(2)(a)(1) is unconstitutional, but the remainder of section 902.1(2) is constitutional; and (2) Defendant’s case must be remanded for resentencing under State v. Roby, 897 N.W.2d 127 (Iowa 2017), which was decided subsequent to Defendant’s resentencing. View "State v. Zarate" on Justia Law

A premarital agreement waiver of attorney fees related to child or spousal support adversely affects the right to such support and, therefore, is unenforceable under Iowa Code 596.5(2).Here, Wife and Husband executed a premarital agreement waiving the right to seek an award of attorney fees in the event of a dissolution of their marriage. During the parties’ dissolution proceeding, Wife requested an award of attorney fees arising from litigating issues of child custody, child support, and spousal support. The district court denied the request for attorney fees, concluding that the waiver provision in the premarital agreement was enforceable. The court of appeals reversed with regard to the attorney fees issue, ruling that the waiver provision violated public policy and was unenforceable to the extent that the attorney fees arise from litigation of child-related issues. The Supreme Court vacated the portion of the court of appeals’ decision pertaining to attorney fees and affirmed the decision on all other issues, holding that the district court erred in relying on the attorney-fee-waiver provision in the parties’ premarital agreement to deny Wife’s request for support-related attorney fees. View "Erpelding v. Erpelding" on Justia Law

The court of appeals erred in ruling that a taxpayer avoided in Iowa inheritance tax through a private postmortem family settlement agreement (FSA).Here, the decedent, before his death, signed a beneficiary form listing the taxpayer as a contingent beneficiary of his brokerage account. That account transferred to the taxpayer upon the decedent's death. The Iowa Department of Revenue (IDOR) determined that the estate owed the inheritance tax on the full account value. The decedent’s grandchildren sued the taxpayer claiming that they were entitled to the brokerage account under the decedent’s will because the decedent lacked the mental capacity to execute an enforceable beneficiary designation for the account. The taxpayer settled the suit by transferring half the account value to the plaintiffs under an FSA. The taxpayer then sought a refund of part of the inheritance tax already paid. The IDOR denied a refund, determining that the taxpayer failed to establish incapacity. The district court affirmed. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the FSA controlled the tax issue. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the district court judgment, holding that, without an adjudication of incapacity, the FSA was not binding on the IDOR and could not avoid the inheritance tax. View "Nance v. Iowa Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s dismissal of Appellant’s motion to reinstate its application for postconviction relief (PCR), which the district court dismissed for want of prosecution under Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.944, holding that Lado v. State, 804 N.W.2d 428 (Iowa 2011) controlled this matter.In Lado, the Supreme Court held that PCR counsel was ineffective in failing to avoid dismissal of a PCR application under Rule 1.944 and that the error was structural. On appeal in the instant case, the court of appeals declined to consider Appellant’s Lado argument because it was raised for the first time in his reply brief. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals, reversed the orders of the district court, and remanded for further proceedings, holding that Appellant’s ineffective assistance argument should be considered for several reasons even though it was not raised until the reply brief. View "Villa v. State" on Justia Law

Under certain circumstances, Plaintiff’s counsel may depose defense counsel and obtain counsel’s prelawsuit work product.Plaintiff filed an administrative complaint charging Defendant, his former employer, with race discrimination. Defendant hired an attorney to investigate the claims and defend the company. Defendant filed an administrative position statement wherein it relied upon the investigation of the attorney it had hired to defend it to support its Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense. In the ensuing civil action, Defendant retained the same attorney and again raised the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense. Plaintiff sought to depose Defendant’s attorney and requested the attorney to provide notes from the previous investigation. Defendant moved for a protective order, claiming attorney-client privilege and work-product protection. The district court denied the protective order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, when an employer raises a Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense and relies upon an internal investigation to support that defense, the employer waives attorney-client privilege and nonopinion work-product protection over testimony and documents relating to the investigation. View "Fenceroy v. Gelita USA, Inc." on Justia Law

The district court order disqualifying an attorney from representing a criminal defendant, based primarily on speculative evidence of a potential conflict, constituted “an untenable ground for the district court to exercise its discretion.”The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court granting the State’s motion to disqualify attorney Steven Gardner from defending Carlos Ramon Mulatillo on felony drug charges. Less than two weeks before the jury trial was to commence, Mulatillo and Gardner were informed of the name of a confidential informant and the potential conflict of interest between Gardner and this individual. Gardner had previously represented the confidential informant for approximately one month on felony drug charges. After a Watson hearing, the district court concluded that there was a serious potential for a conflict of interest that precluded Gardner from representing Mulatillo. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence provided by the State did not rise to the level of substantial evidence that was necessary to prove that Gardner’s continued representation of Mulatillo created a serious potential for an actual conflict of interest. View "State v. Mulatillo" on Justia Law

The gestational surrogacy contract in the instant case was legally enforceable in favor of the intended, biological father against a surrogate mother and her husband who were not the child’s genetic parents.Plaintiffs were a married couple who signed a contract with Defendants, the surrogate mother and her husband. The surrogate mother was impregnated with embryos fertilized with the plaintiff-father’s sperm and the eggs of an anonymous donor. After one surviving child was born, Defendants refused to honor the agreement. Plaintiffs sued to enforce the contract and gain custody of the child. The district court concluded that the contract was enforceable, terminated the presumptive parental rights of the surrogate mother and her husband, established paternity in the biological father, and awarded him permanent legal and physical custody. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly established paternity in the biological father based on the undisputed DNA evidence, terminated the presumptive parental rights of Defendants and awarded permanent custody to the biological, intended father. A contrary holding invaliding surrogacy contracts would deprive infertile couples of the opportunity to raise their own biological children and limit the personal autonomy of women willing to serve as surrogates. View "P.M. v. T.B." on Justia Law

After Defendant’s initial sentence was voided for illegality, the district court resentenced Defendant to a new term of imprisonment. The district court originally suspended Defendant’s prison sentence and instead ordered a five-year term of probation. Upon resentencing, the court refused to credit the time Defendant spent on probation pursuant to the initial sentence against the new term of imprisonment. The Supreme Court held that the failure to award credit for the time spent on probation violated Defendant’s constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy under the Fifth Amendment. The court held that all time Defendant spent on probation pursuant to the voided sentence must be fully credited against a corrected sentence of incarceration because, when an initial sentence is voided for illegality, any punishments already endured must be credited against the corrected sentence. The dissent disagreed, arguing that probation should not be equated with punishment in the same way incarceration is considered for double jeopardy purposes. View "State v. Jepsen" on Justia Law

At issue was whether a conceded error in the admission of evidence in this criminal case was harmless.Defendant was charged with operating while intoxicated (OWI), third offense. During trial, the district court admitted, over Defendant’s objection, the results of Defendant’s breath test. The jury found Defendant guilty. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erroneously admitted the test result in light of Iowa Code 321J.5(2). On appeal, the State conceded that the test results should not have been admitted but that Defendant failed to preserve error below or, alternatively, any error was harmless. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that Defendant did preserve error and that the error was not harmless. View "State v. Ness" on Justia Law