Justia Iowa Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Iowa Department of Transportation (IDOT) condemned a parcel of Landowner’s property to complete the construction of a highway. The compensation commission awarded Landowner $11,100 for the taking. Landowner filed a petition on appeal, arguing that, as a result of the taking, it could no longer use the remaining property for its business and, therefore, that IDOT’s taking left an uneconomical remnant. Landowner argued that the fair market value of the entire property before the condemnation - and thus the damage for the taking - was $200,000. The district court granted summary judgment for IDOT, concluding that Landowner’s petition was untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Landowner’s uneconomical remnant challenge was untimely, and therefore, the district court did not have the authority to consider that claim. View "Johnson Propane, Heating & Cooling, Inc. v. Iowa Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

Myria Holdings, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its primary place of business in Texas. Myria held an ownership interest in two subsidiaries doing business in Iowa. The Iowa Department of Revenue issued a final order concluding that Myria was ineligible to join a consolidated tax return with its subsidiaries because it did not derive taxable income from within Iowa under Iowa Code 422.33(1). The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Myria lacked a taxable nexus with the State of Iowa, and therefore, the Department correctly concluded that Myria lacked taxable income from within the State. View "Myria Holdings Inc. v. Iowa Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

In 2004, Gary Pettit pled guilty to third-degree sexual abuse and third-degree kidnapping, Pettit was incarcerated at the Anamosa State Penitentiary. In 2015, the Iowa Department of Corrections (IDOC) informed Pettit that he would be required to complete sex offender treatment. After a sex offender treatment program (SOTP) classification hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) affirmed the classification decision, concluding that Pettit was required to complete the SOTP. Pettit filed a petition for judicial review, claiming that the IDOC violated his due process rights by refusing to allow him access to counsel during the classification hearing. The district court determined that Pettit was entitled to counsel at the hearing. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded, holding that the district court did not have authority to review the classification hearing under Iowa Code chapter 17A. Remanded for dismissal of Pettit’s petition for judicial review. View "Pettit v. Iowa Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with driving while barred. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, which the district court denied. Defendant was subsequently convicted. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that a law enforcement officer, after making a valid traffic stop supported by reasonable suspicion that an offense may being committed, must terminate the stop when the underlying reason for the stop is no longer present. The Supreme Court agreed with Defendant and reversed, holding (1) when the reason for a traffic stop is resolved and there is no other basis for reasonable suspicion, Iowa Const. art. I, 8 requires that the stop must end; and (2) consequently, the law enforcement officer that stopped Defendant in this case violated Defendant’s rights under the Iowa Constitution. View "State v. Coleman" on Justia Law

DuTrac Community Credit Union owned a parcel of real estate in a commercial development. Kwik Trip, Inc. sought to purchase the property. During due diligence, Kwik Trip discovered that the property was subject to a restrictive covenant that required the approval by an architectural control committee before any building or other structure could be erected. DuTrac and Kwik Trip (Plaintiffs) sought a declaration that the restrictive covenant was unenforceable based on the doctrines of impossibility and supervening impracticability because one of the two members of the architectural control committee was deceased and the other member had eighteen resigned or refused to act on the Committee’s behalf. The district court granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the restrictive covenant cannot be enforced as written, and the modification proposed by Defendants was not practical, nor would it be effective to carry out the original purpose of the covenant. View "Dutrac Community Credit Union v. Radiology Group Real Estate, L.C." on Justia Law

Liberty Bank made five loans to the owner of real property (Property). Liberty Bank and five other banks entered into participation agreements related to the loan. Iowa Great Lakes Holding later defaulted on the loan, and the mortgage was extinguished. After the surrender and foreclosure, Liberty Bank and Central Bank entered into an agreement under which Central Bank acquired assets, including loans, from Liberty Bank. Liberty Bank conveyed the Property to a Central Bank affiliated entity via quitclaim deed. Central Bank then filed a declaratory action against Liberty Bank and the five participating banks seeking a ruling that it owned the Property free and clear of any interest of the participating banks. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that, under the participation agreements, Central Bank did not own the property in fee simple because Liberty Bank did not sell Central Bank a one hundred percent interest in the property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ownership interest of the participating banks in the mortgage and underlying collateral was superior to Central Bank, which claimed its interest was derivative of and limited to the interest held by Liberty Bank. View "Central Bank v. Hogan" on Justia Law

