Justia Iowa Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Jason Weitzel appealed the judgment and sentences entered on his guilty pleas to domestic abuse assault, possession of methamphetamine, carrying weapons, and operating while intoxicated. Defendant challenged the adequacy of his guilty plea colloquy, arguing the district court did not advise him about the statutory thirty-five percent criminal penalty surcharges, and this failure invalidated his guilty pleas. The court of appeals held the district court did not substantially comply with Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)(b)(2) during the guilty plea colloquy because it omitted information regarding the surcharges, and reversed. The State sought certiorari review, and the Iowa Supreme Court concurred with the appellate court that the district court did not substantially comply with rule 2.8(2)(b)(2) because it failed to inform the defendant about the mandatory thirty-five percent criminal penalty surcharges. Because of the district court’s noncompliance, defendant was entitled to withdraw his pleas. The case was remanded back to the district court for further proceedings. View "Iowa v. Weitzel" on Justia Law

West Central Cooperative was an agricultural cooperative owned by farmers. Westco Agronomy Co., L.L.C. was a wholly-owned subsidiary of West Central formed in 2005 for the purpose of streamlining delivery of agronomy products, including seed, fertilizer, and chemicals. In 2002, Westco hired Chad Hartzler to work in the agronomy division selling seed and eventually chemicals. He was later promoted to sales director but retained oversight of some of Westco’s largest accounts, including the Wollesens. A dispute arose over the relationships of these parties, resulting in a three-week jury trial and a substantial damages verdict in favor of the customer and against the cooperative. The Iowa Supreme Court limited its consideration of the case to three matters raised in the cooperative’s application for further review: (1) the district court properly denied the cooperative’s motion for new trial based on inconsistent verdicts; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the cooperative’s pretrial motion to have equitable issues tried first; and (3), with respect to the constitutionality of Iowa Code section 706A.2(5) (2011), the statute unconstitutionally shifts the burden to the defendant. Specifically, any person who provides property or services that end up being used to facilitate “specified unlawful activity” must prove his or her own lack of negligence to avoid liability. However, the Supreme Court found the burden-shifting provision contained in section 706A.2(5)(b)(4) could be severed from the rest of the statute. Accordingly, while the Court otherwise affirmed the district court, it reversed the district court’s dismissal of this claim. View "Westco Agronomy Company, LLC v. Wollesen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court finding that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear Appellant’s challenge under Iowa Code 822.2.Appellant, a prisoner, filed a postconviction-relief action asserting that the policy of the Iowa Department of Corrections unlawfully extended his time in prison by delaying the start date of the sex offender treatment program based on a sex offender’s tentative discharge date. The district court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the case. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding (1) this was not a case concerning subject matter jurisdiction but did, rather, involve authority to hear the case; and (2) the district court did have authority to hear this case. View "Franklin v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court dismissing Appellant’s amended application for postconviction relief.In his application for postconviction relief, Appellant alleged that, pursuant to Iowa Code 822.2(1)(a), his sentence violated several of his civil rights under the United States and Iowa Constitutions. Specifically, Appellant asserted that the Iowa Department of Corrections (IDOC) violated his liberty interest in obtaining parole by failing to provide the sex offender treatment program (SOTP) in a timely manner. The district court found, as a matter of law, that Appellant had not stated a claim for postconviction relief under section 822.2(1)(a). The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding that Appellant should be given an opportunity to amend his application to seek relief under Iowa Code 822.2(1)(e). View "Belk v. State" on Justia Law

This case, which turned on the issue of when Plaintiff’s causes of action accrued, must be reversed and remanded for a new trial because genuine factual disputes over the statute of limitations should be resolved by the factfinder.Plaintiff, Defendant’s brother, entrusted Defendant, his sister, with blank checks signed in advance to be used to pay bills of Plaintiff and his adult children while he was out of the country. When he returned, Plaintiff learned that Defendant had written many checks to herself. When Plaintiff asked for all of his money back, Defendant told him it had been spent. Brother sued. At issue was when Plaintiff’s causes of action accrued. If they accrued when Plaintiff learned Defendant had written checks to herself, his claims were time-barred. But if they accrued when Plaintiff was told the money was gone, they were timely. The district court declined to instruct the jury on the statute of limitations, and the jury returned a substantial damage verdict on several of Plaintiff’s legal theories. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court erred in not instructing the jury on statute of limitations at all. View "Shams v. Hassan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of second-degree murder. On appeal, Defendant claimed, among other things, that he was forced to use a peremptory strike to disqualify a potential juror who should have been disqualified for cause, and therefore, reversal was required even though the potential juror was not seated and there was no specific showing of prejudice. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the actual prejudice test of State v. Neuendorf, 509 N.W.2d 743 (Iowa 1993), rather than the automatic prejudice test of State v. Mootz, 808 N.W.2 207 (Iowa 2012), controlled in this case; and (2) consequently, Defendant could not succeed in this appeal. View "State v. Jonas" on Justia Law

The claims brought by the City of Eagle Grove alleging two properties owned by Cahalan Investments, LLC were abandoned and in an advanced state if disrepair and praying for a transfer of ownership from Cahalan to the City under Iowa Code 657A.10A fit within the public-nuisance exception recognized in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (Iowa 1992), and did not result in a taking requiring compensation to Cahalan.The district court dismissed the City’s petitions seeking ownership of the properties at issue in this case, concluding that the transfer of ownership without just compensation to Cahalan would constitute an unconstitutional taking. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that transfer of title to the two properties under section 657A.10A would not constitute a taking under the circumstances presented in this case, and therefore, there was no constitutional requirement of just compensation. View "City of Eagle Grove, Iowa v. Cahalan Investments, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained after an officer stopped his vehicle for being on a county access road after hours. The district court determined that Defendant violated Iowa Code 350.5 by entering the county access area after hours, regardless of whether there was a sign posted to identify the county access area or the park hours. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the officer did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant’s vehicle when it was on the county access road after hours because, without a proper posting of the closing time, the officer did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant; and (2) therefore, the district court should have suppressed any drug evidence found in Defendant’s vehicle. View "State v. Scheffert" on Justia Law

Iowa may constitutionally deny an inheritance tax exemption for bequests to stepchildren when the marriage between parent and stepparent was dissolved before the stepparent’s death, while granting an exemption when the marriage was not dissolved.The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court affirming the administrative ruling of the Iowa Department of Revenue denying an estate’s request for a tax refund. An administrative law judge rejected the decedent’s stepchildren’s protest challenging the denial of the tax refund on the ground that Iowa Code 450.1(1)(e)’s classification of stepchildren violated their equal protection rights under Iowa Const. art. I, 6. The district court affirmed the Department’s decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 450.1(1)(e) does not violate article I, section 6 of the Iowa Constitution because a rational basis exists for the legislature to exclude stepchildren postdivorce from the inheritance tax exemption for surviving spouses lineal descendants, lineal ascendants, and other stepchildren. View "Tyler v. Iowa Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the juvenile court adjudicating Child as one in need of assistance. The juvenile court specifically found that Father was imminently likely to abuse or neglect Child and that Child was immediately likely to suffer harmful effects due to Father’s failure to exercise a reasonable degree of care in supervising Child. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Father’s physical abuse against other family members did not establish that Child was at risk of imminent harm. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the juvenile court’s judgment, holding that, given Father’s history of domestic violence, combined with his lack of participation throughout this process, the juvenile court properly adjudicated Child a child in need of assistance based on the harmful effects Child was imminently likely to suffer due to Father’s domestic violence. View "In re L.H." on Justia Law