Patrick Alan Ney and John Glenn Ney were brothers with an acrimonious relationship. Patrick filed a petition for injunctive relief seeking a temporary injunction against John. The parties entered into a stipulation and agreement asking the district court to incorporate the terms of their agreement in an order for injunctive relief. The parties agreed that The court approved the terms of the agreement and issued an order incorporating the terms of the stipulated agreement. Patrick subsequently sought a contempt order against John for violation of the injunction. The district court dismissed the action on the ground that the injunction was void because the conduct it restrained was not among the grounds for which protective orders are statutorily authorized. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court had jurisdiction to issue the injunction. Remanded. View "Ney v. Ney" on Justia Law

In 2013, the citizens of Linn County approved a referendum to permit gambling games in the county. Thereafter, a county organization applied to the Iowa Racing and Gaming Commission for a license to operate a new gambling structure. The Commission denied the organization’s application. In 2015, Eugene Kopecky, a county resident, filed a petition for declaratory order with the Commission asking the Commission to answer questions regarding the criteria it may considering licensure decisions. The Iowa Gaming Association, an association comprised of eighteen existing gambling licensees, intervened because the answers to Kopecky’s questions would affect the existing licensees. The Commission then announced its decision. Relevant to this appeal, the Commission ruled that it may consider the economic effect of a new gaming operation on existing gaming facilities when deciding whether to issue a new gaming license. The district court affirmed the Commission’s declaratory order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the rule allowing the Commission to consider the economic effect of a new gaming operation on existing gaming facilities when deciding whether to issue a new gaming license is not “[b]eyond the authority delegated to the agency by any provision of law or in violation of any provision of law” under Iowa Code 17A.19(10)(b). View "Kopecky v. Iowa Racing & Gaming Commission" on Justia Law

The City of Waterloo entered into a contract to sell certain property to a development company and also entered into a development agreement with the development company. Taxpaying residents of the City filed a petition for writ of mandamus and temporary injunction requesting postponement of the sale on the ground that the transaction failed to comply with certain appraisal, notice, right-of-first refusal, and public bid requirements set forth in chapter 306 of the Iowa Code. Ultimately, the district court entered an order enjoining the City from selling or transferring the property without first following the procedures prescribed in Iowa Code 306.23. Thereafter, the City gave the notices of the intended sale under the preference statute. The Taxpayers sought to find the City in contempt for court for noncompliance with the statutory requirements of the notices. The district court concluded that the City’s notices of sale failed to comply with the statutory sales preference but found that the deficiencies did not amount to contempt. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the City violated the injunction but that the City did not act with the requisite willfulness to establish contempt. View "Hartog v. City of Waterloo" on Justia Law

For twenty-four years, Tenants lived on property owned by Owners. Tenants kept one horse on the property. Owners later served Tenants with a thirty-day notice seeking to terminate Tenants’ tenancy. Owners followed up with a three-day notice to quit and a forcible entry and detainer action. In answer, Tenants claimed that they had a farm tenancy and that Owners had not complied with the legal requirements for terminating a farm tenancy. The district court ruled that Owners had complied with the general requirements for terminating a tenancy at will and that Tenants’ decision to graze a single horse on the property was not enough to establish a farm tenancy and trigger the special termination protections of Iowa Code 562.5 through 562.7. The court therefore found that Owners were entitled to removal of Tenants from the premises. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that land which is not devoted primarily to the production of crops or the care and feeding of livestock cannot be the foundation for a chapter 562 farm tenancy. View "Porter v. Harden" on Justia Law